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DELEGATION AT THE FOUNDING
Julian Davis Mortenson & Nicholas Bagley*
This Article refutes the claim that the Constitution was originally
understood to contain a nondelegation doctrine. The Founding generation
didn’t share anything remotely approaching a belief that the constitutional
settlement imposed restrictions on the delegation of legislative power—
let alone by empowering the judiciary to police legalized limits. To the
contrary, the Founders saw nothing wrong with delegations as a matter
of legal theory. The formal account just wasn’t that complicated: Any
particular use of coercive rulemaking authority could readily be characterized as the exercise of either executive or legislative power, and was
thus formally valid regardless of the institution from which it issued.
Indeed, administrative rulemaking was so routine throughout
the Anglo-American world that it would have been shocking if the
Constitution had transformed the workaday business of administrative
governance. Practice in the new regime quickly showed that the Founders
had done no such thing. The early federal Congresses adopted dozens of
laws that broadly empowered executive and judicial actors to adopt
binding rules of conduct for private parties on some of the most
consequential policy questions of the era, with little if any guidance to
direct them. Yet the people who drafted and debated the Constitution
virtually never raised objections to delegation as such, even as they feuded
bitterly over many other questions of constitutional meaning.
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INTRODUCTION
Like a bad penny, the nondelegation doctrine keeps turning up. Its
persistence is puzzling. Apart from two cases in one exceptional year, the
Supreme Court has never relied on the doctrine to invalidate an Act of
Congress.1 Its reinvigoration would mark a radical break with constitutional practice and could entail the wholesale repudiation of modern
American governance. Yet some critics of the administrative state still
claim that the Constitution was originally understood to contain an
implicit bar on delegating legislative power. On their account, the zealous
1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315, 322 (2000)
(“We might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones
(and counting).”).
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application of a nondelegation doctrine is necessary to bring “a second
coming of the Constitution of liberty,”2 one consistent with the
Constitution’s original public meaning.3
These originalist arguments have recently found a receptive audience
at the Supreme Court. In Gundy v. United States, Justice Gorsuch penned a
long dissent bristling with citations to originalist scholars and calling on
the Court to revive the nondelegation doctrine.4 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas joined the opinion, and Justice Alito wrote separately to
signal his “willing[ness] to reconsider the approach we have taken for the
past 84 years.”5 Although Justice Kavanaugh didn’t participate in Gundy,
he issued a short opinion some months later suggesting his openness to
reviving the nondelegation doctrine.6 For the ﬁrst time in modern history,
a working majority on the Supreme Court may be poised to give the
nondelegation doctrine real teeth.
There can be no second coming, however, if there has never been
a ﬁrst. As a group, originalists advance widely varying versions of the
nondelegation doctrine, lending a decidedly protean ﬂavor to what is
supposedly a rock-hard historical fact. But none of the variants on offer
is supported by a serious review of the Founding Era evidence. There
was no nondelegation doctrine if legislative power is deﬁned as “the power
to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct governing future actions
by private persons.”7 There was no nondelegation doctrine if legislative
power is deﬁned as regulation of “those important subjects, which must be
entirely regulated by the legislature itself” rather than “those of less
2. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 18 Regul. 83, 84, 87 (1995)
(reviewing David Schoenbrod, Power Without Responsibility: How Congress Abuses the
People Through Delegation (1993)) (“[T]he odds on selling regulatory reform to Congress
are at this moment a good deal better than the odds on selling the nondelegation doctrine
to the Court.”).
3. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L. Rev. 327, 334–
35 (2002) (“[T]hose who reject a meaningful nondelegation doctrine . . . should not
pretend to speak in the name of the Constitution.”).
4. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–48 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
6. Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari) (“Justice Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points
that may warrant further consideration in future cases.”).
7. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Without resorting to reverseengineered exceptions that appear nowhere in the Founding discussions, neither Justice
Gorsuch’s thesis nor the other variants can be squared with the lack of a single
nondelegation objection to the early Congresses’ adoption of laws delegating the police
power in federal lands, the power to grant patents, the power to regulate all domestic
interactions with Native Americans, the power to impose embargoes, the power to impose
quarantines, and the power to determine direct taxes on real property. See infra sections
III.A, III.C. The claims are likewise incompatible with the fact that the norm entrepreneurs,
who eventually did start to press something resembling a nondelegation doctrine,
challenged not restrictions on private rights or decisions of great moment, but laws that
vested in the President the ability to site post roads or call a ﬁxed number of volunteers for
military service. See infra sections III.B–.C.
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interest,” the details of which may be “ﬁll[ed] up” by an exercise of
executive power.8 There was no nondelegation doctrine if legislative
power is deﬁned as “the power to make rules that b[i]nd or constrain[]
subjects.”9 There was no nondelegation doctrine if legislative power is
deﬁned as “the authority to make rules for the governance of society.”10
And there was no nondelegation doctrine if legislative power is deﬁned as
the “discretion . . . to decide what conduct would be lawful or unlawful.”11
In fact, the Constitution at the Founding contained no discernable,
legalized prohibition on delegations of legislative power, at least so long
as the exercise of that power remained subject to congressional oversight
and control.12 As we explain in Part I, originalists’ arguments to the
contrary bottom out on the insistence that the executive branch’s exercise
of certain highly discretionary powers is so legislative in nature that it
cannot constitute an exercise of the “executive power.”13 The executive
power, however, was simply the authority to execute the laws—an empty
vessel for Congress to ﬁll.14 As such, it’s not just confused but incoherent
8. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, “A Great Power of Attorney”: Understanding the
Fiduciary Constitution 118 (2017) (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43
(1825) (Marshall, C.J.)).
9. Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 83–109 (2014) [hereinafter
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?].
10. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s
Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1297, 1305, 1329 (2003) (offering a definition of legislative power but taking no position on whether legislative power is delegable).
11. Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 718, 744 (2019).
12. Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have advanced the only version of this
argument that we are aware of in the literature. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1721, 1762 (2002) [hereinafter
Posner & Vermeule, Interring]; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Nondelegation
Doctrine: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1331, 1342 (2003). But they “aren’t aware of
any comprehensive professional treatment of the history of the nondelegation doctrine, so
both the historical claims of nondelegation proponents and our discussion here should be
taken as tentative and revisable.” Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra, at 1732.
After they wrote those words, Professor Jerry Mashaw penned a skillful description of
the administrative schemes adopted by early Congresses. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering
American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 Yale L.J. 1256, 1292–
96, 1339–40 (2006) [hereinafter Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law].
Mashaw’s goal, however, was to demonstrate that administration was not foreign to
American law, and he addressed questions pertaining to the nondelegation doctrine—and
to the originalists’ arguments for such a doctrine—at a high level of generality. See id. In
2017, Professors Keith E. Whittington and Jason Iuliano supplied a detailed treatment of
the nondelegation doctrine for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Keith E.
Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev.
379, 381–423 (2017) (compiling an exhaustive dataset of cases that involved a nondelegation challenge between 1789 and 1940). This Article aims to do the same for the Founders.
13. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 3, at 334 (“[A] statute that leaves to executive (or
judicial) discretion matters that are of basic importance to the statutory scheme is not a
‘proper’ executory statute.”).
14. See Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal
Prerogative, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1169, 1235–37 (2019) [hereinafter Mortenson, Royal
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to ask whether an executive action is so legislative in nature as to fall
outside of that basket. Any action authorized by law was an exercise of
“executive power” inasmuch as it served to execute the law.15
As we demonstrate in Part II, much of the confusion arises because—
contrary to our modern turn of mind16—the Founders thought of the
separation of powers in nonexclusive and relational terms. No one
doubted, for example, that Congress wielded legislative power when it
passed a law. But the same act was also described as an exercise of executive
power, inasmuch as it was undertaken pursuant to authority entrusted by
the people.17 By the same token, it was common ground that a diplomat
participated in a legislative act when he concluded a treaty. But it was also
an exercise of executive power to the extent that the diplomat’s actions
were undertaken pursuant to authorization by the relevant domestic
authority.18
The Founders would thus have said that agencies wield legislative
power to the extent they adopt rules that Congress could have enacted as
legislation.19 At the same time, the Founders would have said—indeed,
they did say—that such rulemaking also constitutes an exercise of the
executive power to the extent it is authorized by statute.20 Either way, it’s
constitutional. Indeed, coercive administrative rulemaking was so routine
throughout the Anglo-American world that it would have been astounding
if the Constitution had prohibited it.21
But it did not. To the contrary, and as Part III shows, early Congresses
adopted dozens of laws that broadly empowered executive and judicial
actors to adopt binding rules of conduct. Many of those laws would have
run roughshod over any version of the nondelegation doctrine now
endorsed by originalists. Yet, in more than ten thousand pages of recorded
Prerogative]; Julian Davis Mortenson, The Executive Power Clause, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1269,
1336 (2020) [hereinafter Mortenson, Executive Power Clause].
15. See infra section II.B.
16. For a typical example of modern originalists’ misunderstanding of the Founding
framework, see, e.g., Ilan Wurman, Nondelegation at the Founding, 130 Yale L.J.
(forthcoming Mar. 2021) (manuscript at 28), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3559867 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Wurman, Nondelegation] (“Chief Justice
Marshall seems to have recognized that there is a category of ‘exclusively’ legislative
power . . . .”). For one admirable exception, see Alexander & Prakash, supra note 10, at
1318–20 (“Perhaps the President exercises legislative power (making laws) in the process of
exercising the executive power (executing the delegating statute).”).
17. See infra section II.B.1.
18. See infra section II.B.2.
19. Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The proper characterization of
governmental power should generally depend on the nature of the power, not on the
identity of the person exercising it.”). Professor Thomas Merrill has pressed a structural
argument along these lines. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From
Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2097, 2122–31 (2004).
20. See infra section II.B.
21. See infra section II.A.2.
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debate during the Republic’s ﬁrst decade, the people who drafted and
debated the Constitution rarely even gestured at nondelegation objections
to laws that would supposedly have been anathema to them—even as they
feuded bitterly and at punishing length over many other questions of
constitutional meaning.22 If the nondelegation doctrine had brooded
secretly in the interstices of the Constitution’s Vesting Clauses, it would
have precluded much early legislation and shown up repeatedly in
extensive debates. Its absence speaks volumes. As the 1790s wore on,
creative lawyers did very occasionally express their opposition to proposed
legislation in constitutional terms.23 But their arguments never carried the
day in legislative debates. Worse still for originalists, the objections were
directed at laws that would not violate any version of the nondelegation
doctrine on offer today.
Our conclusion is straightforward. The nondelegation doctrine has
nothing to do with the Constitution as it was originally understood. You
can be an originalist or you can be committed to the nondelegation
doctrine. But you can’t be both.
I. THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE AGAIN OF THE
MODERN NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
A.

Rise and Fall

The origins of the nondelegation doctrine are somewhat obscure.
Apart from the Supreme Court’s rejection of what might have been a
nondelegation argument in 1813,24 no claims even resembling the modern
doctrine appear in its case law until almost four decades after ratiﬁcation.25
Even then, Chief Justice Marshall’s famous dictum in the 1825 case of
Wayman v. Southard that “[i]t will not be contended that Congress can
delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly
and exclusively legislative,” is best read as a banal statement that Congress
22. See infra Parts II–III. The primary historical sources reviewed for this Article
include: the Annals of Congress, House Journals, and Senate Journals for the ﬁrst ﬁve
Congresses; the Documentary History of the First Congress; the preratiﬁcation state and
national records that are described in Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 14,
at 1306–09 & nn.169–193; and the contemporary political and legal theory literature that are
described in Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1187 n.63. For more on how
the Founders were inﬂuenced by the literature extant in their period, see id. at 1188–91.
23. See infra section III.C.
24. See Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813).
The statute in question suspended trade with Great Britain and France, but authorized the
President to lift the embargo if he determined that either country had decided to respect
the neutral commerce of the United States. Id. at 383–84. The Supreme Court did not
respond directly to the Brig Aurora’s argument that “Congress could not transfer the
legislative power to the President.” Id. at 386. It wrote only that “we can see no sufficient
reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the [law allowing
trade], either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.” Id. at 388.
25. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).
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could not permanently cut itself out of the constitutional design—
explaining why it was a clariﬁcation, not a contradiction, when Marshall
immediately went on to say that “Congress may certainly delegate to
others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”26
Something closer to the modern version of the nondelegation doctrine
began to crop up in state courts in the mid-nineteenth century, often in
connection with legislatively authorized referenda and assignments of
authority to municipal corporations.27 But the actual invalidation of
legislative enactments was rare in state courts and unheard of in federal
courts, as Professors Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano document:
“[T]here was never a time in which the courts used the nondelegation
doctrine to limit legislative delegations of power.”28 Not until 1892 did the
Supreme Court say that a law vesting the President with too much
discretion might constitute an unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power.29 Even then, however, the Court upheld the statute in
question.30
Over the next forty years, the Supreme Court continued to sustain
laws that delegated broad discretion to adopt obligatory rules affecting
private rights.31 In 1928, the Court took it as a given that “Congress may
use executive officers in the application and enforcement of a policy
declared in law by Congress, and authorize such officers in the application
of the Congressional declaration to enforce it by regulation equivalent to
law.”32 All Congress needed to supply, the Court said, was an “intelligible
principle” to guide the exercise of that authority.33
Which takes us to 1935, and the only two cases in which the Supreme
Court has struck down a federal law for violating the nondelegation

26. Id. at 42–43; see also Posner & Vermeule, Interring, supra note 12, at 1738–39
(advancing this interpretation of Wayman).
27. See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 12, at 422–24; see also Louis L. Jaffe, An
Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: II, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 561, 562–66 (1947).
28. Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 12, at 381; see also id. at 392–417 (providing an
exhaustive survey of the nondelegation doctrine in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
29. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity
and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.”).
30. Id. (concluding that the law in question “does not, in any real sense, invest the
President with the power of legislation”).
31. See, e.g., Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 48–49 (1939) (upholding a law enabling
the Secretary of Agriculture to set farm quotas); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287
U.S. 12, 21, 25–26 (1932) (sustaining a law granting the Interstate Commerce Commission
the power to approve consolidations “in the public interest”); United States v. Grimaud, 220
U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (rejecting a nondelegation challenge to grazing regulations adopted
by the Secretary of Agriculture for forest reserves).
32. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
33. Id.
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doctrine.34 In Panama Reﬁning Co. v. Ryan, the Court declared
unconstitutional a provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act
empowering the President to prohibit the transportation of any oil
extracted in excess of established quotas.35 And in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, the Court invalidated another provision in the same
Act authorizing the President to approve “codes of fair competition”
submitted to him by trade associations on issues ranging from labor
practices to minimum wages.36
In placing justiciable limits on Congress’s authority, the 1935 cases
were of a piece with the Supreme Court’s contemporaneous efforts to
cabin Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.37 And so the
Court’s reversal of its approach to the Commerce Clause in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. signaled a similar retreat from the nondelegation
doctrine.38 Already by 1940, the Supreme Court was rejecting a
nondelegation challenge to statutory authorization for a commission to set
coal prices “in the public interest.”39 That pattern held for the next eighty
years. As late as 2001, the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns unanimously concluded that a vague legislative standard in the

34. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935);
Panama Reﬁn. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the Court
invalidated a law that would have established minimum wages and maximum hours for coal
companies once those wages and hours were adopted by a sufficient fraction of the industry.
298 U.S. 238, 311–12 (1936). Though the Court voiced nondelegation concerns similar to
those in Schechter Poultry, the case has been taken to stand for the proposition that “it violates
due process for Congress to give a self-interested entity rulemaking authority over its
competitors.” Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 821 F.3d 19, 27–28 (D.C. Cir.
2016).
35. 293 U.S. at 430.
36. 295 U.S. at 541–42.
37. See Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges
in America, 1900–1940, at 59–60 (2014) (noting how the Court used both types of decisions
to signal “the depth of the Court’s opposition to the New Deal’s corporatist adventure”).
Indeed, Schechter Poultry rejected the codes of fair competition on both nondelegation and
Commerce Clause grounds. 295 U.S. at 542–51.
38. 301 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1937); see also John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 132
(1980) (“Coming along when it did, the nondelegation doctrine became identiﬁed with
others that were used in the early thirties to invalidate reform legislation, such as substantive
due process and a restrictive interpretation of the commerce power . . . when those
doctrines died the nondelegation doctrine died along with them.”).
39. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 397 (1940). At least two
other contemporaneous cases rejected similar nondelegation challenges. See Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (sustaining the Emergency Price Control Act’s
authorization of the Office of Price Administration to set prices that “will be generally fair
and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act” for commodities and rents
nationwide); Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 194, 226 (1943) (sustaining
against a nondelegation argument a law empowering the FCC to regulate “in the ‘public
interest, convenience, or necessity’”).
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Clean Air Act—“requisite to protect the public health”—was sufficiently
intelligible for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine.40
The nondelegation doctrine thus had no illustrious birth at the
Founding; it had no vibrant nineteenth-century adolescence; and its one
moment of glory in 1935 was bookended by repeated refusals to invalidate
laws vesting broad discretion in the executive branch. Forget the debate
over whether the nondelegation doctrine is dead. It was never alive to
begin with.
B.

And Rise Again

Yet here we are. In American Trucking, Justice Thomas wrote separately
to say that “[o]n a future day . . . I would be willing to address the question
whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our
Founders’ understanding of separation of powers.”41 Scholars immediately
took up his call to build an originalist case for the nondelegation doctrine.
In 2002, Professor Gary Lawson theorized that the nondelegation doctrine
is implicit in the Constitution’s division of legislative, executive, and
judicial power.42 For him, a law authorizing the executive branch to do
something that too closely resembles lawmaking is unconstitutional when
it purports to empower the executive to act outside its assigned sphere of
activity.43
Because Lawson’s claim was primarily structural, not historical,44
Professors Larry Alexander and Saikrishna Prakash were left to muster
evidence for the claim that the nondelegation doctrine has been with us
from the start.45 That evidence was heavy on citations to theorists like
Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone, but light on concrete evidence from
the Founding.46 Alexander and Prakash do draw on a handful of citations
to the Philadelphia Convention, several state conventions, and the
Federalist Papers to support the different and uncontroversial point that
“the legislative power was understood as the authority to make rules for

40. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 473–76 (2001).
41. Id. at 487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
42. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 333; see also Michael B. Rappaport, The Selective
Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New Approach to the Nondelegation
Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City of New York, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 265, 271 (2001)
(building an originalist argument for a version of the doctrine that applies “selectively” in
certain domains).
43. Lawson, supra note 3, at 342–43 (“However difficult it may be to distinguish the
legislative, executive, and judicial powers at the margins, the Constitution of 1788–89 clearly
places such a distinction at the center of its structure. There are constitutional lines that the
executive and judicial powers may not cross.”).
44. Id. at 395 n.263 (“I am more inclined to view [key constitutional] terms as having
an ‘essentialist’ meaning that does not depend on historical usage.”).
45. Alexander & Prakash, supra note 10, at 1310.
46. Id. at 1310–14.
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the governance of society.”47 As they forthrightly acknowledge, however, it
doesn’t follow from that observation that the Founders would have understood the Constitution to preclude the executive branch from making rules.48
The next installment in the campaign to give originalist bona ﬁdes to
the nondelegation doctrine came in Professor Philip Hamburger’s 2014
treatment, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 49 Hamburger argues that
modern administrative law constitutes an “extralegal” expression of
“absolute power” that is anathema to the Anglo-American legal tradition.50
To establish this proposition, however, Hamburger relies almost entirely
on selected medieval and early-modern English material and misunderstands not just its political and intellectual context, but the basic legal
framework in which it is embedded.51 More to the point, he only so much
as glances at the evidence of what the Founding generation actually said
about the original public meaning of the Constitution.52
Thin historical sourcing notwithstanding, the new wave of originalist
scholarship proved popular on the bench. In 2015, Justice Thomas wrote
a separate opinion that drew liberally from Hamburger in arguing that
“[w]e should return to the original meaning of the Constitution: The
Government may create generally applicable rules of private conduct only
through the proper exercise of legislative power.”53 The following month,

47. See id. at 1305, 1314–17.
48. See id. at 1329 (“[E]ven if one agreed with everything we have said, what remains
to be answered is the important question of whether the Constitution actually authorizes
the delegation of Congress’s legislative powers.”).
49. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9; see also Karen Orren &
Stephen Skowronek, The Policy State: An American Predicament 7 (2017) (arguing that “the
policy state” has “mangled [government’s] forms, helped polarize its politics, and eroded
confidence in its basic operations”).
50. See Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 6.
51. See, e.g., id. at 12–13, 21–33 (conﬂating the royal prerogative and statutory
powers). For a devastatingly polite demolition of Hamburger’s historical claims, see
generally Paul Craig, The Legitimacy of US Administrative Law and the Foundations of
English Administrative Law: Setting the Historical Record Straight (Oxford Legal Stud.
Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 44, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2802784 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Craig, Legitimacy of US Administrative Law]. For their
further exchange, see generally Philip Hamburger, Early Prerogative and Administrative
Power: A Response to Paul Craig, 81 Mo. L. Rev. 939 (2016); Paul Craig, English
Foundations of US Administrative Law: Four Central Errors 3, 40 (Oxford Legal Stud. Rsch.
Paper, Paper No. 3, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2852835 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Craig, Four Central Errors].
52. See Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 1547, 1551 (2015) (reviewing
Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9) (“If Hamburger were an
originalist in the conventional American sense, he would spend far more time on the
ordinary meaning of the text as of 1789 and on the ratiﬁcation debates, and far less time on
subterranean connections between the Stuart monarchs and German legal theory.”).
53. Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 86 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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then-Tenth Circuit Judge Gorsuch wrote an opinion of his own to similar
effect.54 Two years later, he was tapped for a spot on the Supreme Court.55
C.

Gundy v. United States

Formally, the Supreme Court in Gundy v. United States rejected a
nondelegation challenge to Congress’s conferral of authority on the
Attorney General to decide whether to apply provisions of a new sex
offender registry law to people who had been convicted prior to the law’s
enactment.56 Yet Justice Gorsuch’s dissent still managed to shock. It wasn’t
the fact that Justice Gorsuch was reiterating views about the nondelegation
doctrine that he had previously espoused on the Tenth Circuit, nor was it
that Justice Thomas joined him and that Justice Alito expressed openness
to the argument.57 It was that Chief Justice Roberts—whom many expected
to be more institutionally cautious—joined the opinion in full.58 If Justice
Kavanaugh or Justice Barrett is similarly inclined—and Kavanaugh has
already signaled that he may be59—the nondelegation doctrine may soon
become a genuine limit on Congress’s power to enlist agencies in the task
of governance.
That sort of countermajoritarian tampering with the cornerstone of
American governance could prove immensely destabilizing. Justice
Gorsuch’s opinion calls for abandoning the intelligible principle standard
in favor of a test that would distinguish between those statutes allowing the
executive to “ﬁll up the details” and those conferring policymaking
discretion.60 Were it to become law, Gorsuch’s approach would force
courts to make subjective and contestable judgments about what counts as
a detail and what counts as something more.61 Almost any statute could
ﬂunk a test that mushy. Indeed, it’s telling that Gorsuch’s thirty-three page
opinion doesn’t so much as cite to Whitman v. American Trucking, the
seminal nondelegation case of the modern era, even as it exhaustively
54. See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666, 670 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2015) (Gorsuch,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (citing to both Lawson, supra note 3, at
332 and Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 337).
55. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Conﬁrmed by Senate as
Supreme Court Justice, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/
us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
56. 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019).
57. See id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
58. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, John Roberts the Institutionalist?, Take Care (June 22,
2019), https://takecareblog.com/blog/john-roberts-the-institutionalist [https://perma.cc/
CS9Z-9HR4].
59. See Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 140 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the
denial of certiorari).
60. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
61. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[I]t is small wonder that we have almost never felt qualiﬁed to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or
applying the law.”).
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canvasses the rest of the nondelegation case law.62 It is hard to resist the
conclusion that Gorsuch thinks the Supreme Court botched American
Trucking and that the Clean Air Act should have fallen by the wayside.
Maybe the Supreme Court won’t pull the trigger. In Gundy’s wake,
canny observers argued that, as with the Commerce Clause, the Court
might issue one or two symbolic opinions invalidating statutes of little
importance, but it won’t have the stomach to do more.63 That may be right:
It’s hard to believe the Court will strike down cabinet agencies anytime
soon. At the same time, it seems fair to take the conservative justices at
their word. And if they do in fact mean what they say, Justice Kagan is right
that “most of Government is unconstitutional—dependent as Congress is
on the need to give discretion to executive officials.”64
The Court doesn’t have to invalidate many statutes to sow discord. By
claiming the power to draw arbitrary lines based on their own sense of
which delegations are acceptable, the Court would generate enormous
uncertainty about every aspect of government action. Nondelegation
lawsuits would proliferate, and their targets would be the agencies that
we’ve come to rely on for cleaner air, effective drugs, and safer roads.
Lower courts might enter injunctions, perhaps nationwide, against the
implementation of statutes they ﬁnd objectionable. Of perhaps greater
long-term consequence, the courts will be sorely tempted to narrowly
construe statutes to avoid newly perceived constitutional difficulties, which
would itself frustrate Congress’s ends. With an increasingly polarized
federal bench, it’s not difficult to imagine serious disruptions in basic
governance. In the meantime, the ever-present possibility of invalidation
on nondelegation grounds means that some legislative deals will be too
risky to be worth chasing, contributing to further gridlock in Congress.
Don’t discount, either, the diffuse ways that Supreme Court rhetoric about
the fundamental incompatibility of the administrative state with the
Constitution will warp the broader legal culture, with consequences that
are hard to pin down but which will probably not conduce to effective
governance.
This is radical stuff. To make it go down easier, Justice Gorsuch
appeals to originalism: “The framers understood . . . that it would frustrate
‘the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ if Congress could
merely announce vague aspirations and then assign others the

62. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137–41 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
63. Professor Gerard Magliocca called it “[t]he [c]oming Lopez [m]oment for [n]on[d]elegation.” Gerard Magliocca, The Coming Lopez Moment for Non-Delegation,
PrawfsBlawg (June 21, 2019), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2019/06/thecoming-lopez-moment-for-non-delegation.html [https://perma.cc/239Y-DNDR] (analogizing to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), which struck down a federal statute
banning guns in school zones on the ground that Congress had exceeded its authority under
the Commerce Clause for the ﬁrst time in almost sixty years).
64. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2130.
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responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its goals.”65 For support,
Gorsuch quotes Chief Justice Marshall’s dictum from Wayman v. Southard
before invoking John Locke’s argument that “[t]he legislative cannot
transfer the power of making laws to any other hands.”66
On the key point, that’s all there is. Though littered with assertions
about the Framers’ beliefs, the only actual quotes from historical sources
either speak generally to the undesirability of vesting all constitutional
powers in one body or recite the familiar reasons that the Constitution
makes legislating hard.67 None of the sources address whether the
Founders believed that a law passed by both houses of Congress and signed
by the President was unconstitutional if it delegated too much authority or
authority of the wrong kind. Instead, the opinion’s rhetorical force comes
from the invocation of modern thinkers who argue that delegation
threatens liberty and erodes accountability.68 If the Founders didn’t
believe in the doctrine, Gorsuch claims—quoting Lawson—“the ‘[v]esting
[c]lauses, and indeed the entire structure of the Constitution,’ would
‘make no sense.’”69 As the remainder of this Article shows, that simply isn’t
true.
II. BEFORE 1789
To show that there was no nondelegation doctrine at the Founding,
this Article reviews two comprehensive bodies of historical evidence. Part
II lays the groundwork with preratiﬁcation evidence about the background
understandings of legislative delegations. This includes the political and
legal theory literature on which the Founding generation was raised and
65. Id. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
66. Id. (quoting John Locke, The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government (1690), reprinted in Two Treatises of
Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration ch. XII, § 141, at 163 (Ian Shapiro ed.,
Yale Univ. Press 2003)). Gorsuch says that Locke was “one of the thinkers who most
inﬂuenced the framers’ understanding of the separation of powers.” Id. As Professor
Richard Primus has noted, however, Gorsuch “cites no authority for the proposition,” and
there is in fact reason to doubt it. Richard Primus, John Locke, Justice Gorsuch, and Gundy
v. United States, Balkinization (July 22, 2019), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2019/07/johnlocke-justice-gorsuch-and-gundy-v.html [https://perma.cc/2EMD-78BT] [hereinafter Primus,
Locke, Gorsuch, and Gundy].
67. See, e.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (saying that “the
framers understood” and that “[t]he framers understood, too”); id. at 2134 (referencing
the Framer’s intentions no less than nine times, including claims about what they
“insist[ed]” and “believed” “in their words,” and about how “the framers went to great
lengths” in “the framers’ design”); id. at 2135 (continuing to say that “[t]he framers warned
us” and “[a]s Madison explained,” including what “[t]he framers knew, too,” what “the
framers afforded [the judiciary],” and what both “Madison acknowledged” and “Chief
Justice Marshall agreed”); id. (“[T]he framers took this responsibility seriously . . . .”); id. at
2144 (tying these claims and “all the alarms the founders left for us” to the statute at issue).
68. See, e.g., id. at 2140 n.62.
69. Id. at 2134–35 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawson, supra note 3, at 340).
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in which its discussions were steeped, as well as evidence of judicial,
political, and legal practice during the period leading up to the ratiﬁcation
of the Constitution. Part III then compiles evidence on the actual political
practice of the new Republic under the ratiﬁed Constitution: what types of
delegations politicians considered, what they said about the proposals, and
the results of these deliberations.
In this Part, we begin with background understandings. Before the
Constitution was drafted and ratiﬁed, what would a reasonable North
American lawyer have thought about the permissibility of legislative
delegations under the salient legal customs, practices, and traditions?
Whichever variant is under discussion, originalist arguments for the
nondelegation doctrine all rest on one or both of two descriptive claims
about the Anglo-American legal order. First, nondelegation advocates
claim that the public at large in 1789 would generally have understood
that legislative power (or perhaps just aspects of it deemed core or
essential) could not be delegated.70 Second, nondelegation advocates
claim that certain activities—usually the formulation of coercive and
generally applicable rules—could not qualify as a valid exercise of
executive power.71
No version of either claim has ever been historically substantiated. To
the contrary, both are refuted by the preratiﬁcation evidence we have
compiled.72 As section II.B shows, eighteenth-century British legal and
political theorists thought legislative power simply meant the authority to
issue authoritative instructions—and they agreed that it could be
delegated by whoever happened to hold it. And as section II.C shows, it
was a perfectly intelligible move for eighteenth-century commentators to
describe the exercise of delegated rulemaking authority as executive. The
70. Id. at 2133 (“As Chief Justice Marshall explained, Congress may not ‘delegate . . .
powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.’” (quoting Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 42–43 (1825))); see also, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 10, at 1297
(noting commentators’ assumption that Congress’s “delegated power to make laws could
not be transferred to third parties”); Lawson, supra note 3, at 333–34 (“Justice Stevens is
wrong—and quite fundamentally wrong—to suggest that the Constitution contemplates
delegations of legislative power.”).
71. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between the
implementation of statutes “over matters already within the scope of executive power” and
statutes outside of that scope (quoting David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could
the Court Give It Substance?, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1223, 1260 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod,
The Delegation Doctrine])); Panama Reﬁning Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418–19 (1935)
(distinguishing “such a breadth of authorized action as essentially to commit to the
President the functions of a Legislature, rather than those of an executive or administrative
officer executing a declared legislative policy”); see also, e.g., Lawson, supra note 3, at 334
(“[A] statute that leaves to executive (or judicial) discretion matters that are of basic
importance to the statutory scheme is not a ‘proper’ executory statute.”); Wurman,
Nondelegation, supra note 16 (manuscript at 28) (noting regulatory authority can “be
characterized as executive power” if it “involve[s] mere matters of detail”).
72. For a description of the full range of historical materials on which our conclusions
in this Article are grounded, see supra note 22.
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Founders’ discussion of legislative and diplomatic service demonstrates
the error—indeed, the confusion—of insisting that any particular
government act must be classiﬁed as the exercise of one and only one
power.
A.

Methodology

Before plunging into the evidence, however, we offer a brief word
about methodology. Whatever else might be said for Justice Gorsuch’s
dissent in Gundy, the nondelegation doctrine is not a logically required
implication of the bare constitutional text. History is thus the linchpin of
the originalist case. Without it, the doctrine’s defenders are reduced to
ambitious textual arguments that are unpersuasive on their own terms73
and ﬂatly inconsistent with two centuries of established practice in the
United States.74 With it, they can plausibly resolve textual ambiguities by
pointing to common background understandings as a tiebreaker.
The original public meaning of constitutional text, however, can’t be
a secret or hidden meaning. For originalists to carry their argument, the
historical evidence ought to show that most everyone at the Founding
would have understood the Constitution to bar the delegation of too much
power or power of the wrong kind. Without such evidence, originalist
arguments reduce to the claim that speciﬁc provisions governing the
separation of powers—in particular, the allocation of executive, legislative,
and judicial authorities to different branches—imply a nontextual
nondelegation doctrine.75 But that’s no different from the argument—one
that originalists have traditionally delighted in excoriating—that the
speciﬁc constitutional provisions protecting privacy imply a general

73. For a typical example, see Lawson, supra note 3, at 333–43; see also supra notes 42–
48 and accompanying text. Endless ink has been spilt in rebuttal, demonstrating that the
constitutional text can easily be read to accommodate the practice of delegating to the
executive the power to make rules. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as
Ordinary Interpretation, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1939, 2019 (2011) (“Even though the resulting
agency regulation would look like a statute and carry the same legal force as one, nothing
in the text of the Constitution compels the conclusion that the agency is thereby exercising
delegated ‘legislative Power[].’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 1));
Merrill, supra note 19, at 2101 (arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits the
delegation of legislative power “in order to ‘carry[] into Execution’ the enumerated powers
granted to Congress” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 18)); Posner
& Vermeule, Interring, supra note 12, at 1723 (“A statutory grant of authority to the
executive isn’t a transfer of legislative power, but an exercise of legislative power.”).
74. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost
One Hundred Years of Administrative Law (2012) (documenting the establishment and
growth of the administrative state from the Founding).
75. See Manning, supra note 73, at 1945 (“By invalidating schemes . . . [because] they
offend a freestanding norm of strict separation, formalists undervalue the indeterminacy of
the Vesting Clauses relative to Congress’s authority to shape government under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. [This] attribute[s] . . . a speciﬁcity of purpose that the text
may not support.”).
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commitment to substantive due process.76 Penumbras for me, but not for
thee.77
Moreover, the evidence has to be both consistent and speciﬁc: If
originalists argue for a doctrine that applies only to rules binding private
persons, but not to those conferring “certain non-legislative
responsibilities” on the executive,78 there ought to be persistent evidence
that the Founders actually carved the world that way. It won’t do for
originalists to infer hard-edged legalized limitations on the political
process from ambiguous ﬁrst principles animating the constitutional
structure. Yes, the Framers were concerned about consolidated power.
And yes, they cared about public accountability. But it doesn’t follow that
they had well-developed views—or indeed views of any kind—about the
impropriety of laws that delegated excessive discretionary authority. Still
less does it follow that they would have agreed, even at a high level of
abstraction, about what counted as “excessive.” (Even modern-day
originalists can’t agree on that.)79
These are stern evidentiary demands. Fortunately, the Founding is an
evidence-rich environment. The Constitution emerged in a period of
extraordinary intellectual ferment in which the brightest minds in political
theory sought to reconcile the competing demands of popular
sovereignty, individual liberty, and energetic governance.80 It was debated
extensively at the Philadelphia Convention, in the press, and in the state
ratifying conventions.81 Nor did discussion end after the Constitution’s
adoption. Records of Congress’s proceedings in its ﬁrst decade run to
more than ten thousand pages, and a remarkable fraction consists of
debates over constitutional meaning.82
76. Cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721–25 (1997) (eschewing an
approach that would “deduce[] [rights] from abstract concepts” and instead requiring “a
‘careful description’” grounded in “concrete examples” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993))).
77. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). In dissent, Justice
Black explained the point as follows:
The Court talks about a constitutional “right of privacy” as though there
is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to
be passed which might abridge the “privacy” of individuals. But there is
not. There are, of course, guarantees in certain speciﬁc constitutional
provisions which are designed in part to protect privacy at certain times
and places with respect to certain activities.
Id. at 508 (Black, J., dissenting).
78. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text (canvassing some of the affirmative
theories offered by nondelegation theorists).
80. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American
Republic, 1788–1800, at 4–29 (1993).
81. Id.
82. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period: 1789–
1801, at 296 (1997) (“Congress and the executive resolved a breathtaking variety of
constitutional issues great and small, left us a legacy of penetrating and provocative
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What’s more, there were immense incentives to gin up half-baked or
even outright implausible constitutional objections. By 1791, Federalists
and Republicans had split into discernable political parties with sharply
divergent visions.83 Each came to see the other as an existential threat to
the country, with Republicans viewing Federalists as crypto-monarchists
and Federalists seeing Republicans as Jacobins who might spark another
bloody revolution.84 With stakes that high, policymakers did not hesitate to press ambitious and novel constitutional arguments in service of
their political goals. “The Constitution of this country,” one Federalist
observed, “is upon all occasions introduced as a stumbling-block in the
discussions of this House, and instead of forming any safe rule of conduct,
it proves a mere cobweb—a mere jargon of political maxims, and is the
foundation of sophisms in almost every debate.”85
So if the nondelegation doctrine really was a central precept of the
constitutional order, originalists ought to be able to point to consistent,
concrete, and speciﬁc evidence of its existence. The historical record of
the Founding Era is too rich and voluminous to require resort to any
heroic inferences. Yet there is triﬂing evidence of a nondelegation doctrine even being argued for by aggressive legal innovators, let alone broadly
accepted by the Founders as a group.86 Rather, contemporary political
theory and practice before the Founding both conﬁrm that broad delegations of all kinds of legislative authority were not only constitutionally
tolerable, but commonplace.
B.

Legislative Power Could Be Delegated

1. The Theory of Legislative Delegations Before 1789. — Though the
Constitution itself says nothing about the nondelegation doctrine, its
Vesting Clauses parcel out the executive, legislative, and judicial powers to
the three branches, each with distinct mechanisms of election or appointment.87 The Founders divided power in this manner because both their
own experience and the best political science of the era left them with
serious concerns about the excessive consolidation of governmental
authority.88

constitutional arguments, and developed a sophisticated glossary of the meaning of a whole
host of constitutional provisions.”); see also Jonathan Gienapp, The Second Creation 8
(2018) (“In the years immediately following ratiﬁcation, a great many debates—often those
in which the initial controversy was . . . much narrower—rapidly mutated into contests over
what the Constitution did or did not license.”).
83. Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 80, at 257–302, 691–754.
84. Id.
85. 8 Annals of Cong. 1732 (1798) (statement of Rep. Otis).
86. See infra Part III.
87. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1.
88. Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution 244–87 (1996).
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So far, this is common ground. The nondelegation doctrine’s
defenders, however, go further. They typically maintain, as Justice Gorsuch
did in his Gundy dissent, that “the framers understood” the legislative
power “to mean the power to adopt generally applicable rules of conduct
governing future actions by private persons.”89 And they typically assert
that the affirmative grant of this power to Congress necessarily means that
the Constitution categorically prohibits its redelegation to other
branches—though on their account, Congress may ask those branches “to
ﬁll up the details” so long as “Congress makes the policy decisions.”90
Both claims are mistaken. To begin with, the Framers did not think
that the legislative power had to involve the promulgation of “generally
applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”91
Indeed, the weirdly precise granularity of that deﬁnition would have left
them scratching their heads. The standard understanding of legislative
power was much simpler and far more pragmatic. As Baron de
Montesquieu explained, the legislative power was “no more than the
general will of the state.”92 This “general will” was most often explained by
analogy to the human mind, as in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s classic
extended metaphor:
Every free action has two causes which concur to produce it, one
moral—the will which determines the act, the other physical—
the strength which executes it. When I walk towards an object, it
is necessary ﬁrst that I should resolve to go that way and secondly
that my feet should carry me. When a paralytic resolves to run
and when a ﬁt man resolves not to move, both stay where they
are. The body politic has the same two motive powers—and we
can make the same distinction between will and strength, the
former is legislative power and the latter executive power.93
The most inﬂuential contemporary political theorists of the Framer’s era
simply wouldn’t have agreed with Justice Gorsuch’s narrow deﬁnition of
legislative power as the power to make binding rules of general
applicability for private persons. In the literature and political discussions
of the Founding, legislative power was both broader and simpler: “[T]hat,
89. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2136. Gary Lawson is perhaps the most ardent adherent of this view. See
Lawson, supra note 3, at 360–61.
91. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
92. 1 M. de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws bk. XI, ch. VI, at 201
(London, printed for T. Evans & W. Davis 1777) (“The other two powers may be given rather
to magistrates or permanent bodies, because they are not exercised on any private subject;
one being no more than the general will of the state, and the other the execution of that
general will.”). Montesquieu was a leading eighteenth-century political philosopher and
inﬂuential authority on the Founders. See Hank Burchard, Constitutionally Montesquieu,
Wash. Post (Nov. 10, 1989) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
93. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract bk. III, ch. 1, at 101 (Maurice Cranston
trans., Penguin 1968). Rousseau was, similarly, a foundational eighteenth-century political
philosopher. James J. Delaney, Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Internet Encyc. of Phil.,
https://iep.utm.edu/rousseau [https://perma.cc/T4BF-7F85] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
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which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be
employed for preserving the community and the members of it.”94 And
the authoritative exercise of that power was exercised through its
possessor’s “right . . . of making . . . the laws” to formulate that direction.95
But could that legislative power be delegated? Eighteenth-century
legal discussions regularly evince the presumption that competent persons
and institutions could delegate their authorities to agents, and that those
agents would then exercise those authorities both on behalf and under the
ultimate supervision of the original principal.96 Where a limitation on
delegation existed, it was noted with particularity and explained by some
speciﬁc justifying consideration relevant to the circumstance.97 The
94. John Locke, The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent,
and End of Civil Government (1690) [hereinafter Locke, Second Treatise], reprinted in
Two Treatises of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration ch. XII, § 143, at 164
(Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter Two Treatises of Government]
(arguing that antecedent natural law requires this power to be exercised through standing
laws rather than arbitrary decrees); see also, e.g., Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan pt. II, ch. 20,
at 158 (Oxford Univ. Press 1952) (1651) (“It belongeth therefore to the Soveraigne to bee
Judge, and to præscribe the Rules of discerning Good and Evill: which Rules are Lawes; and
therefore in him is the Legislative Power.”); Thomas Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law
bk. II, ch. IV, § X, at 280 (2d Am. ed., Baltimore, William Neal & Joseph Neal 1832) (1754)
(“It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common understanding, or joint
sense of the body politic, to determine and direct what is right to be done . . . .”).
95. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *146 (describing “the supreme magistracy,
or the right both of making and of enforcing the laws”); see also Jean Louis de Lolme, The
Constitution of England; Or, an Account of the English Government ch. IV, at 55 (Knud
Haakonssen & David Lieberman eds., Liberty Fund 2007) (1784) (“[T]he Legislative power
belongs to Parliament alone; that is to say, the power of establishing laws, and of abrogating,
changing, or explaining them.”); Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Principles of the
Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns bk. I, ch. III,
§ 34, at 95 (Knud Haakonssen, Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008)
(1797) (“[T]o make laws both in relation to the manner in which it desires to be governed,
and to the conduct of the citizens:—this is called the legislative power.”); The Federalist No.
33, at 159 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“What is a power, but the ability
or faculty of doing a thing? . . . What is a legislative power, but a power of making laws?”);
Montesquieu, supra note 92, at bk. 11, ch. 6, at 198 (“By virtue of the [legislative power],
the prince or magistrate enacts temporary or perpetual laws, and amends or abrogates those
that have been already enacted.”); cf. 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States ch. XXIV, § 1237, at 137 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891)
[hereinafter Story, Commentaries on the Constitution] (“What is a legislative power, but a
power of making laws?”).
96. For just one example, see, e.g., 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *453 (“[T]he
father . . . may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or
schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco parentis . . . .”).
97. See, e.g., Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King ch. 17, at 180 (D.E.C. Yale
ed., Selden Soc’y 1976) (17th century AD) (“Therefore we shall consider the king’s power
of judicature under these two notions, viz. (1) What points of judicature or decision he
himself may personally execute. (2) In what manner he may transfer the exercise of
jurisdiction.”); Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. 1, ch. II, § IX, at 19 (“Some of our rights are
alienable, others are unalienable. Those rights are alienable which the law does not forbid
us to part with. Those only are unalienable which we cannot part with consistently with the
law.”).
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question becomes, then, whether legislative authority was such an exception to the general delegability of legal authorities.
Far from supporting such an exception, the legal and political theory
of the era refutes it. Conventional wisdom held that “all lawful authority,
legislative, and executive, originates from the people.”98 For the Founders,
in other words, government’s very existence meant that the “original
legislative power” had already been delegated.99 Founder, Justice, and
Federalist James Wilson sketched the standard story:
All these powers and rights, indeed, cannot, in a numerous and
extended society, be exercised personally; but they may be
exercised by representation. One of those powers and rights is to
make laws for the government of the nation. This power and
right may be delegated for a certain period, on certain
conditions, under certain limitations, and to a certain number of
persons.100
From the outset, then, the Founders’ account of government itself belies
flattened modern claims that there was anything intrinsically nondelegable
about any portion of the legislative power. The people already delegated it
once.
Originalists must therefore be arguing for a non-re delegation principle:
Once conveyed to a representative agent, the argument must go, the
legislative power cannot then be passed further down the line. And some
proponents have indeed made arguments along these lines. Professors
Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman, for example, have recently built on
Professor Robert Natelson’s research to claim that the eighteenth-century
private law of ﬁduciary duties proves that constitutional governance
authorities cannot be redelegated.101 As Hamburger explains the argument: “[T]he concept of delegation actually shows that Congress cannot
subdelegate its lawmaking power. Under agency law . . . [t]he initial

98. James Burgh, Political Disquisitions bk. I, ch. II, at 3–4 (London, printed for E. &
C. Dilly 1774) (“In governors, it may be compared to the reﬂected light of the moon; for it
is only borrowed, delegated, and limited by the intention of the people, whose it is, and to
whom governors are to consider themselves as responsible, while the people are answerable
only to God . . . .”).
99. See Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. II, ch. IV, § IV, at 286 (“There is, indeed, an
original legislative power in every civil society; but some farther act is necessary, besides the
mere union into such a society, before this power can be naturally vested in any one part of
the society exclusive of the rest . . . .”); see also, e.g., Obadiah Hulme, An Historical Essay
on the English Constitution ch. I, at 6 (London, printed for Edward & Charles Dilly 1771)
(“For this reason, they never gave up their natural liberty, or delegated their power, of
making laws, to any man, for a longer time than one year.”).
100. James Wilson, Lectures on Law ch. V, at 557 (1791) [hereinafter Wilson, Lectures
on Law], reprinted in 1 Collected Works of James Wilson 427, 557 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark
David Hall eds., Liberty Fund 2011) [hereinafter Collected Works].
101. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 8, at 113–14.
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delegation . . . implies potestas delegata non potest delegare—that delegated
power cannot be further delegated.”102
It is hard to overstate the ahistoricity of this claim.103 To begin with,
the entire argument-by-analogy hinges on the proposition that non potest
delegare was a well-known and uncontroversial proposition of eighteenthcentury private law. But the sourcing even for the private law claim is thin.
Natelson cites two eighteenth-century law treatises and three English cases
from 1755, 1668, and 1613.104 Lawson and Seidman cite a trio of American
agency law treatises from the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century.105 And
Hamburger cites an agency treatise from 1889 and two Supreme Court
cases from 1831 and 1850.106 It should go without saying that sweeping
assertions about widely shared (let alone undisputed) understandings
should not rest on such scanty source material.
More to the point, these authors cannot point to any evidence that
the private law agency analogy should govern constitutional
interpretation. In the tens of thousands of pages of searchable archival
material from the Continental Congress, from the drafting and ratiﬁcation
of the Constitution, and from the records of the ﬁrst ten years of Congress,
we have not been able to ﬁnd a single appearance of the phrase “delegata
potestas non potest delegari” or any variant thereof.107 The ﬁrst mention
of anything approximating the principle in the United States federal and
state case reports was not until 1794.108 It is not just that modern authors
have offered “virtually no evidence” to suggest that the analogy had any
purchase at the Founding.109 So far as we can tell, there is no such
102. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 386.
103. For a thorough-going dismantling of the claim in a broader context, discussing the
lack of evidence that the Founders ever actually thought of the Constitution on a power-ofattorney model, see generally Richard Primus, The Elephant Problem, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub.
Pol’y. 373 (2019) [hereinafter Primus, The Elephant Problem].
104. See Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 239, 260–61
(2006) (supporting this claim by citing three English cases; Matthew Bacon, A New
Abridgment of the Law (John Exshaw ed., 5th ed. 1786); and Charles Viner, A General
Abridgment of Law and Equity (2d ed. 1791)).
105. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 8, at 113–14. Lawson and Seidman cite: 1
Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law (1730); 2 James Kent, Commentaries on
American Law (1827); 1 Samuel Livermore, A Treatise on the Law of Principal and Agent
and of Sales by Auction (1818); and Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency, as
a Branch of Commercial and Maritime Jurisprudence (1844).
106. See Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 386 (citing
Warner v. Martin, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 209 (1850); Shankland v. Washington, 30 U.S. 390, 395
(1831); Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise of the Law of Agency 12 (1889)).
107. For the databases searched, see supra note 22.
108. At least that we’ve been able to ﬁnd. See Hughes v. Giles, 2 N.C. 26, 26 (1794)
(resolving the contested ownership of a horse following a double sale by a faithless bailee).
109. See Primus, The Elephant Problem, supra note 103, at 373, 382 (“[T]here is no
indication that opponents of extensive federal power used the power-of-attorney frame to
make their arguments . . . . If the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted with the
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evidence, certainly not with respect to the question of delegated governance authority.
To the contrary, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers
reliably embraced not just the logic but the necessity of delegation.
Certainly this was the case with executive authority, as with Locke’s
explanation that vesting the executive power in a single person means “he
has in him the supreme execution, from whom all inferior magistrates
derive all their several subordinate powers, or at least the greatest part of
them.”110 It was equally true of judicial authority, as with Blackstone’s
observation that “our kings have delegated their whole judicial power to
the judges of their several courts.”111
So if all three functional powers have already been delegated once by
the people, and if executive and judicial powers could both be
redelegated, then why would the legislative power be any different? The
answer is that it wasn’t. To the contrary: Absent express derogation from
the principle, legislative authority was every bit as susceptible to redelegation as its executive and judicial siblings.112 The Whig hero Algernon
Sidney observed, for example, that while the King “can [not] have the
Legislative power in himself,” the legislative branch could choose to give
him the “part in it” that “is necessarily to be performed by him, as the Law
prescribes.”113 And when legislative power was exercised pursuant to such
restrictive tools applicable to powers of attorney was mainstream in 1788, [then this] is hard
to explain . . . .”).
110. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 94, ch. XIII, § 151, at 167.
111. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *267; see also, e.g., 3 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *56 (“For, as the barons of parliament were constituent members of that
court; and the rest of its jurisdiction was dealt out to other tribunals, over which the great
officers who accompanied these barons were respectively delegated to preside . . . .”);
Edward Coke, Part Twelve of the Reports (1660), reprinted in 1 The Selected Writings of
Sir Edward Coke 418, 431 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (reporting the observation in Floyd
v. Barker (1607), 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (KB), that “for this, that he himself cannot do it to all
persons, he delegates his power to his Judges, who have the Custody and Guard of the King’s
oath”).
112. Indeed, the eighteenth-century understanding of legislative power refutes claims
that nondelegation doctrine is simply a matter of identifying that which is legislative power
and then prohibiting its delegation. The fact that legislative power was simply the power to
issue authoritative instructions, see supra text accompanying notes 94–99, makes it a facially
unworkable theory of government to claim that it was a categorically nondelegable authority.
113. Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government ch. III, § 46, at 459 (London
1698); see also David Hume, Essay XIV: Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences
(1787) [hereinafter Hume, The Rise of Arts and Sciences], reprinted in Essays Moral,
Political, and Literary 111, 115–16 (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987) (describing primitive
governance regimes under which “the monarch, ﬁnding it impossible, in his own person,
to execute every office of sovereignty, in every place, must delegate his authority to inferior
magistrates”); cf. Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of Universal Jurisprudence
bk. I, at 212 (Thomas Behme & Knud Haakonssen eds., William Abbott Oldfather trans.
1931, Liberty Fund 2009) (1672) [hereinafter Pufendorf, Elements of Universal
Jurisprudence] (“[T]he supreme sovereignty promulgates the law, either with his own voice,
or through the instrumentality of those who have been delegated by him.”). Blackstone
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delegation, its boundaries were deﬁned by the breadth or speciﬁcity of that
grant: As philosopher David Hume explained, “every minister or
magistrate . . . must exert the authority delegated to him after the manner,
which is prescribed.”114
Many Founders explicitly affirmed this understanding that legislative
power could be redelegated just like any other. As James Wilson explained
shortly after ratiﬁcation:
Representation is the chain of communication between the
people and those, to whom they have committed the important
charge of exercising the delegated powers necessary for the
administration of publick affairs. This chain may consist of one link,
or of more links than one; but it should always be sufficiently strong
and discernible.115
Other Americans likewise took for granted that such redelegations were
legally valid. During the rising constitutional standoff of the 1760s, for
example, the pamphleteer Aequus argued that “[t]he delegation” by Britain
“of a legislative power to the colonies” should under the circumstances
be considered “as exclusive of all parliamentary participation in the proper

made a similar point about the Crown’s delegated legislative authority, noting that “[a]
proclamation for disarming papists is . . . binding, being only in execution of what the
legislature has ﬁrst ordained.” 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *270–71. He expressly
contrasted that kind of delegated authority from assertions of intrinsic legislative authority:
“[A] proclamation for allowing arms to papists, or for disarming any protestant subjects, will
not bind; because the ﬁrst would be to assume a dispensing power, the latter a legislative
one; to the vesting of either of which in any single person the laws of England are absolutely
strangers.” Id.
114. Hume, The Rise of Arts and Sciences, supra note 113, at 125 (describing “civilized
monarchy”). That’s why he objected so strongly to Parliament’s infamously open-ended
grant of full powers to Henry VIII in 1539—not only because they “gave to the king’s
proclamation the same force as to a statute enacted by parliament,” but also because they
“framed this law, as if it were only declaratory, and were intended to explain the natural
extent of royal authority.” 3 David Hume, The History of England, from the Invasion of
Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688, at 266–67 (Liberty Fund 1983) (1778).
115. Wilson, Lectures on Law, supra note 100, ch. XI, at 721 (emphasis added). That’s
why he agreed that “[w]hen the Parliament transferred legislative authority to Henry VIII,
the act transferring could not in the strict acceptation of the term be called
unconstitutional.” James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787)
(notes of Thomas Lloyd), reprinted in 2 Documentary History of the Ratiﬁcation of the
Constitution 350, 361 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H.
Schoenleber & Margaret A. Hogan eds., digital ed. 2009) [hereinafter Documentary
History]; see also 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *271 (“[The statute] enacted, that
the king’s proclamations should have the force of acts of parliament . . . which was
calculated to introduce the most despotic tyranny; and which must have proved fatal to the
liberties of this kingdom, had it not been luckily repealed [under] his successor, about ﬁve
years after.”); James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787) (notes
of Alexander J. Dallas), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra, at 340, 348 (“So that
when that body was so base and treacherous to the rights of the people as to transfer the
legislative authority to Henry VIII, his exercising that authority by proclamations and edicts
could not strictly speaking be termed unconstitutional . . . .”).
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subjects of their legislation.”116 And of course the Continental Congress
only possessed legislative power because the several states had delegated
that power to it.117 While it might not always be wise for the legislature
to delegate its rulemaking authority, Benjamin Franklin observed,
“[C]ertainly in particular Cases it may.”118 And so commentators criticizing particular delegations of avowedly legislative authority would follow
the likes of the British politician Edmund Burke,119 the French statesman
Jacques Turgot,120 and the American lawyer James Kent121 in casting aspersions on the particular policy without ever suggesting that it was impermissible for a legislature to thereby “confer[] on the [executive branch’s]
proclamations the force of law.”122 And let’s be clear: All the legislative bills
criticized on these policy grounds were enacted as law. So much for a
longstanding and deeply entrenched Anglo-American understanding.

116. Aequus, From the Craftsman, Mass. Gazette & Bos. Newsl., Mar. 6, 1766, reprinted
in 1 American Political Writing During the Founding Era, 1760–1805, at 62, 64 (Charles S.
Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983) [hereinafter American Political Writing] (“[H]ave
not the royal charters been granted . . . delegating to them the before-mentioned qualiﬁed
power of legislation?”).
117. For more on state delegation as the source of the Continental Congress’s legislative
power, see infra text accompanying notes 132–133.
118. Benjamin Franklin, A Dialogue Between X, Y, and Z, Pa. Gazette, Dec. 18, 1755,
available at Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Franklin/01-06-02-0131 [https://perma.cc/PX5G-UP7J] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020) (discussing
the Pennsylvania militia bill). The dialogue reads, in part:
Y. But can it be right in the Legislature by any Act to delegate their
Power of making Laws to others?
X. I believe not, generally; but certainly in particular Cases it may.
Legislatures may, and frequently do give to Corporations, Power to make
By Laws for their own Government. And in this Case, the Act of Parliament
gives the Power of making Articles of War for the Government of the Army
to the King alone, and there is no Doubt but the Parliament understand
the Rights of Government.
Id. The law under discussion was enacted. See id. at n.8 (editor’s note).
119. See Edmund Burke, Speech on Mr. Fox’s East India Bill (Dec. 1, 1783), in 4 Select
Works of Edmund Burke 93, 161 (Francis Canavan ed., 1999) [hereinafter Select Works]
(“The whole subordinate British administration of revenue was then vested in a committee
in Calcutta . . . . [T]o this committee were delegated . . . [the functions] of the supreme
administration of revenue . . . . By the new scheme they are delegated to this committee,
who are only to report their proceedings for approbation.”).
120. A Letter from M. Turgot, late Comptroller-General of the Finances of France (Mar.
22, 1778), translated in Richard Price, Observations on the Importance of the American
Revolution, and the Means of Making It a Beneﬁt to the World 107, 116 (London, printed
for T. Cadell 1785) (“They even delegate authority to executive bodies, and to Governors,
to prohibit the exportation of certain commodities on certain occasions.”).
121. James Kent, A Country Federalist, Poughkeepsie Country J., Dec. 19, 1787,
reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 430, 434 (“[U]nder Henry the
8th . . . the House was composed of a most abject set of slaves, who by a single act the most
extraordinary that ever was recorded, conferred on the King’s proclamations the force of
law.”).
122. Id.
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2. The Practice of Legislative Delegations Before 1789. — The theory we
have canvassed so far was amply reﬂected in practice. Indeed, anyone who
spends serious time in the line-level historical materials will be struck by
the sheer ubiquity of delegation as a standard mode of governance.
Certainly British constitutionalism had a long-established practice of
delegating legislative authority—or “secondary legislation,” as it is called
nowadays.123 Easily the broadest (and most notorious) such delegation was
a 1539 statute in which Parliament authorized the King to “set forth
proclamations under such penalties and pains as to him and them shall
seem necessary, which shall be observed as though they were made by act
of parliament.”124 Even after the effective establishment of parliamentary
supremacy in the years following 1688, however, such delegations of
legislative power “continued[,] as Parliament came to appreciate both its
convenience and its necessity amidst wars, disease outbreaks, and social
changes.”125 There were many “prominent instances of rulemaking power
accorded to administrators by Parliament from the sixteenth century
onwards, much of which occurred during the period before the American
revolution.”126 In one example of particular relevance to the Founders,
municipal authorities thought it obvious that the colonial assemblies’
legislative power necessarily rested on a delegation from some British
source.127
123. Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government 59–60 (1995) (“By secondary legislation is
meant ‘every exercise of a power to legislate conferred by or under an Act of Parliament’.”
(quoting Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation, Report, 1971–1972, HL 184, HC 475
(UK))).
124. An Act that Proclamations Made by the King’s Highness with the Advice of His
Honourable Council Shall Be Obeyed and Kept as Though They Were Made by Act of
Parliament 1539, 31 Hen. 8 c. 8 (providing only the limit that “this shall not be prejudicial
to any person’s inheritance, offices, liberties, goods, chattels or life,” other than as
punishment for failure to comply). The phrase “Henry VIII Clause” is standard usage in
British constitutional discourse to this day. See, e.g., Henry VIII Clauses, UK Parliament,
https://www.parliament.uk/site-information/glossary/henry-viii-clauses
[https://perma.cc/7U9X-HSZF] (last visited Oct. 8, 2020).
125. Robert C. Sarvis, Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative
Power, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 317, 320 (2006); see also Cecil T. Carr, Delegated Legislation: Three
Lectures 48–56 (1921) (describing successive delegations of power by Parliament). For
more context on statutory reform in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see David
Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century
Britain 179–98 (1989) (describing successive reform programs).
126. Craig, Legitimacy of US Administrative Law, supra note 51, at 19–27 (canvassing
examples of extraordinarily broad delegations of rulemaking authority over commercial
regulations, environmental law, welfare beneﬁts, and excise).
127. The only real question from the domestic British perspective was whether the
colonial authorities’ legislative power was grounded in an indirect delegation from
Parliament or whether it “abide[d] in them solely . . . by virtue of a charter” from the Crown.
John Adams, Novanglus: Or, a History of the Dispute with America, from Its Origin, in 1754,
to the Present Time (1774), reprinted in 4 The Works of John Adams, Second President of
the United States 3, 111 (Charles C. Little & James Brown eds., 1851) (quoting a
seventeenth-century Massachusetts governor’s claim taking the latter position).
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Legislative delegations were a persistent feature of colonial and postindependence state governance in North America as well. Historians
have explained that the Virginia legislature, for example, “delegated
many special powers” to the governor and Council of State, including the
authority “to direct recruiting, training, equipping, provisioning, and
utilization of troops and seamen”; to restrict “counterfeiting, and the
engrossment of essential war commodities”; to supervise “the
commonwealth’s lead mines, land office, and navy”; and even “to maintain
fair prices.”128 The Maryland Assembly once refused to approve a bill
imposing speciﬁc rules on pilotage in Maryland harbors because it thought
“the whole business relative to that subject ought to be put under the
control of the executive, by an act of the general assembly, that would
comprehend all other ports in [the] state.”129 (The Maryland Senate
immediately agreed, and the offending statutory speciﬁcations were
stricken.)130 Maryland went so far as to delegate its legislative power of
eminent domain to the federal commissioners responsible for establishing
“the permanent seat of the government of the United States,” where use
of that power was “proper and necessary” for “the erection of public
buildings, and for other public purposes.”131 And the whopper of all state
delegations was their adoption of the Articles of Confederation, which
“expressly delegated” an enormous range of legislative authorities from
the states to the national government.132 As Alexander Hamilton put it, “If
the [New York] constitution forbids the grant of legislative power to the
union,” then a wide range of authorities granted by the Articles of
Confederation “are illegal and unconstitutional, and ought to be
resumed.”133 But they weren’t, because it didn’t.

128. Session of Virginia Council of State (Jan. 14, 1778) (editorial note), available at
Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/0101-02-0065 [https://perma.cc/8XYP-RQ9D] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
129. Votes and Proceedings of the S. of the State of Maryland 75 (May 30, 1783) (online
ed. 2009) (message by the House of Delegates).
130. Id. at 76 (message by the Senate) (returning an amended bill, “having left out the
parts relative to pilots and pilotage agreeably to your message”).
131. An Act to Condemn Land, if Necessary, for the Public Buildings of the United
States, 204 Md. Laws Sess. 199, ch. 44 (1790) (“[T]he commissioners . . . are authorised to
order the [local] sheriff [to summon a jury to establish the value of land]; and thereupon
the owners of the said land shall be entitled to receive such valuation; and after such inquest,
the said land shall for ever belong to the United States.”).
132. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. II (“Each State retains its Sovereignty,
freedom and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this
confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.”).
133. Alexander Hamilton, New York Assembly: Remarks on an Act Granting to Congress
Certain Imposts and Duties (Feb. 15, 1787), in 4 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 71, 75–
76 (Harold C. Syrett ed., digital ed. 2011) [hereinafter The Papers of Alexander Hamilton]
(“If, on the contrary, those authorities were properly granted, then it follows that the
constitution does not forbid the grant of legislative power . . . .”); see also Votes and
Proceedings of the S. of the State of Maryland 84 (Mar. 11, 1786) (online ed. 2009) (message
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The Continental Congress, which set the most salient national
precedents, delegated legislative authority by the bucketload.134 Delegates
experimented constantly with bureaucratic mechanisms for developing
regulatory schemes on subjects that ranged from the national postal
service,135 to a proposal for the provision of medical services,136 to the
settlement of the national accounts.137 Organizing the national territories prompted the creation of even more complex bureaucracies,
with even more open-ended grants of legislative authority. The Illinois
Commissioner, for example, was given authority to issue “decrees” on
topics ranging from property rights and real estate regulation to the
promotion of “Justice harmony and industry.”138 The Northwest Ordinance
by the Senate) (“This State has already given certain powers to congress by a public act,
respecting the regulation of the trade of the United States . . . .”).
134. For more on the Continental Congress’s experimentation with a bewildering series
of committees, boards, and officers, see generally Calvin Jillson & Rick K. Wilson,
Congressional Dynamics: Structure, Coordination, and Choice in the First American
Congress, 1774–1789 (1994); Jennings B. Sanders, Evolution of Executive Departments of
the Continental Congress, 1774–1789 (1935) (examining the evolution and operation of
the executive departments of the Continental Congress); Jennings B. Sanders, The
Presidency of the Continental Congress, 1774–89: A Study in American Institutional History
(1930) (studying the development of the early congressional presidency and “the
personalities intimately associated with it”). For more background on how the Founders
struggled with the nature of the President’s authority, including several early developments
in the evolution of executive power under the Continental Congress, see Josh Chafetz,
Congress’s Constitution: Legislative Authority and the Separation of Powers 94 (2017). For
some brief law review treatments, see, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 585–91 (2004) (discussing
the development of executive departments under the Continental Congress); Jennifer L.
Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 Stan. L. Rev. 443, 477–78, 532–45
(2018) (surveying the Continental Congress’s use of the phrase “officer” for officials
charged with implementing policy).
135. See, e.g., 23 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 670 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1914) (recording an “Ordinance for Regulating the Post Office of the United
States of America” (1782)) (instructing that the post “be established and maintained by . . .
the Postmaster General . . . , to extend to and from . . . New Hampshire and . . . Georgia
inclusive, and to and from such other parts of these United States, as from time to time, he shall
judge necessary, or Congress shall direct” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
136. See, e.g., 21 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 1094 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1912) (recording proposed regulations of the Hospital Department and the
Medical Department (1781)) (presenting a draft resolution creating a Medical Board “to
digest rules and carry into execution, every thing relative to the Medical Department” with
approval of either Commander in Chief or the head of “a seperate [sic] Department”).
137. See, e.g., 32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 263–66 (Roscoe
R. Hill ed., 1936) (recording an “Ordinance for settling the Accounts between the United
States and Individual States” (1787)) (establishing a two-level bureaucracy responsible for
compiling, evaluating, and “ﬁnally adjust[ing] on uniform and equitable principles” a
comprehensive accounting of debts owed both to and by the national government
(emphasis added)).
138. 32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 266–69 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.,
1936) (recording a “Report of Committee on Post St. Vincents and Illinois” (1787)). His
ﬁrst “duty” was to “divide the [existing] settlements into proper districts” and then “as soon
as may be to summon the Inhabitants of each to meet” and then to elect “magistrates” who
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followed a similar plan, creating a bureaucratic apparatus headed by a
governor, who was authorized not only to adopt a body of civil and
criminal laws to govern the district,139 but also to “make proper divisions”
of the territory, to “lay out the parts of the district in which the indian titles
shall have been extinguished,” and to establish “such magistrates and
other civil officers in each county or township, as he shall ﬁnd necessary
for the preservation of the peace and good order in the same.”140
Some of these delegations may have been wise; others were surely
not. And some were just mechanisms for passing the buck, as with the delegation of authority to make what would become the Treaty of Paris.141 But
whatever the motives behind any particular delegation, it went without
saying that Congress could delegate enormous and open-ended rulemaking
authority to its agents.142 Indeed, the only contemporary legal challenges
to delegations we have found were grounded in the Articles’ explicit and
would act as both local judges and territorial legislators. Id. at 267. Once the basic governing
structure was in place, the Commissioner was charged with making the appointments of
additional executive officers “with the advice and Consent of the major part of the said
Magistrates.” Id. at 268.
139. The adoption of laws required approval by a majority of three territorial judges:
The governor, and judges or a majority of them shall adopt and publish
in the district such laws of the original states criminal and civil as may be
necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district and report
them to Congress from time to time, which laws shall be in force in the
district until the organization of the general assembly therein, unless
disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards the legislature shall have
authority to alter them as they shall think ﬁt.
32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 336 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1936)
(recording an “Ordinance for the government of the territory of the United States North
West of the river Ohio” (1787)) [hereinafter 1787 Northwest Ordinance]. The sole
apparent limit on the territorial government’s discretion—that it adopt “laws of the original
States”—was interpreted to permit stitching together different laws from different states
piecemeal, amending their “diction” as necessary along the way. See Arthur St. Clair,
Address of the Governor to the Legislature (May 29, 1795) [hereinafter St. Clair, 1795
Address], in 2 The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair 353, 357–62 (William Henry
Smith ed., 1881) [hereinafter The St. Clair Papers] (noting that the governor was outvoted
on this issue in 1788 before reversing the earlier interpretation in 1795).
140. 1787 Northwest Ordinance, supra note 139, at 336–37.
141. See 23 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 873 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1914) (recording notes of debates (1782)) (“Congress on a trial found it impossible from
the diversity of opinions & interests to deﬁne any other claims than those of independence
& the alliance. A discretionary power therefore was to be delegated with regard to all other
claims.”).
142. As one example of how the several states shared this view of Congress’s ability to
delegate legislative authority, consider the proposal from “a convention that met at Hartford
consisting of the New England States and & N. York” that “the Commander in cheif [sic] of
the Army of the united States be authorised & empowered to take such Measures as he may
deem proper & the public Service may render necessary” in order to induce “a punctual
Compliance with the Regulations which have been or may be made by Congress for Supplies.”
Letter from John Witherspoon to William Livingston (Dec. 16, 1780), in 16 Letters of
Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, at 451, 451 (Paul H. Smith, Gerard W. Gawalt & Ronald
M. Gerphart eds., 1989) (emphasis added) (criticizing the proposal on policy grounds).
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particularized exception to that general rule for “emit[ting] bills” of credit
and “borrow[ing] money.”143 Articles IX and X expressly prohibited
delegating that authority to a committee that sat during congressional
recesses, and instead required exclusive determination of such questions
by “the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States
assembled.”144 Where a derogation from the presumptive delegability of
legislative power was called for, it was speciﬁed.
It is not that broad delegations prompted no concerns. To the
contrary, as Madison emphasized, it was “unquestionably an act of a high
and important nature” to delegate even “a sort of legislative power.”145 But
we have found only two preratiﬁcation hints of nondelegation skepticism
expressed in a legal register. In both cases, the objection failed.
The simpler instance involves Thomas Burke’s 1777 criticism of the
proposal to delegate state ﬁscal authorities to the national government
via the Articles of Confederation: “If the Legislature can delegate their
power to tax to any person they may Delegate it to the Executive
Magistrate, and may make him absolute, by giving him the power over the
property of the Community. If they cannot delegate to him they cannot

143. Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX; id. art. X. In 1783, facing a ﬁnancial crisis
in which “further drafts [on the public credit] were indispensable to prevent a stop to the
public service,” Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris urgently requested that Congress
delegate power over ﬁnances to a committee consisting of a member from each State. 25
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 847–48 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922)
(statement of Robert Morris (1783)) (noting that “our money affairs” were “3½ Million of
livres short of the bills actually drawn”); see also Robert Morris to the President of Congress
(Elias Boudinot) (Jan. 9, 1783), in 7 The Papers of Robert Morris 287, 287 (John Catanzariti,
Elizabeth M. Nuxoll, Mary A. Gallagher, Kathleen H. Mullen, Nelson S. Dearmont &
Clarence L. Ver Steeg eds., 1988) (referencing “some Circumstances of an important and
conﬁdential Nature relating to the Finances of the United States”).
Morris’s proposal was criticized on a variety of grounds, including by at least one
unnamed person who “objected to [it] as improper, since Congress wd. thereby delegate an
incommunicable power, perhaps, and would at any rate lend a sanction to a measure
without even knowing what it was; not to mention the distrust which it manifested of their
own prudence and ﬁdelity.” 25 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 848
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (recording notes of debates (1783)). So Congress instead
appointed a three-person committee empowered only to consult with the Superintendent
and report back. Id. The reference to an “incommunicable power” was clariﬁed in a
discussion of an analogous proposal later that year, which was again said to run afoul of the
proposition that “Congs. could not delegate to Comrs. a power of allowing claims for which
the Confedon. reqd. nine States.” Id. at 961.
144. Compare Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 5 (authorizing “a
committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated ‘A Committee of the States’,
and to consist of one delegate from each State”), and id. art. X (“[P]rovided that no power
be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of
Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United States assembled be
requisite.”), with id. art. IX, para. 6 (providing that Congress “shall never . . . emit bills, nor
borrow money . . . unless nine States assent to the same”).
145. James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2, 1791), in 13 The Papers of James Madison
372, 378 (J.C.A. Stagg ed., digital ed. 2010).
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delegate to any other.”146 Burke’s view didn’t prevail, of course; the Articles
of Confederation were in fact adopted, along with the broad array of
unequivocally legislative powers that it expressly delegated to the national
government.
Consider also an earlier episode in the Pennsylvania Assembly. In
1764, the newly elected Pennsylvania Assembly devoted lengthy discussion
to a set of “Petitions to His Majesty from the late Assembly . . . praying for
a Change of Government.”147 Those petitions had been written during the
previous legislative session, and were transmitted to Richard Jackson,
“counsel for the Province of Pennsylvania, in London” to be “presented,
under certain Restrictions, to the Crown.”148 The topic provoked much
excitement, and “a considerable Debate insued [sic], in which a great
Contrariety of Opinions appear[ed] among the Members.”149 The Speaker
of the Assembly, Isaac Norris, had especially strong views:
[A]s he was of Opinion the House had no Right to delegate their
Powers to any Man, or any Set of Men whatever, to alter or change
the Government, he was for putting an entire Prohibition on the
Agent’s presenting the said Petitions, without further and express
Orders from the House for that Purpose.150
It’s not clear whether this was a true nondelegation challenge in the
modern sense, or whether it was really a version of the Lockean antialienation principle,151 given Norris’s focus on “alter[ing] . . . the
Government.”152 Either way, Norris’s argument was rejected. The Assembly

146. Thomas Burke’s Notes on the Articles of Confederation (Dec. 18, 1777), in
8 Letters of Delegates to Congress 1774–1789, at 433, 437 (Paul H. Smith, Gerard W.
Gawalt, Rosemary Fry Plakas & Eugene R. Sheridan eds., 1981) (“The delegation . . . is as
unconstitutional as if the Governor or Judges were to Substitute other persons to exercise
their respective powers, or as if the assembly were to appoint substitutes to Enact Laws or
impower the Delegates in Congress to enact Laws.”). Notably, Burke’s claim suggests that a
special nondelegation principle might apply in relation to the power to lay taxes and
manage the public ﬁsc. This view had some staying power in some quarters: “[S]o strong
were the prejudices against taxing dogs; that . . . even after it was adopted litigeous [sic]
persons were found, who disputed it constitutionality, Saying the ‘Legistlature [sic] had no
right to delegate to any body the power of imposing Taxes’ . . . .” Letter from James
Ronaldson to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 20, 1809), in 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 68,
68 (James P. McClure & J. Jefferson Looney eds., digital ed. 2008–2020). But even this was
contested. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on Federalist Arguments in Congressional
Debates (Aug. 3, 1798), in 30 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, supra, at 471 (noting Robert
Goodloe Harper’s view that “the constn leaves the levying taxes to the discretion Of
Congress. therefore Congress may leave it to the discretion of the President”).
147. Votes and Proceedings of the H.R. of the Province of Pennsylvania 5682 (Oct. 20,
1764), reprinted in 7 Pennsylvania Archives (Charles F. Hoban ed., 1935).
148. Id. at 5678, 5682.
149. Id. at 5682.
150. Id.
151. See infra section II.A.3.
152. Votes and Proceedings of the H.R. of the Province of Pennsylvania 5682 (Oct. 20,
1764), reprinted in 7 Pennsylvania Archives, supra note 147.
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formally considered his proposal to prohibit the agent from presenting
the petitions, and it was defeated by a vote of 20-12.153
3. Hints of an Anti-Alienation Principle. — Far from reﬂecting a
pervasive understanding that legislative power could not be delegated, the
Founding Era evidence indicates the opposite. That didn’t necessarily
mean, however, that everyone agreed legislatures were totally free from
constraint in their disposition of rulemaking authority. A small handful of
writers did argue for one speciﬁc limitation, albeit one different in kind
from the modern nondelegation doctrine. On their account, what was
prohibited was legislatures’ permanent alienation of legislative power
without right of reversion or control.
The best-known exposition of this anti-alienation principle was
probably Section 141 of John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government:
[T]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any
other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people,
they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone
can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by
constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that
shall be. And when the people have said, we will submit to rules,
and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms,
nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can
the people be bound by any laws, but such as are enacted by those
whom they have chosen, and authorized to make laws for them.
The power of the legislative being derived from the people by a
positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than
what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws
and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to
transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other
hands.154
The Gundy dissent is typical of the genre in misreading this passage as an
endorsement of the modern nondelegation principle.155 But, as the
contrast in the very ﬁrst sentence of Section 141 suggests, “transfer” and
“delegat[ion]” mean different things. Locke consistently uses “transfer”
153. Id. at 5683 (noting that the question of “[w]hether Instructions shall be sent to our
Agent, not to present the said Petitions to the Crown, until he receives further Orders for
that Purpose from this House” was “carried in the Negative” by calling the previous
question). How did Speaker Norris feel about this? Well, he didn’t show up for work the
next morning. Id. at 5684. It later turned out that he had resigned. Id. at 5685.
154. Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 94, ch. 11, § 141, at 163 (emphasis added); see
also id. § 142, at 164 (“The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making
laws to any body else, or place it any where, but where the people have.”).
155. See, e.g., Alexander & Prakash, supra note 10, at 1297–99 (reproducing a block
quote of Section 141 in the article’s very ﬁrst paragraph and interpreting it to “den[y] that
the legislative power entailed the power to make third parties into legislators by delegating
to them the right to make laws”). Even if the dissenters and their academic allies had the
right reading of Locke, they’d still have to offer some theory on which one paragraph from
a seventeenth-century English political treatise should trump the theory and practice of
eighteenth-century America. See Primus, Locke, Gorsuch, and Gundy, supra note 66.
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in the ordinary seventeenth-century property sense of permanent
alienation.156 In contrast, he uses “delegation” in connection with powers
which the delegating principal may supervise and at some point resume.157
On the former point, Locke was consistent with Thomas Hobbes, who
deﬁnes a man’s “Transferring” a right as “devest[ing] himselfe of hindring
another of the beneﬁt of his own Right,” equivalent to “lay[ing] downe,”
“Renouncing,” or “lay[ing] aside.”158 And in both respects, Locke’s view
was endorsed by the German jurist Samuel Pufendorf, who later observed
that even if some authorities “cannot be transferred from us to another,”
they can nonetheless “be delegated for others to exercise, in such wise,
however, that they have all their authority [autoritatem] from those in
whom the authority [potestas] roots and rests.”159
The deeper source of the Gundy dissent’s error, however, is its failure
to appreciate the historical context in which Locke was writing. As the
Founders well knew, Locke didn’t press this point because he was worried
about a burgeoning bureaucracy.160 He was answering a vastly more urgent
call, in the context of a deadly serious debate about the very right to rule
England. Section 141 was an assault on one of absolutism’s core tenets: the
claim that the people had not merely delegated legislative authority to their

156. E.g., John Locke, The First Treatise: The False Principles and Foundation of Sir
Robert Filmer (1690), ch. IX, § 88, reprinted in Two Treatises of Government, supra note
94, at 57 (“It might reasonably be asked here, [why do] children [inherit] . . . the properties
of their parent’s upon their decease? [F]or it being personally the parents, when they die,
without actually transferring their right to another, why does it not return again to the
common stock of mankind?”); id. § 100, at 62 (“[Some might claim] that a man can alien
his power over his child; and what may be transferred by compact, may be possessed by
inheritance. I answer, a father cannot alien the power he has over his child: he may perhaps
to some degrees forfeit it, but cannot transfer it . . . .”). Locke’s discussion of a monarch’s
voluntary subjugation to another sovereign is especially on point: “When a king makes
himself the dependent of another, and subjects his kingdom,” then he has “betrayed or
forced his people, whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved, into the power and
dominion of a foreign nation.” Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 94, ch. XIX, § 238, at
206. Such acts, Locke argued, were incapable of transferring any right to rule: “By this, as it
were, alienation of his kingdom [the king] himself loses the power he had in it before,
without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it.” Id.
157. See Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 94, ch. XIX, § 212, at 194 (noting that when
those “who had[] [legislative authority] by the delegation of the society” exceed the
boundaries of their power, “the people . . . come again to be out of subjection, and may
constitute to themselves a new legislative”).
158. Hobbes, supra note 94, pt. I, ch. 14, at 100–01 (“To lay downe a mans Right to any
thing, is to devest himselfe . . . of hindring another of the beneﬁt of his own Right . . . . Right
is layd aside, either by simply Renouncing it; or by Transferring it to another.”).
159. Pufendorf, Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, supra note 113, bk. I, def’n VII,
§ 2, at 88 (emphasis added).
160. The Founders were intensely familiar with the history of the English Civil War, the
Glorious Revolution, and the associated polemical debates between the likes of Locke and
Robert Filmer. The players in those dramas were the Founding equivalent of our heroes
and villains from World War II. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1188–
89, 1191–94.

2021]

DELEGATION AT THE FOUNDING

309

sovereign, but had alienated it to him entirely. Here’s Jean Bodin, the
seminal theorist of absolute sovereignty:
If such absolute power is given him simply and unconditionally,
and not in virtue of some office or commission, nor in the form
of a revocable grant, the recipient certainly is, and should be
acknowledged to be, a sovereign. The people has renounced and
alienated its sovereign power in order to invest him with it and
put him in possession, and it thereby transfers to him all its
powers, authority, and sovereign rights, just as does the man who
gives to another possessory and proprietary rights over what he
formerly owned.161
Nor was this view merely a Continental curiosity. The English legal scholar
Francis Bacon had made the same claim about domestic English law,
arguing that “it is in the power of a Parliament to extinguish or transfer
their owne authority” entirely: “[I]f the Parliament should enact . . . that
there should be no more Parliaments held, but that the King should have
the authority of the Parlament [sic]; this act were good in Law.”162
These are the positions that Locke was rejecting in Section 141 of the
Second Treatise. The stakes of the argument were nothing less than the
legitimacy of popular self-determination: No more than the people could
enslave themselves could Parliament do the same thing on their behalf.
That is certainly how others read Section 141. Take the eighteenthcentury English jurist Thomas Rutherforth, for whom Locke serves as the
161. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth bk. I, ch. VIII, at 67 (M.J. Tooley ed.
& trans., Seven Treasures 2009) (1576). The Gundy dissent’s conscription of Locke as a
fellow traveler in resisting legislative delegations is as muddled as Hamburger’s invocation
of Edward Coke to the same end. See, e.g., Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?,
supra note 9, at 43–50; see also Craig, Four Central Errors, supra note 51, at 17, 26
(“Hamburger repeatedly elides prerogative and administrative power[] . . . [but] the
prerogative entails a ground of lawful authority in English law that exists independently of
statute . . . . This is ﬁrst year English constitutional law.”).
162. Francis Bacon, A Collection of Some Principal Rules and Maximes of the Common
Lawes of England, in The Elements of the Common Lawes of England 69 (London, Assignes
of J. More Esq. 1636) (comprising Bacon’s chapter on “non impedit clausula derogatoria,
quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a quibus constituuntur”). Bacon contrasted
this to the impossibility of Parliament restraining its future self: “[F]or as it is in the power
of a man to kill a man, but it is not in his power to save him alive and to restraine him from
breathing or feeling,” he explained, “so it is in the power of a Parliament to extinguish or
transfer their owne authority, but not whilst the authority remaines entire to restraine the
functions and exercises of the same authority.” Id.; see also Hobbes, supra note 94, pt. II,
ch. 17, at 131 (“[M]embers of society “conferre all their power and strength upon one Man,
or upon one Assembly of men . . . and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will,
and their Judgements, to his Judgment.”); id., pt. II, ch. 18, at 134 (“[T]here can happen
no breach of Covenant on the part of the Soveraigne; and consequently none of his Subjects,
by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his Subjection.”); cf. Robert Filmer,
Patriarcha (London 1680), reprinted in Patriarcha and Other Writings 1, 3 (Johann P.
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (denouncing the “perilous conclusion . . .
that ‘the people or multitude have a power to punish or deprive the prince if he transgress
the laws of the kingdom,’” even though “this vulgar opinion hath of late obtained great
reputation”).
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culminating authority in a twenty-page discourse on the distinction
between an official’s tenure of possession in a governance authority and
the quantum of power that authority entails.163 For Rutherforth, that
distinction prompted the following inquiry:
It is questioned, indeed, whether any one can have full property
in civil power; whether a kingdom can be patrimonial; or whether
the right to govern a civil society can possibly be alienable, at the
discretion of the possessor, as his right to any other estate, or to
any other part of his patrimony is. Certainly, when the people
have vested civil power in any particular man, or body of men,
this grant of theirs does not imply that such power is alienable;
that the man, or the body of men in whom it is so vested, have a
right either to exercise it themselves, or to alienate it to anyone
else, at their own discretion.164
Throughout his work, Rutherforth follows Locke in using “alienation” and
“transfer” to signify the permanent termination of a property right.165 And
it is on that question—whether the legislative authority is presumptively
alienable by those in whom it has been vested—where he says that “Mr.
Locke’s reasoning upon this head seems to be decisive.”166
But Rutherforth doesn’t leave things there. To the contrary, he
reﬁnes the question to suggest that Locke’s already narrow anti-alienation
principle covers even less ground than readers might ﬁrst assume:
But, then, though a king with legislative power, cannot, [merely]
in virtue of such legislative power, alienate his kingdom, so that
sovereignty in government, does not imply such sovereignty to be
alienable, or plenitude of power does not imply plenitude of
property in such power; yet there is still a farther question,
whether the people who delegated the sovereign power, could not,
likewise, confer a right upon the person . . . to whom they
delegated such power, of making it over to others? [W]hether, as
they gave the legislative power, they could not, likewise, give a
right of transferring that power?167
163. In general, Rutherforth argued that “things are held or possessed by three sorts of
tenure . . . . A man may have full property in corporeal things; or he may have a claim of
usufruct in them; or they may be his by a temporary tenure.” Rutherforth, supra note 94,
bk. II, ch. IV, § XIV, at 317. The same holds true for governance authority: “[P]lenitude of
property is [thus] so far from implying plenitude of power” that “the tenure by which [a
ruler] holds this power, or so much of it as the constitution gives him, ought to be carefully
distinguished from the power itself.” Id. at 317, 319.
164. Id. at 318 (emphasis added); cf. id., bk. I, ch. II, § IX, at 19 (“Some of our rights
are alienable, others are unalienable . . . . Certainly where a man’s right to possess a
thing . . . is absolute, or is not restrained or limited at all by the law; he may part with it . . .
either by giving it up entirely, or by transferring it to some other person.”).
165. He used the same terminology for both private and public law. Compare id., bk. I,
ch. VI, § I, at 46–47 (discussing the “transfer” or “alienat[ion]” of private property rights),
with id., bk. II, ch. VIII, § XIV, at 462–63 (discussing the “transfer” or “alienation” of
governance authority).
166. Id., bk. II, ch. IV, § XIV, at 319.
167. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
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The answer to this question Rutherforth suggests, is actually yes. Somewhat
tendentiously, he concludes by reframing Locke’s position in Section 141
as a default presumption, rebuttable by speciﬁc evidence that a particular
legislative principal actually did intend to authorize alienation by its
agent.168
Other late eighteenth-century writers, lawyers, and politicians
repeatedly surfaced the same distinction between fee-simple alienation
and right-of-reverter delegation.169 As the Tory politician Bolingbroke
wrote in reference to the people as a whole:
[T]he collective Body of the People of Great Britain delegate, but
do not give up, trust, but do not alienate their Right and their
Power, and cannot be undone, by having Beggary, or Slavery
brought upon Them, unless They co-operate to their own
Undoing, and in one Word betray Themselves.170
Particularly relevant to modern nondelegation debates are comparable observations about transfer and delegation by political institutions, as
with Burke’s reﬂection that a “king may abdicate for his own person, [but]
he cannot abdicate for the monarchy . . . . [B]y a stronger reason, the
house of commons cannot renounce its share of authority. The engagement
and pact of society, which generally goes by the name of the constitution,
forbids such invasion and such surrender.”171 Pufendorf likewise emphasized that “kings who have been constituted by the people’s will . . . cannot
transfer the right to rule to anyone else, though they may employ the
services of ministers in actively exercising it.”172 The point thus amounted
to a general proposition: “For [c]ertain kinds of authority[,] . . . even

168. Id. (“There are, certainly, many inconveniences, which would, probably, attend
such an establishment as this; but none of them show it to be impossible.”). We don’t
actually think this is the best reading of Locke. But Rutherforth did.
169. For a much later example of the point, see the editor’s note to the 1893 U.S.
edition of Blackstone:
[T]he government is a mere agency established by the people for the
exercise of those powers which reside in them. The powers of government
are not, in strictness, granted, but delegated, powers. As all delegated powers
are, they are trust powers, and may be revoked. It results that no portion
of sovereignty resides in government. A man makes no grant of his estate
when he constitutes an attorney to manage it.
1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 49 n.12 (George Sharswood
ed., Philadelphia 1893) (1750) (commenting, in the editor’s footnote, on this more “simple
and reasonable idea” in contrast to Blackstone’s supposition that the right of sovereignty
“reside[s] in those hands which the exercise of the power of making laws is placed”).
170. Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, letter XVII, at
209 (2d ed. London 1735) (emphasis added).
171. Edmund Burke, Reﬂections on the Revolution in France (1790), reprinted in 2
Select Works, supra note 119, at 85, 107 (emphasis added).
172. Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature and Nations bk. I, ch. 1, § 19, reprinted
in The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf 93, 106 (Craig L. Carr ed., Michael J. Seidler
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1994).
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though we may not transfer them as such to someone else as his
possession . . . , can have their enactment delegated to others . . . .”173
Scattered references to a Lockean anti-alienation view can also be
found in the colonial, framing, and ratiﬁcation records. Thomas Jefferson,
for example, savaged legislative proposals to create a dictatorship during
the revolutionary war by arguing that the “laws [of nature] forbid the
abandonment of [legislative responsibility], even on ordinary occasions; and
much more a transfer of their powers into other hands and other forms,
without consulting the people.”174 And the Founding Era politician James
Otis just about plagiarized the whole of Section 141 in claiming that “[t]he
legislature cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands”
because “[t]heir whole power is not transferable.”175 This perspective may
have found its most succinct enunciation in a 1768 election sermon from
Massachusetts preacher Daniel Schute:
A Community having determined that to commit the power of
government to some few of their number is best, the right the
some few can have to it, must arise from the choice of the
whole; . . . . This delegation is not indeed the giving away of the right
the whole have to govern, but providing for the exercise of their
power in the most effectual manner.176
In sum, the categorical transfer of legislative power without provision for
reversion or control might have threatened the principles of selfgovernment. Mere delegations did not.
In practice, even those few Founding Era commentators who gestured
at it could scarcely have imagined that the anti-alienation principle would
ever do any limiting work in the real world. Congress would have to
effectively abolish itself by enacting a law providing something like, “All
legislative authority vested in the Congress is hereby transferred irrevocably
and in perpetuity to the President, and no enactment subsequently made
by this Congress shall have any force.”177 The closest thing we have seen to
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 182–83 (2d ed. Philadelphia,
printed for Mathew Carey 1794) (emphasis added); see also id. at 181 (“[I]t was proposed
in the house of delegates to create a dictator, invested with every power legislative, executive
and judiciary, civil and military, of life and of death, over our persons and over our
properties . . . .”).
175. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved 37 (Boston,
Edes & Gill 1764), reprinted in Collected Political Writings of James Otis 119, 147 (Richard
Samuelson ed., 2015).
176. Daniel Shute, An Election Sermon (1768), in 1 American Political Writing, supra
note 116, at 110, 117 (emphasis added); cf. Federal Farmer, An Additional Number of
Letters from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, Letter X (May 2, 1788) [hereinafter
Federal Farmer, Letter X, May 2, 1788], reprinted in 20 Documentary History, supra note
115, at 1006, 1011 (warning, in the context of a debate over low legislative salaries restricting
representation to the wealthy, of “the same policy, which uniformly and constantly exerts
itself to transfer power from the many to the few”).
177. Even if it tried to, the familiar rule that one Congress cannot bind a future
Congress would prevent its action from taking hold. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr.,
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a legal invocation of the anti-alienation principle in practice emerged in
some nineteenth-century cases involving laws enacted by territorial legislatures pursuant to congressional delegation.178 From time to time, the
argument was ﬂoated that Congress, having delegated its legislative power,
could not alter the laws thus made after the initial delegation was
conveyed. The Supreme Court eventually rejected this argument in the
late 1800s, explaining that
[s]uch a power is an incident of sovereignty, and continues until
granted away. Congress may not only abrogate laws of the
territorial legislatures, but it may itself legislate directly for the
local government. It may make a void act of the territorial
legislature valid, and a valid act void. In other words, it has full
and complete legislative authority over the people of the
Territories and all the departments of the territorial
governments.179
This is, of course, precisely the circumstance that applies with delegations
to the executive branch. Even as Congress delegates wide authority to
adopt prescriptive rules, it retains “full and complete legislative
authority.”180 Delegation of that authority pursuant to ongoing legislative
supervision and control presents no constitutional difficulty.
C.

Rulemaking Pursuant to Statutory Authorization Was an Exercise of
Executive Power

Now the ﬂip side of the coin. When an administrative agency issues a
generally applicable rule that regulates private conduct, has it acted in an
executive capacity? Under the standard constitutional grammar of the
Founding, the answer is yes. That’s because executive power had an
Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 Yale L.J. 189, 191 (1972) (calling
it “a thing which, on the most familiar and fundamental principles, so obvious as rarely to
be stated, no Congress for the time being can do”).
178. For more on delegations of this sort, which were routine in the early Republic, see
infra section III.A.1.
179. Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880) (stating this despite the
fact that “there was not an express reservation of power in Congress to amend the acts of
the territorial legislature”); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 45 (1890) (“But it is too plain for argument that this
charter, or enactment, was subject to revocation and repeal by Congress whenever it should
see ﬁt to exercise its power for that purpose. Like any other act of the territorial legislature,
it was subject to this condition.”). In Murphy v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court expressed the
point with particular clarity: “In the exercise of this sovereign dominion [over territories],
[the people of the United States] are represented by the government of the United States,
to whom all the powers of government over that subject have been delegated . . . .” 114 U.S.
15, 44 (1885). The Court explained, however, that “in ordaining government for the
Territories . . . all the discretion which belongs to legislative power is vested in Congress;
and that extends, beyond all controversy, to determining by law . . . the form of the local
government in a particular Territory, and the qualiﬁcation of those who shall administer
it.” Id.
180. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. at 133.
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extremely thin meaning: the authority to execute instructions and
prohibitions as formulated by some prior exercise of legislative power.181
In this respect, executive authority served as the culminating element
of an uncomplicated tripartite scheme in which each of the “three grand
immutable principles in good government” was enmeshed with the others
as interlocking pieces of “complete” or “perfect” governance.182 The full
three-part sequence notionally comprised successive exercises of what the
Founders called “legislative, judicial, and executive power.”183 First you
issued instructions. Then you adjudicated the application of those
instructions. Then you executed those instructions. It was really that
simple.
This stylized sequence didn’t always play out in exactly that order;
certainly not every act of law execution requires the prior entry of court
judgment. Moreover, any given official might hold more than one of the
powers simultaneously, in which case the same person could both will and
execute some plan, instruction, or intention.184 And there was some
taxonomic disagreement, with many commentators suggesting (probably
rightly) that judicial power was best understood as a subset of the
executive.185 It was common ground, however, that no government was
“complete” unless it had each of these three “powers of Legislation,
Judgment, and Execution” over every subject matter within its prescriptive
jurisdiction.186
The upshot for nondelegation debates is straightforward. Without
exception of which we are aware, late eighteenth-century Anglo-American
181. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1173; Mortenson, Executive
Power Clause, supra note 14, at 1273.
182. Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 14, at 1319–21 (quoting A
Bostonian, A View of the Federal Government, Its Defects, and a Proposed Remedy, Bos.
Indep. Chron. (Aug. 10, 1786), reprinted in 1 Am. Museum 294, 295 (1787)).
183. Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted
in 15 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 243, 248.
184. Rutherforth explained the point: “Though we here consider the legislative and
executive bodies as distinguished from one another . . . yet it is not necessary that these
bodies should be different from one another in fact.” Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. II, ch.
IV, § VII, at 294–95. “Whatever prudential reasons there may be,” he continued, “there does
not appear to be any reason in the nature of the thing, against supposing that both these
powers may possibly be vested in the same person or in the same body.” Id. at 295. The
Constitution actually presents a version of this, giving the President a share of both
legislative power (in the form of the veto) and executive power (in the Executive Power
Clause). U.S. Const. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 1.
185. See, e.g., Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. II, ch. III, § VII, at 275 (“[Some] consider
the civil power as consisting of . . . [three] parts, legislative, judicial and executive. Whereas,
in fact, the province of judicial power is plainly to direct and apply . . . the public force of
the society; and in this view it can be nothing else but a branch of the executive power.”);
see also Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1238; Mortenson, Executive Power
Clause, supra note 14, at 1320 & n.268.
186. See John De Witt II, Am. Herald, Oct. 29, 1787, reprinted in 4 Documentary History,
supra note 115, at 156, 159.
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lawyers, academics, and politicians understood executive power as the
narrow but potent authority to carry out projects deﬁned by a prior
exercise of the legislative power.187 Here’s Rutherforth again:
It belongs to the legislative power, considered as the common
understanding, or joint sense of the body politic, to determine
and direct what is right to be done: and it belongs to the
executive power, considered as the common or joint strength of
the same body, to carry what is so determined and directed into
execution.188
On this historical understanding, agency rulemaking pursuant to statutory
authorization would qualify as an exercise of executive power, for the
simple but decisive reason that the agency is carrying out legislative
instructions. By the Founders’ lights, Mistretta v. United States was thus
rightly decided: Even if “rulemaking power originates in the Legislative
Branch,” it “becomes an executive function” at the moment it is
“delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch.”189
The mistake comes in assuming that executive rulemaking can only be
described as an exercise of executive power. To the contrary, sophisticated
discussions from the Founding recognize that efforts to classify government action in the abstract are irreducibly indeterminate. While Madison
didn’t have our modern vocabulary for framing problems, it’s hard to miss
the point in his observation to Jefferson that “the boundaries between the
Executive, Legislative & Judiciary powers, though in general so strongly
marked in themselves, consist in many instances of mere shades of
difference.”190 The game-like quality of this unstable exercise in classiﬁcation was explicitly surfaced by John Jay in an early draft of Federalist 64:
“Some object because the Treaties so made are to have the Force of Laws,
and therefore that the makers of them will so far have legislative power[.]
This objection is a mere play on the word legislative . . . .”191
187. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1221–22, 1231–32, 1235, 1237–
38; Mortenson, Executive Power Clause, supra note 14, at 1334–40.
188. Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. II, ch. III, § X, at 280.
189. See 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989) (affirming the constitutionality of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission against a nondelegation challenge).
190. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson: New York (excerpts) (Oct. 24 &
Nov. 1, 1787) [hereinafter 1787 Letter from Madison to Jefferson], reprinted in 13
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 442, 446; see also The Federalist No. 37, at 182
(James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[N]o skill in the science of government has yet
been able to discriminate and deﬁne, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces the
legislative, executive and judiciary . . . .”).
191. John Jay, Draft of Federalist No. 64 (Mar. 5, 1788), reprinted in 16 Documentary
History, supra note 115, at 309, 317 (“Whatever name therefore be given to the obligation
of Treaties or whether the making them be called the Exercise of legislative or of any other
kind of authority certain it is that the people have a Right to dispose of the power to make
them as they think expedient . . . .”). Jay’s purpose was to deﬂect criticism of the President’s
role in the legislative act of treatymaking. Id. (responding to this criticism). For more on
the classiﬁcation of treaties—including the persistence of this criticism about the President’s
role in treatymaking—see infra section II.C.2.
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Jay’s response to these objections was neither unresponsive nor unfair.
To the contrary, his reference to “mere play” reﬂected a deep truth: Any
particular government action can be simultaneously legislative (in the
sense of issuing new instructions or rules) and executive (in the sense of
implementing instructions from a legislative principal). Choosing between
the two classiﬁcations is just a matter of framing relationships—and of
playing with words. On this point, Justice Stevens’s argument concurring
in the judgment in Bowsher v. Synar is as compelling now as the day it was
written: “[G]overnmental power cannot always be readily characterized
with only one of those three labels. On the contrary, as our cases
demonstrate, a particular function, like a chameleon, will often take on
the aspect of the office to which it is assigned . . . .”192
The Founders’ recognition of this point is most visible in two contexts:
passing statutes and adopting treaties. In each context, an agent’s exercise
of lawful authority to participate in the promulgation of obligatory rules
was repeatedly described as “executive” with respect to the legislative
principal’s instructions. Those descriptions squarely refute originalist
claims that government action must be neatly slotted under a single font
of government authority. Depending on the relationships you focused on,
a given act could properly be classiﬁed as both legislative and executive at
the same time.
1. The Legislative Act of Passing Statutes Could Accurately Be Described as
an Exercise of Executive Power. — To understand this indeterminacy, start
with the Continental Congress. Like the federal government that later
emerged under the U.S. Constitution, the national government under the
Articles of Confederation was commonly understood to possess all three
powers of a complete government—albeit in notoriously ineffective
form.193 As one Federalist summarized, “the old Congress [was] a single

192. 478 U.S. 714, 749–51 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Under . . .
the analysis adopted by the majority today, it would . . . appear that the function at issue is
‘executive’ if performed by the Comptroller General, but ‘legislative’ if performed by the
Congress”). Stevens isn’t arguing that the allocation of these responsibilities should be
beyond judicial review; his point is that the Vesting Clause categories alone are incapable of
doing the work the majority was asking them to do.
193. As James Wilson put it, the Continental Congress had “some legislative, but little
executive and no effective judicial power.” James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania
Convention (Dec. 4, 1787) [hereinafter Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention],
reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 465, 474 (emphasis added); see also
Edmund Randolph, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 6, 1788), reprinted in 9
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 970, 986 (“In it, one body has the Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial powers: But the want of efficient powers has prevented the dangers
naturally consequent on the union of these.”); Notes of James Madison on the Convention
(June 16, 1787) (statement of Rep. Randolph), reprinted in 1 The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787, at 249, 256 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand’s Records of
the Federal Convention] (“[I]f the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs. has been
safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.”); Notes of William Paterson
on the Convention (June 16, 1787) (statement of Rep. Randolph), reprinted in 1 Farrand’s
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body, without a head, possessing and exercising, as the spur of the occasion
might suggest . . . legislative, judicial and executive powers, blended and
confused in the undistinguishable mass of their impotence.”194
The Continental Congress had some legislative power in the
traditional sense of the authority to promulgate instructions and
authorizations with the force of law.195 It had some judicial power in the
traditional sense of authority to promulgate deﬁnitive resolutions of
speciﬁc individual disputes, either in its own right196 or by creating special
bodies for the purpose.197 And it had some executive power in the
traditional sense of authority to execute legislative instructions by, as James
Madison put it, “operat[ing] immediately on . . . persons [and]
properties.”198 (By the time of the convention, congressional delegates
Records of the Federal Convention, supra, at 264, 273 (“Congress possess both Legislation
and Execution.”).
194. Solon, Jr., Providence U.S. Chron., Feb. 25, 1790 [hereinafter Solon, Jr., Feb. 25,
1790], reprinted in 26 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 737, 738. As was often the
case with discussions of the tripartite scheme, some commentators described only two truly
fundamental powers, with the judicial essentially a logical subset of the executive. See, e.g.,
Theophilus Parsons, Address to the Massachusetts Convention (Jan. 23, 1788) [hereinafter
Parsons, Jan. 23, 1787 Address to the Mass. Convention], reprinted in 6 Documentary
History, supra note 115, at 1313, 1325 (“Under the confederation the whole power, executive
and legislative, is vested in one body . . . .”); Americanus V, N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Dec. 12,
1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 397, 401 (“In . . . the present
Congress . . . the whole of the legislative and executive powers centre in a single body.”).
195. See, e.g., Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, paras. 1, 4 (empowering
Congress to “have the sole and exclusive right and power” of “establishing rules for deciding
in all cases, what captures on land or water shall be legal” and “regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States”).
196. See, e.g., id. art. IX, para. 2 (empowering Congress to be “the last resort on appeal
in all disputes and differences . . . between two or more States concerning boundary,
jurisdiction or any other causes whatever”); see also Deirdre Mask & Paul MacMahon, The
Revolutionary War Prize Cases and the Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 63 Buff. L. Rev. 477,
489–94 (2015) (describing the resolution of prize appeals by the congressional Committee
of Appeals); William F. Swindler, Seedtime of an American Judiciary: From Independence
to the Constitution, 17 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 503, 514–17 (1976) (describing congressional
adjudication of territorial disputes among states).
197. See, e.g., Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IX, para. 1 (empowering Congress
to “have the sole and exclusive right and power of . . . appointing courts for the trial of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and
determining ﬁnally appeals in all cases of captures”); see also Mask & MacMahon, supra
note 196, 494–97 (describing the creation of the Court of Appeal in Cases of Capture).
198. Notes of James Madison on the Convention (June 28, 1787) (statement of Rep.
Madison), reprinted in 1 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at
444, 447 (noting that the power “to operate immediately on . . . persons [and] properties”
was already “the case in some degree as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be
the case in (a far greater degree) under the plan proposed to be substituted” (footnote
omitted)); see also Notes of James Madison on the Convention (June 25, 1787) (statement
of Rep. Pinckney), reprinted in 1 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note
193, at 397, 404 (“[T]he States . . . are the instruments upon which the Union must frequently
depend for the support & execution of their powers . . . .” (emphasis added)); cf. Notes of
Robert Yates on the Convention (June 28, 1787) (statement of Rep. Madison), reprinted in
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were executing the body’s legislation variously “by themselves,” through
“committees” both ad hoc and formalized, through individual agents,199
and through the creation and supervision of institutionalized “boards” of
governance.200)
So far, so standard. Yet some Founders—not most, but some—
conﬁdently classiﬁed Congress in quite different terms: as a fundamentally
executive body. And as a conceptual matter, they weren’t wrong to do so.
Indeed, these alternative descriptions exemplify how the standard conceptual vocabulary could be deployed with perfect consistency to support
entirely different classiﬁcations, in precisely the sense of intellectual “play”
that John Jay described.201
1 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at 453, 455 (“[T]he present
powers of congress . . . may and do, in some cases, affect property, and in case of war, the
lives of the citizens”).
199. Congress had enforcement agents of various kinds through much of its existence.
A key issue during the impost debates of 1781 and 1783 was thus whether a comparable
mechanism should be created for the direct collection of revenue. While the point was
contested, Madison certainly thought so:
A requisition of Congress on the States for money is as much a law to them
as their revenue Acts[,] when passed[,] are laws to their respective
Citizens. If, for want of the faculty or means of enforcing a requisition, the
law of Congress proves inefficient, does it not follow that in order to fulﬁl
the views of the federal constitution, such a change [should] be made as
will render it efficient?
25 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 875 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922)
(statement of Rep. Madison (1783)). For some other perspectives on the question, compare
id. at 870 (statement of Rep. Wolcott (1783)) (noting that he “did not like” the proposal
for revenue “to be collected by Congress”), with id. (statement of Rep. Wilson (1783))
(arguing that he “considered this mode of collection as essential” in agreement with
Madison), and id. (statement of Rep. Hamilton (1783)) (noting that he was “strenuously of
the same opinion” as Wilson). For a succinct summary of those debates in larger
constitutional context, see generally Lance Banning, James Madison and the Nationalists,
1780–1783, 40 Wm. & Mary Q. 227 (1983).
200. Solon, Jr., Feb. 25, 1790, supra note 194, at 738. The steadily increasing
bureaucratization of Congress’s executive function reﬂected a broadly shared sense that “so
Long as that respectable body persist in the attempt to execute as well as to deliberate on
their business it never will be done.” Robert Morris to Silas Deane (Dec. 20, 1776), in 5
Letters of Delegates to Congress, 1774–1789, at 620, 626 (Paul H. Smith, Gerard W. Gawalt,
Rosemary Fry Plakas & Eugene R. Sheridan eds., 1979).
201. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. Some of these dissenting claims were
more pragmatic than grounded in any conceptual reframing. At least one commentator
argued, for example, that the Congress’s judicial and executive capabilities were so
ineffective that in fact its only true power was legislative. The Triumphs of Reason, Being a
Dialogue on the New Constitution, Poughkeepsie Country J. (Mar. 11, 1788), reprinted in
20 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 853, 858 (“[T]hey had no judicial nor executive,
no way to inforce their discretionary requisitions, either for money or for men, on the
disobedient members, but by carrying arms against them and enkindling civil war.”). The
ineffectiveness of congressional execution has led some scholars to assume mistakenly that
contemporaneous descriptions of the Continental Congress’s executive power have to be
read as references to its foreign affairs competences. See, e.g., Michael McConnell, The
President Who Would Not Be King 253 (2020) (interpreting the Virginia Plan’s reference
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Take the recurring claim by a handful of commenters that Congress
should be understood as “merely an executive body.”202 How could that
be, when the Confederation Congress undeniably had the powers of both
“Execution” and “Legislation”?203 Recall that the fundamental problem in
any effort to draw stable “boundaries between the Executive, Legislative
[and] Judiciary powers”204 is the ﬁrst step: deciding how to frame each
actor’s functional role in the sequence of action that moves from decision
to execution. From this perspective, the Continental Congress straddled
exactly the taxonomic “boundar[y]” that Madison was describing. Focus
on Congress’s authority to issue binding instructions alone, and the
legislature is obviously exercising the legislative power, with its own officers
(and potentially the several States) acting as executive agents.
But that is not the only way to think about the relevant institutional
relationships. Instead of treating Congress as an uncaused cause, the
separation-of-powers analysis can be framed around the anterior
relationship between legislative delegates and their electoral constituencies. That alternative frame was fairly intuitive in a system of national
government where states were viewed as the real principals in interest and
where both the individual delegates and Congress as a whole were what
John Adams described as “no more than attorneys, agents and trustees for
to “[T]he Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation” as “necessarily
includ[ing] something more than the power of law execution”); Jack Rakove, The
Beginnings of National Politics 383 (1979) [hereinafter Rakove, Beginnings] (“The idea
that Congress was essentially an executive body persisted because its principal functions, war
and diplomacy, were traditionally associated with the crown . . . .”); Martin Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1772 (1996) (“[T]hey also gave Congress the
power to make war and appoint and commission all military officers serving the nation—
authority usually thought to be executive in nature.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 Yale L.J. 231, 275–77 (2001) (“Given
that . . . diverse observers acknowledged that Congress enjoyed the executive power and that
its Department of Foreign Affairs was executive in nature, there can be little doubt that
Congress possessed the executive power over foreign affairs.”).
202. See, e.g., A Democratic Federalist, Pa. Herald, Oct. 17, 1787, [hereinafter A
Democratic Federalist, Oct. 17, 1787], reprinted in 13 Documentary History, supra note
115, at 386, 387; see also, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letter X, May 2, 1788, supra note 176, at
1008 (“[T]he present congress is principally an executive body.”); Letter from Thomas
Burke to the North Carolina Assembly (Oct 25, 1779), in 14 Letters of Delegates to
Congress, 1774–1789, at 108, 109 (Paul H. Smith, Gerard W. Gawalt & Ronald M. Gephart
eds., 1987) (“[T]he Nature of Congress which is a deliberating Executive assembly . . . .”).
This framing of congressional power retained enough rhetorical resonance that at least one
contemporary pamphlet was at pains to “refute” it during the ratiﬁcation debates by
adopting the internal frame rather than the external one. See A Friend to Order, Balt. Md.
Gazette, Oct. 30, 1787, reprinted in 11 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 26, 26
(listing the Continental Congress’s legislative authorities to refute the “belie[f] that
Congress are merely an Executive body.”).
203. Notes of William Paterson on the Convention (June 16, 1787) (statement of Rep.
Randolph), reprinted in 1 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at
270, 273.
204. 1787 Letter from Madison to Jefferson, supra note 190, at 446; see also The
Federalist No. 37, at 182 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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the people.”205 And in that sense, Congress and its delegates were acting
in an executive capacity in carrying out the people’s will. As Republicus
explained, “[C]ivil government . . . originates with the people . . . . They
form the compact, they prescribe the rules and they also enact them or
delegate others to do it for them; who are . . . their servants and accountable
to them and to them only [for] how they execute those trusts.”206 In this
sense, the Democratic Federalist was actually quite right to argue that
“Congress . . . are merely an executive body.”207
To modern eyes, these are deeply counterintuitive descriptions. But
the framing would have felt natural to the Founders, who were awash in
centuries of debates about the nature of political representation, the
criteria of legislative legitimacy, and the locus of sovereignty.208 The idea
was deeply embedded in British discourse, where A Craftsman, for
example, observed that “the House of Commons is, properly speaking, no
more than a Court of Delegates, appointed and commission’d by the whole
diffused Body of the People of Great-Britain to speak in their sense, and act
in their Name.”209 And A Freeman’s discussion of the ratiﬁcation process
exempliﬁed this view of legislative service as a “merely . . . ministerial”
charge “to be executed” without reference to the individual’s potentially
diverging policy views:
[T]he people themselves are the sole and ﬁnal deciders. Before
them the proposed Federal Government is to be tried—by them it
is to be approved or condemned, and their sentence is to be
executed by their delegated servants in the Convention, who
should act merely in an official or ministerial character.210
This framing was both reﬂected in and reinforced by a social practice
“as old as . . . Parliament itself” of electoral constituencies issuing detailed

205. John Adams, “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” No. 3, Bos. Gazette,
Sept. 30 1765, available at Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Adams/06-01-02-0052-0006 [https://perma.cc/R749-H8KH] (last visited Oct.
9, 2020) (“[T]he people have a right to revoke the authority, that they themselves have
deputed, and to constitute abler and better agents, attorneys and trustees.”).
206. Republicus, Ky. Gazette, Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 8 Documentary History, supra
note 115, at 375, 377.
207. A Democratic Federalist, Oct. 17, 1787, supra note 202, at 386, 387.
208. If you’re going to read one thing on the background here, please make it Don
Herzog’s Happy Slaves. See generally Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent
Theory (1989) (critiquing the origins and development of the now-prevailing political
theory that indispensable governmental legitimacy stems from the consent of the governed
as free individuals).
209. Caleb D’Anvers, No. 56, 2 The Craftsman 72, 72 (1727); see also, e.g., James Wilson,
Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament (1774), reprinted in 1 Collected Works, supra note 100, at 3, 9 (“The
representatives are reminded whose creatures they are; and to whom they are accountable
for the use of that power . . . .”).
210. Freeman, Md. J., Feb. 19, 1788, reprinted in 12 Documentary History, supra note
115, at 578, 579.
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voting instructions to their legislative delegates.211 The same pattern
quickly emerged in the Continental Congress, where all thirteen state
legislatures issued such instructions to their delegates by the packetload.212 Indeed, contemporaries observed that the “right of any State to
instruct its delegates in Congress” was “founded in the same principle of
freedom” as the “undoubted right” of the “constituents of every
District . . . to instruct their representatives in both houses” of state
government.213 While the obligatory character of such instructions had
211. Paul Kelly describes the background thus:
The practice of instructing . . . had a history as old as that of Parliament
itself. Originally M.P.s were no more than attorneys for their constituents,
and accordingly came up to Parliament with instructions. But ideas of
representation had changed, and by the end of the ﬁfteenth century the
medieval delegate of a locality was already being transformed into a
representative of all the interests of the nation.
Paul Kelly, Constituents’ Instructions to Members of Parliament in the Eighteenth Century,
in Party and Management in Parliament, 1660–1784, at 169, 170 (Clyve Jones ed., 1984)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 179 (noting also that colonial assemblies in North America
“had begun with seventeenth-century assumptions, but then had reverted back to medieval
forms of attorneyship in representation”).
For more on the theoretical relationship between suffrage, representation, and
instructions, see generally Willi Paul Adams, The First American Constitutions 228–53 (Rita
Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littleﬁeld Publishers 2001) (1973); Marc W.
Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary
America 61–108 (1997); Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–
1787, at 163–96 (1998 ed. 1969). For terriﬁc accounts of how the eighteenth-century
American theory and practice of representational government varied from region to region,
see generally Richard R. Beeman, The Varieties of Political Experience in EighteenthCentury America (2004); David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in
America 783–844 (1989). For more on the relationships between state legislatures and their
constituencies, see generally Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution 161–74 (Enlarged ed. 1992); Alison G. Olson, Eighteenth Century Colonial
Legislatures and Their Constituents, 79 J. Am. Hist. 543 (1992).
212. See, e.g., 32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 237 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed., 1936) (reproducing the text of instructions from the North Carolina legislature to
their delegates to the Continental Congress (1787)); id. at 72–74 (New York (1787)); 28
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 387 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933)
(Massachusetts (1785)); 26 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 332
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1928) (South Carolina (1784)); 25 Journals of the Continental
Congress, 1774–1789, at 591 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (Pennsylvania (1783)); id. at 968–69
(New Jersey and Delaware (1783)); 24 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at
139 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922) (Connecticut (1783)); 21 Journals of the Continental
Congress, 1774–1789, at 937 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912) (Georgia (1781)); 17 Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 802 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (Maryland (1780)); 14
Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 617 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed.,
1909) (Virginia (1779)); 3 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 298
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905) (New Hampshire (1775)); id. at 274 (Rhode Island
(1775)).
213. Philodemus, Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove
Party Prejudice (1784), in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 116, at 606, 620 (calling
this right “undoubted . . . (however speciously it may have been lately denied)”); see also
id. at 607–08 (noting that inhabitants “had an unquestionable right to instruct their
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long been contested, the key point for our purpose was never in serious
dispute: Elected officials serving in the legislature could both accurately
and meaningfully be described as the executive agents of an underlying
electoral principal.214
While this characterization of legislative service most often appeared
as a rhetorical ﬂourish celebrating legislative accountability, the taxonomic question took center stage during the thoroughly substantive dispute
about whether the young national government could and should bolster
its tottering ﬁnances by imposing its own system of taxation. The Virginia
congressman Arthur Lee led opponents of centralized taxation in
claiming that a national impost would be “subversive of the fundamental
principles of liberty.”215 In essence, Lee’s reasoning relied on the widespread view that liberty could not tolerate “placing the purse in the same
hands with the sword”216—a standard trope for distinguishing between
“the power of executing” and “the power of enacting.”217
Eventually, James Madison pushed back. He argued that Lee was
conﬂating his frames by claiming, along with “sundry members[,] that
Congress was merely an Executive body.”218 That characterization, he
respective Delegates on . . . [any] subject” and that “no member of either house would have
thought himself at liberty to disregard the instruction of a majority of his constituents”).
214. See, e.g., James Madison, Notes on Debates (Jan. 28, 1783), in 6 The Papers of
James Madison, supra note 145, at 141, 147 (“[A]ltho’ the delegates who compose Congress
more immediately represented, [and] were amenable to, the States from which they
respectively come, yet, in another view, they owed a ﬁdelity to the collective interests of the
whole.”); Wilson, Lectures on Law, supra note 100, ch. V, at 558 (“[A parliamentary act] is
a contract, to which there are three parties; those, who constitute one of the three parties,
not acting even in publick characters. A peer represents no one; he votes for himself; and
when he is absent, he may transfer his right of voting to another.”).
215. 25 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 871 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922) (statement of Rep. Lee (1783)). For more on the dispute, see Banning, supra note
199, 241–52; Rakove, Beginnings, supra note 201, 325–29, 337–42. Also worth reading is
Wesley Campbell’s insightful discussion of this dispute’s implications for modern
commandeering doctrine. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional
Change, 122 Yale L.J. 1104, 1171–81 (2013).
216. 25 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 871 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922) (statement of Rep. Lee (1783)); see also, e.g., id. at 897 (statement of Rep. Mercer
(1783)) (arguing that “the liberties of [England] had been preserved by a separation of the
purse from the sword” and that “he never [would] assent in [Congress] or elsewhere to the
scheme of the Impost”).
217. For some famous examples, see, e.g., The Federalist No. 78, at 392 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“The Executive . . . holds the sword of the community.
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties
and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
influence over either the sword or the purse.”); James Madison, “Helvidius” Number 1
(Aug. 24, 1793), available at Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Madison/01-15-02-0056 [https://perma.cc/K7YY-EXY9] (last visited Oct. 10,
2020) (“[A] great principle in free government . . . separates the sword from the purse, or
the power of executing from the power of enacting laws.”).
218. 25 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 907 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1922) (statement of Rep. Madison (1783)).
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conceded, may have captured something signiﬁcant about the national
government’s relationship to the states.219 But the external question of
where Congress’s authority came from had no bearing on the internal
question of whether Congress as an institution could exercise the
legislative power of issuing binding instructions.220 For Madison, the
answer was obvious:
[B]y the Articles of Confederation, Congs. had clearly &
expressly the right to ﬁx the quantum of revenue necessary for
the public exigencies, & to require the same from the States . . . .
[T]he requisitions thus made were a law to the States, as much as
the Acts of the latter for complying with them were a law to their
individual members . . . .221
How could it be, he asked, that “these powers were reconcilable with the
idea that Congress was a body merely Executive?”222
In response to Madison’s sally, two opponents of centralized revenue
collection accused him of abandoning basic principles of democratic
accountability. The intensity of their response may seem overwrought until
you recall the central role played by social contract theory during debates
about the legitimacy of the American rebellion. That’s why Lee averred
that “the doctrine maintained by [Madison] was pregnant with dangerous
consequences to the liberties of the confederated States.”223 His colleague
John Mercer went a step further, vowing that “if he conceived the fœderal
compact to be such as it had been represented he would immediately
withdraw from Congress & do every thing in his power to destroy its
existence.”224 At this point, even Madison’s ally Alexander Hamilton
seemed to concede that Congress was fundamentally executive on the
traditional “instructions” frame, although he argued that institutional
realities should mitigate Lee’s and Mercer’s anxieties.225 The day’s session
closed shortly thereafter, with the taxation proposals still unresolved.226
The point of this excursion into preconstitutional discourse about the
nature of Congress’s power isn’t to ﬁgure out whose classiﬁcation was bestsuited to the substance of their debate. The point is that, conceptually
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 908; see also id. at 907 (“[H]e did not conceive . . . that the opinion was
sound that the power of Congress in cases of revenue was in no respect Legislative, but
merely Executive.”). For Madison, this was a consistent theme. See, e.g., id. at 875 (“A
requisition of Congress on the States for money is as much a law to them as their revenue
Acts when passed are laws to their respective Citizens.”).
222. Id. at 908.
223. Id. at 909–10 (statement of Rep. Lee (1783)) (“[H]e had rather see Congress a
rope of sand than a rod of Iron.”).
224. Id. at 910 (statement of Rep. Mercer (1783)).
225. Id. at 910 (statement of Rep. Hamilton (1783)) (going on to “point[] out the
difference between the nature of the constitution of the British Executive [and] that of the
U.S. in answer to Mr. Lee’s reasoning from the case of Ship money”).
226. Id. at 911–12.

324

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:277

speaking, both sides were right. When taken as an authoritative source of
legally binding instructions, the Continental Congress was indeed acting
in a legislative capacity. And when taken as the agent of the authorizations
and instructions issued by its electoral principal, the Continental Congress
was indeed acting in an executive capacity.
2. The Legislative Act of Treatymaking Could Accurately Be Described as an
Exercise of Executive Power. — Treaties may work even better than legislation
as an analogy for agency rulemaking. That’s because treatymaking
typically involved not one but two government entities, with the second
acting as an executive agent implementing instructions issued by the
ﬁrst.227 The upshot of the analysis, though, was the same: When officials
participated in the production of a legislative instrument, it was often
perfectly accurate to describe their action as an exercise of executive
power.
Start with a descriptive point. Just like statutes, treaties were classiﬁed
as legislative instruments—a fact that prompted some of the ﬁercest
separation-of-powers attacks on the Constitution during all of ratiﬁcation.
The Antifederalist George Mason and the Federalist James Wilson didn’t
agree on much, but they both disliked the Treaty Clause for excluding the
House from (and privileging the Senate in) a fundamentally legislative
act.228 As Wilson put it, this threatened “a perfect despotism” by consolidating “the powers of legislation, and Executive and judicial powers” in
the Senate: “To make treaties legislative, to appoint officers Executive for the

227. See infra text accompanying notes 244–255.
228. The legislative character of treaties was a particular hobby horse for Mason, and
his widely republished Objections to the Constitution in many ways set the mold for this
criticism. See George Mason, Objections, Mass. Centinel, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted in 14
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 149, 151; see also George Mason: Objections to the
Constitution (Oct. 7, 1787), in 8 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 40, 41–42
(introducing Mason’s objections in the editor’s note by describing its wide circulation in
1787, with just one version getting “reprinted in twenty-one newspapers from New
Hampshire to South Carolina” and prompting a swift Federalist response). For
others making the point, see, e.g., Brutus, Va. Indep. Chron., May 14, 1788 [hereinafter
Brutus, May 14, 1788], reprinted in 9 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 798, 801–02
(“[B]y the new plan of government, a treaty made by the president and senate shall be ‘the
supreme law of the land’ . . . . That seems to be saying . . . that a part shall be greater than
the whole—Or that though three branches must make the law, two may destroy it.”); Cato
VI, N.Y.J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 19 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 416, 419–
20 (criticizing the proposed Constitution for granting the “important” power of making
treaties, as “[c]omplete acts of legislation” which “affect your person and property, and even
the domain of the nation,” to “the senate and executive alone . . . without the aid or
interference of the house of representatives”); Richard Henry Lee, Letter to Edmund
Randolph, Va. Gazette, Oct. 16, 1787, reprinted in 14 Documentary History, supra note 115,
at 364, 367 (decrying the proposed Constitution because “the president and senate have all
the executive and two thirds of the legislative power. In some weighty instances (as making
all kinds of treaties which are to be the laws of the land) they have the whole legislative and
executive powers”).
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Executive has only the nomination—To try impeachments judicial.”229
This objection prompted the frequent demand to amend the Constitution
so as to require the House to approve treaties, which would otherwise be
an insufficiently controlled act of legislative authority.230
The logic behind classifying treatymaking as a legislative act was
straightforward. Treatymaking created binding obligations and conferred
legal powers pursuant to authoritatively formulated sovereign intent. That
meant it was an exercise of one type of legislative power. On the
international plane, for example, treaties were plainly “legislative,”231 a
“branch of legislative power,”232 and part of “the law of nations.”233 But
even from a domestic perspective, treaties were typically described as

229. Notes of James McHenry on the Convention (Sept. 6, 1787) (statement of Rep.
Wilson), reprinted in 2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at
529, 530 (emphasis added). Wilson returned constantly to this point. See, e.g., Notes of
James Madison on the Convention (Sept. 6, 1787) (statement of Rep. Wilson), reprinted in
2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at 521, 522; Notes of James
Madison on the Convention (June 1, 1787) (statement of Rep. Wilson), reprinted in 1
Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at 64, 66; Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787
Address to the Pa. Convention, supra note 193, at 491; cf. Notes of William Pierce on the
Convention (June 1, 1788) (statement of Rep. Wilson), reprinted in 1 Farrand’s Records of
the Federal Convention, supra note 193, at 73, 73–74.
230. See, e.g., Letter from George Mason to John Lamb (June 9, 1788), reprinted in 9
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 818, 822–23 (enclosing proposed amendments to
the draft Constitution, including supermajority requirements in both houses of Congress to
ratify some kinds of treaties); Notes of James Madison on the Convention (Sept. 7, 1787)
(statement of Rep. Wilson), reprinted in 2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention,
supra note 193, at 535, 538; The Society of Western Gentlemen Revise the Constitution, Va.
Indep. Chron., May 7, 1788, reprinted in 9 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 769,
771.
231. See Richard Morris, Notes on the Constitution (Jan.–July 1788), reprinted in 23
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 2531, 2534 (“[T]he B[ri]t[ish] constitution was
his Guide in [evaluating the draft Constitution]. and we All Know they are by No Means
totally Sep[ara]te & Dist[inc]t. The King Ex[ecuti]ve Branch Legislative He makes treatys. The
force of Laws. Jud[iciar]y Apptd. by him and Removeable by him . . . .” (ﬁrst, second, fourth,
ﬁfth, six, and seventh alterations in original) (emphasis added)).
232. William Findley, Address to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 3, 1787)
[hereinafter Findley, Dec. 3, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention], reprinted in 2
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 457, 459 (“Notwithstanding the legislative power
in Article I, section 1, the power of treaties is given to the President and Senate. This is [a]
branch of legislative power.”).
233. 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *257 (describing how, as part of “the law of
nations,” treaties are “binding upon the whole community” that made them).
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legislative.234 Both Blackstone235 and the Continental Congress236 agreed,
and the proposition was central to Federalist defenses of the Supremacy
Clause, including those offered by James Wilson,237 James Madison,238
George Nicholas,239 and Cassius.240
Some contemporary commentators gestured at a more complex view
under which some treaties had immediate domestic operation, but other
treaties—perhaps those that violated individual rights,241 conﬂicted with
234. This fact may seriously unsettle the historiography of modern foreign relations law,
where it is conventional wisdom that eighteenth-century Anglo-American law gave treaties
no domestic effect unless the legislature “received” them. See, e.g., 14 Sir William
Holdsworth, A History of English Law 66 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1964). For
some important but tentative dissents, see Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical
Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as the “Supreme Law of the Land”, 99
Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2112 n.81, 2126–51 (1999) (concluding “that the domestic effect of
treaties in British law in the eighteenth century remains understudied; that contrary to the
assumptions made by American legal academics, the story is not neat at all; and that there
is . . . evidence . . . to suggest that British practice was evolving from self-execution to nonself-execution”); Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1479,
1516–25 & n.199 (2006) (relying on secondary sources to conclude that “[t]he relevant
British treaty-making practice seems to be one of partial non-self-execution”).
235. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *67 (“[T]he law of nations (wherever any
question arises which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full
extent by the common law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land.”). Blackstone
suggested that this principle extended to both civil and criminal prohibitions. See, e.g., 1
William Blackstone, Commentaries *252–53 (noting that “hostility upon any nation in
league with the king” remained criminal despite the repeal of the relevant statute,
apparently because “it remains a very great offence against the law of nations, and
punishable by our laws”).
236. 32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 176, 178 (Roscoe R. Hill
ed., 1936) (recording a letter from the Continental Congress to the states (1787))
(“When . . . a treaty is constitutionally made ratiﬁed and published by us, it immediately
becomes binding on the whole nation and superadded to the laws of the land, without the
intervention of State Legislatures.”).
237. See James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 3, 1787)
[hereinafter Wilson, Dec. 3, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention], reprinted in 2
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 457, 460 (“Treaties in all countries have the force
of laws. 1st. Blackstone.” (emphasis added)).
238. See James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 18, 1788), reprinted
in 10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1371, 1382 (“Are not treaties the law of the
land in England? I will refer you to a book which is in every man’s hand—Blackstone’s
Commentaries. It will inform you that treaties made by the King are to be the supreme law
of the land.”).
239. See George Nicholas, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788),
reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1387, 1388–89 (quoting Blackstone
to make the same point as Madison).
240. Cassius I: To Richard Henry Lee, Esquire, Va. Indep. Chron., Apr. 2, 1788,
reprinted in 9 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 641, 644 (explaining at length that
treaties were inherently “the supreme laws of the land” from the moment “when made”—
not just in Britain and the colonies, but “in other countries” as well).
241. See Peyton Randolph, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 18, 1788),
reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1371, 1385 (“The lives and
properties of European subjects are not affected by treaties; which are binding on the
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established domestic law,242 or alienated sovereign territory243—might
require legislative reception. But no one disputed that treaties served a
legislative function as to the international actors they empowered and
restrained. Certainly we have seen no suggestion in the Founding records
that treaty instruments were themselves “executive” or “judicial” in
nature.
That brings us to a point that has confused some modern readers who
misunderstand the grammar of governance at the Founding. Despite the
consensus view that treaties were legislative, once in a while careful readers
of the Founding records will stumble across a comment describing the act
of making treaties as an exercise of executive power.244 After our earlier
aggregate community in its political social capacity.”); see also Patrick Henry, Address to
the Virginia Convention (June 18, 1788) [hereinafter Henry, June 18, 1788 Address to the
Va. Convention], reprinted in 10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1371, 1382
(arguing that “[t]o say that [treaties] are municipal, is to me a doctrine totally novel,” such
that the draft Constitution’s treaty power “extended farther than it did in any country in the
world”). Henry spent quite a while arguing that this claim was supported by a famous
diplomatic dispute between England and Russia—a case that he appears unfortunately to
have misunderstood. See Henry, June 18, 1788 Address to the Va. Convention, supra, at
1384–85.
242. See Francis Corbin, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), reprinted
in 10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1387, 1392 (arguing that “the difference
between a commercial treaty and other treaties” is that a “commercial treaty must be
submitted to the consideration of Parliament”).
243. See Brutus, May 14, 1788, supra note 228, at 801 (“Do you think, Cassius, that the
King by treaty can alienate the British dominions? Every man acquainted with the subject
will, I believe answer NO. That in such case an act of parliament must give validity to the
treaty.”); George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), reprinted in
10 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 1387, 1390 (“Will any Gentleman undertake to
say, that the King, by his prerogative, can dismember the British empire?—Could the King
give Portsmouth to France?—He could not do this without an express act of
Parliament . . . .”).
244. The best-known instance is an indeterminate fragment buried in The Dissent of the
Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention. See The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the
Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, Pa. Packet,
Dec. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 618, 634 (“And the
senate has, moreover, various and great executive powers, viz.: in concurrence with the
president general, they form treaties with foreign nations, that may control and abrogate
the constitutions and laws of the several states.”). This description—with its emphasis on the
Senate’s “form[ing]” them—is entirely consistent with the explanation that follows in the
main text. But the story is even more equivocal than that. First, the passage itself pivots from
describing treaty formation as “executive” to emphasizing that the separation-of-powers
problem emerges from its legislative effect. Second, at least one prominent signer of the
Dissent repeatedly rejected this framing, not only during the Pennsylvania debates but in
published writings after they ended. See William Findley, Hampden, Pittsburgh Gazette,
Feb. 16, 1788, reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 663, 666. Nor have
we found any subsequent citation to this portion of the Pennsylvania Dissent, either to praise
it or to refute it.
Turning to the record of debates only further complicates matters. Space does not
permit a full explanation, but it suffices to note that in a series of three speeches by James
Wilson and one by Thomas McKean, the pair of leading Federalists purported to
exhaustively enumerate and rebut every criticism of the Constitution that had been made.
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discussion of the “executive” quality of legislative service, the question this
prompts should feel familiar: How could a legislative instrument be
created by someone serving in a “merely” executive capacity? The answer
should now feel familiar too: When a diplomat negotiates, drafts, and
concludes a treaty, he is merely executing the instructions and authority
that were earlier conveyed by his authorizing principal.245 It is this frame
that explains the Founders’ occasional description of the treaty power as
the execution of a legislated intention.
As those speaking in this register emphasized, the act of treatymaking
is executed—certainly in the ﬁrst instance, and often conclusively—by a
group of plenipotentiary representatives who negotiate, specify, and
conclude the agreement. Indeed, the Continental Congress was constantly
delegating either “full” or “partial” powers to diplomatic agents, along
with instructions ranging from scant246 to spectacularly comprehensive.247
And so these plenipotentiaries were executive agents who were both

Yet in all forty-nine pages of comprehensive, detailed rebuttal, neither Wilson nor McKean
once described their opponents as arguing that treaties were conceptually executive. And
they covered an enormous amount of ground: Wilson’s notes tracked thirty-ﬁve distinct
Antifederalist objections in preparation for the ﬁrst speech, twenty-two objections for the
second speech, and nine objections for the third speech. See Wilson, Dec. 4, 1787 Address
to the Pa. Convention, supra note 193, at 467–69, 485–86 n.2 (outlining Wilson’s ﬁrst
speech); James Wilson, Address to the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787) (notes of
Thomas Lloyd, morning session), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at
550, 551–52, 571 n.2 (outlining Wilson’s second speech); James Wilson, Address to the
Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787) (notes of Thomas Lloyd, afternoon session),
reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 571, 571–72 (outlining Wilson’s
third speech and referencing at least 240 Antifederalist objections separately tracked by
Wilson in the preceding days); see also Thomas McKean, Address to the Pennsylvania
Convention (Dec. 10, 1787) (notes of Thomas Lloyd), 2 Documentary History, supra note
115, at 532, 533–35.
245. As Baron de Montesquieu and Thomas Rutherforth’s idiosyncratic division of
executive power into foreign and domestic variants suggests, the institutional relationships
involved in treatymaking have a distinctive tendency to surface this characteristic of
representative government generally. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at
1250–60 (explaining that Montesquieu and Rutherforth are consistent with the standard
treatment of executive power as not just subordinate to, but actually impotent without,
instructions from the legislative power).
246. See, e.g., 22 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 67 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1914) (1782) (informing the envoy to France that “[y]ou are . . . authorised [and]
directed . . . to enter into such engagements with . . . with any particular state . . . or with
any man . . . for the purpose of binding these United States to discharge the said loan with
the interest”).
247. See, e.g., 28 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 116 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) (1785) (reciting detailed “[i]nstructions . . . to their Minister
Plenipotentiary in Europe, for . . . speedily forming Treaties of Amity” with various nations);
8 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 518–23 (Worthington Chauncey Ford
ed., 1906) (1777) (reciting detailed charges for various European envoys); 4 Journals of the
Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 215–20 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1906)
(1776) (vesting the delegation with “full powers” to treat with Canadians on topics up to
and including union, pursuant to four pages of detailed “Instructions, &c”) .
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empowered and restricted by binding directions from the legislative
principal. As John Jay described:
I know that it is with Congress to give Instructions, and that it is
my Business faithfully to execute and obey them—If in their
Opinion the Instruction in Question requires no Alteration I will
chearfully [sic] and punctually adhere to it, for upon this, as
upon every other Occasion, I shall think it my Duty to observe
their Orders, whatever may be the Light in which the Policy of
them may appear to me.248
Rutherforth explained why: “[T]he external executive power, in its own
nature, is no more an independent power of acting without being
controlled by the legislative than the internal executive power is.”249
The draft Constitution carried forward this expectation of legislative
control, as with the emphasis in Federalist 64 that “the president must, in
forming [treaties], act by the advice and consent of the Senate,”250 or with
Federalist 66’s assertion that it would be impeachable “misbehavior” for
the President to “pervert[] the instructions” or otherwise “contraven[e]
the views” of the Senate in treatymaking.251 During the Massachusetts
ratiﬁcation debates, the Federalist Theophilus Parsons made a similar
point,252 arguing that the Senate would act “in their executive capacity” in
two ways: “[I]n making treaties and conducting the national negociations
[sic].”253 Given that the Senate must conduct negotiations, the question
for Parsons was whether it would do so as an independent decisionmaker

248. 29 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 629 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1933) (recording a report of John Jay from the Office of Foreign Affairs (1785)); see
also 31 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 484 (recording a speech of John
Jay (1786)) (“I shall always remember that I am to be governed by the instructions, and that
it is my duty faithfully to execute the orders of Congress.”); id. at 480 (“Whether Mr.
Gardoqui would be content with such an Article, I cannot determine, my instructions
restraining me from even sounding him respecting it.”).
249. Rutherforth, supra note 94, bk. II, ch. III, § VII, at 277.
250. The Federalist No. 64, at 474 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (emphasis added).
251. The Federalist No. 66, at 492 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
Hamilton, writing as Publius, made this argument in response to criticism that the Senate’s
role in the impeachment process was ethically inconsistent with its role in the treaty process.
Id. at 491 (“The convention might with propriety have meditated the punishment of the
executive, for a deviation from the instructions of the senate . . . .”).
252. His intervention is all the more notable, since his ghost-written Essex Result has
given aid and comfort to residuum theorists for years. Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra
note 14, at 1250 n.347. As explained in previous work, the Essex Result (like the authors on
which it drew) was plainly referring to nothing more than the execution of legislated
instructions in different subject matter realms. Id. By the time Parsons spoke during
ratiﬁcation, it had been quite a while since he wrote for the town of Essex in 1778. Id. But
as the discussion above demonstrates, he stood by his earlier application of Montesquieu
and Rutherforth, including the logical implications of the executive power’s essential nature
as an empty vessel. Id.
253. Parsons, Jan. 23, 1787 Address to the Mass. Convention, supra note 194, at 1326
(emphasis added).
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entitled to make its own call on foreign policy.254 And his answer was clear:
absolutely not. Any legislative instruction enacted pursuant to the standard
presentments process would bind the execution of American foreign
policy.255
Which brings us back to the essential indeterminacy of characterizing
government power. That indeterminacy is why the Federalist John Jay256
agreed with the Antifederalist Brutus257 that tail-chasing on the
classiﬁcation of treaties wasn’t very useful. That indeterminacy is why
Hamilton thought that the classiﬁcation of treatymaking involved “an
arbitrary disposition” without much strict meaning.258 And that
indeterminacy is why the most prominent Federalist and the most
prominent Antifederalist at the Pennsylvania ratiﬁcation convention
agreed that even though “the power of treaties . . . is [a] branch of

254. See id.
255. See id. In his view, “the representatives might tack any foreign matter to a moneybill, and compel the senate to concur.” Id. at 1327 (defending the Senate’s power to amend
appropriations bills). Parson’s concern about coerced approval makes sense only if the
enactment would then have binding legal force independent of the budget process. Cf.
Luther Martin, Genuine Information VI, Balt. Md. Gazette, Jan. 15, 1788, reprinted in 15
Documentary History, supra note 115, at 373, 374 (making a similar point about the
malleability of appropriations bills).
256. The Federalist No. 64, at 328 (John Jay) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (responding to
the antifederalist criticism that “treaties . . . should be made only by men invested with
legislative authority”). Jay observed that “whatever name be given to the power of making
treaties,” it “surely does not follow that because they have given the power of making laws
to the legislature, that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every other
act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and affected.” Id.
257. Brutus’s disinterest in the framing game is particularly striking, since it came
during an otherwise relentless and hyper-detailed attack on the Senate’s mixture of powers.
Brutus XVI, N.Y.J., Apr. 10, 1788, reprinted in 17 Documentary History, supra note 115, at
64, 68 (“[W]hether the forming of treaties, in which they are joined with the president,
appertains to the legislative or the executive part of the government, or to neither, is not
material.”).
258. The Federalist No. 75, at 378–79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(“[I]f we attend carefully to its operation, [the treaty power] will be found to partake more
of the legislative than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall
within the deﬁnition of either of them.”); see also id. at 378 (“Though several writers on the
subject of government place that power in the class of executive authorities, yet this is
evidently an arbitrary disposition . . . .”). Hamilton is evidently referring to Montesquieu
and Rutherforth. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1250–60. Note where
Hamilton lands, in two respects. Forced to choose among the categories, Hamilton says that
if the power to make treaties is any one thing, it’s legislative. But Hamilton also made clear
that once you start playing the “arbitrary” framing game, it’s entirely valid to describe the
act of making treaties as executive in the technical sense as well.
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legislative power,”259 it was nonetheless true that the executive agent
“makes treaties ministerially.”260
There was no contradiction between these two perspectives; the same
person could say both things and be right both times.261 Treaties
represented an act of legislative power, but treatymaking was executed
“ministerially.”
*

*

*

As an originalist matter, the Supreme Court has thus erred in denying
“that agencies exercise ‘legislative power’ and ‘judicial power.’”262 The
Founders would have said that agencies absolutely wield legislative power
to the extent they declare binding rules that Congress could have enacted
as legislation.263 At the same time, the Founders would have said—indeed,
they did say—that such rulemaking also constitutes an exercise of the
executive power to the extent it is authorized by statute.264 It isn’t one or

259. Findley, Dec. 3, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention, supra note 232, at 459
(“Notwithstanding the legislative power in Article I, section 1, the power of treaties is given
to the President and Senate.”); see also Notes of James McHenry on the Convention (Sept.
6, 1787) (statement of Rep. Wilson), reprinted in 2 Farrand’s Records of the Federal
Convention, supra note 193, at 529, 530 (“To make treaties [is] legislative . . . .”).
260. Findley, Dec. 3, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention, supra note 232, at 460
(arguing the same, with “laws” substituted for “treaties” as an obvious transcription error
given the reference in the next sentence to impeachment for treatymaking); see also Wilson,
Dec. 3, 1787 Address to the Pa. Convention, supra note 237, at 460 (“The President and
Council in [the Pennsylvania] Constitution makes the treaty ministerially.” (emphasis
added)).
To be crystal clear: A ministerial act was one performed subject to the direction of an
authorizing principal. E.g., Locke, Second Treatise, supra note 94, ch. XIII, § 153, at 168
(“[T]he federative power . . . and the executive [are] both ministerial and subordinate to
the legislative . . . .”). That’s why an Antifederalist delegate tried to use this latter framing
to partisan advantage: “If it is ministerial, the Senate are not here a legislature. Supreme laws
cannot be made ministerially, but legislatively.” John Smilie, Address to the Pennsylvania
Convention (Dec. 3, 1787), reprinted in 2 Documentary History, supra note 115, at 457,
460.
261. The 1788 North Carolina ratifying convention may offer the best example of this
ﬂickering executive–legislative duality. Space here doesn’t suffice to trace the back-andforth in any detail, but the delegates spent July 25 to July 28 shifting between these two
equivalently accurate frames before James Iredell observed—with what surely must have
been exasperation—that “[t]he power of making treaties is very important, and must be
vested somewhere . . . .” Hillsborough Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 The Debates in the
Several Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 106, 128 (Jonathan Elliot
ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of Rep. Iredell) (emphasis added). The sense of the discussion
seemed to settle on Federalist William Davie’s invocation of the standard formula: While
treaties were indeed conceptually legislative, the power of making them had “in all countries
and governments, been placed in the executive departments.” Id. at 119 (statement of Rep.
Davie). And the convention ﬁnally moved on.
262. City of Arlington v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013).
263. See supra section II.B; see also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
264. See supra section II.C.
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the other; it’s both. And on the dominant understanding at the Founding,
there was no separation-of-powers problem either way.
III. AFTER 1789
But what about political practice in the early Republic? Did the
Founders’ experience wrestling with delegation in the wild reveal that
a novel and nontextual limitation lurked in the interstices of the Vesting
Clauses? The answer is no. A comprehensive survey of legislative practice
in the First Congress, as well as a review of the legislative debates over
delegation in the following decade, shows that the Founders’ practice
reﬂected the political and legal theory on which they drew: Regulatory
delegations were limited only by the will and judgment of the legislature.
This Part does not traffic in hypotheticals. We do not claim that it is
impossible to conceive of a delegation that might have triggered resistance
from a majority of the Founders, or that such resistance could not possibly
have been expressed in a constitutional register. There were a variety of
ideas in circulation from which aggressively inventive lawyers could have
cobbled together nondelegation-style arguments: the abhorrence of
tyranny, fears of concentrated authority, and a concern for the separation
of powers. And it doesn’t take a radical legal realist to recognize that
sufficiently virulent policy objections to a sufficiently awful proposal can
sometimes ﬁnd a legal vessel through which to express themselves.
But that’s not what happened. In actual practice, Congress after
Congress delegated vast powers without even a whiff of constitutional
protest.265 Over the course of the 1790s, some intrepid souls began to raise
nondelegation objections to legislation that they already opposed on
independent grounds.266 But they were not drawing on a well-established
principle with a known pedigree that commanded broad assent. Still less
could they point to a shared conceptual apparatus for distinguishing
permissible from impermissible delegations. To the contrary, their
arguments were scorned as opportunistic efforts to constitutionalize policy
disputes—and they were rejected every time. The nondelegation doctrine
simply was not an accepted feature of the constitutional fabric at the time
of ratiﬁcation. Its adoption long after the Founding was an act of
constitutional creativity.
A.

Delegations by the First Congress

When the First Congress thought particularized guidance important,
it didn’t hesitate to specify statutory requirements in elaborate detail—as
often happened, for example, with customs duties. But when Congress
valued ﬂexibility and discretion, it delegated expansive legislative
authority without even spotting a constitutional issue, much less grappling
265. See infra section III.A.
266. See infra notes 386–403 and accompanying text.
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with some solemn “obligation to decide” whether it was thereby
“unconstitutionally divest[ing] itself of its legislative responsibilities.”267
Indeed, a modern reader could be forgiven for wondering whether
the First Congress went out of its way to violate each of the criteria that the
Gundy dissent claims are deeply embedded in American constitutional
tradition. Delegations in the First Congress authorized both interference
with and outright deprivation of private rights. They vastly exceeded
Justice Gorsuch’s vision of ministerial fact-ﬁnding within the boundaries
of crisply deﬁned legal categories. They consolidated prescriptive and
enforcement authority within sometimes-sprawling bureaucratic apparatuses. They delegated virtually unguided discretion on major policy
questions touching on the most pressing governmental business of the
age.268 And the First Congress did so without betraying a hint of concern
that doing so might violate the Constitution. Taken as a whole, Congress’s
comfort with delegations of all stripes cannot be squared with the Gundy
dissent’s claim that “[t]he framers understood . . . that it would frustrate
‘the system of government ordained by the Constitution’ if Congress could
merely announce vague aspirations and then assign others the
responsibility of adopting legislation to realize its goals.”269
The point isn’t merely that the statutes were enacted. It’s that there
are extensive records, mainly from the House of Representatives and
running to nearly 2,000 pages, of the contentious constitutional disputes
sparked by legislation in the First Congress.270 The Founders were obsessed
with their new charter and fought over it endlessly.271 Some of those
debates explored fundamental questions about Congress’s authority and
the separation of powers, as in the ferocious battles over the First Bank of
the United States and the removal power.272 Other constitutional debates
were picayune, bordering on the bizarre. But they were ubiquitous.
Yet not one of the laws we discuss below prompted even a hint of worry
that something like a constitutional nondelegation doctrine might preclude
267. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2135 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 397–423 and accompanying text.
268. See Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law, supra note 12, at 1256,
1338–40 (“Some of these [Federalist-era] delegations were so broad that one might wonder
whether a twenty-ﬁrst century court would be able to ﬁnd any standards guiding the exercise
of administrative authority.”). In the late 1960s, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis offered a
breezy overview of six delegations in the First Congress. See Kenneth Culp Davis, A New
Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713, 719–20 (1969). But Davis overlooked the
most signiﬁcant delegations and signiﬁcantly understated the quality of the evidence from
the First Congress. See id.
269. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
270. See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 480–585 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (debating the
removal power).
271. See Currie, supra note 82, at 116 (describing how “[c]onstitutional questions
cropped up in the House and Senate every time somebody sneezed” in the First Congress).
272. See infra sections III.B–.C.

334

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:277

congressional action—even though, as Professor David Currie has said, the
First Congress appeared “sincerely concerned not to do anything it was
unauthorized to do.”273 It is this lack of evidence of even a half-hearted
argument—knowing what we know about the constitutionalization of
politics, the uncertain boundaries of even well-accepted legal theories, and
above all else the tetchy pedanticism of many in the Founding
generation—that speaks with such deafening force.
Before turning to the record, a word of clariﬁcation. While many of
the delegations that we discuss empowered federal officials to craft rules
of conduct for private persons—the key concern of the Gundy dissent and
most originalist defenders of the nondelegation doctrine—a few did
not.274 Our discussion ranges more broadly because the Founders’
deﬁnition of legislative power was much broader than Justice Gorsuch’s.275
If a nondelegation doctrine had existed at the Founding, it would have
been plausibly implicated by any law that empowered federal officials to
issue authoritative instructions, regardless of whether those instructions
applied to private persons. Indeed, the ﬁrst nondelegation objections that
eventually did appear were directed at laws that did not allow for
prescriptive rulemaking.276
1. The Police Power in Federal Lands. — Begin with the fact that the First
Congress delegated the entirety of its police power over federal lands to
federal officers and judges. One of Congress’s ﬁrst acts was to “continue”
the Northwest Ordinance, which authorized the territorial governor and
judges to
adopt and publish in the district, such laws of the original States,
criminal and civil, as may be necessary, and best suited to the
circumstances of the district . . . ; which laws shall be in force in
the district until the organization of the general assembly
therein, unless disapproved of by Congress; but afterwards the
[territorial] legislature shall have authority to alter them as they
shall think ﬁt.277
As inherited by the First Congress, the delegation thus conveyed
standardless discretion to craft the entire body of laws for the territories—
including criminal laws, which modern-day originalists tell us raise
especially acute nondelegation concerns.278

273. Currie, supra note 82, at 120.
274. See infra sections III.B–.C.
275. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
276. See infra section III.C.
277. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 50–51 (1789) (emphasis added) (reprinting
the full text of the Northwest Ordinance in the margin). For more on the Northwest
Ordinance and comparable territorial delegations under the Continental Congress, see
supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144–45 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
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The First Congress did make some technical changes to “adapt the
[ordinance] to the present Constitution.”279 But did it impose newly
determinate standards on a delegation that, for adherents of the modern
nondelegation doctrine, should have been anathema to the new
Constitution? Not remotely. Only three statutory adaptations were made.
First, the new statute gave the President appointment and removal
authority over territorial officers previously appointed by the Continental
Congress.280 Second, the statute required the governor to communicate
with the President instead of with Congress.281 Third, the statute
authorized the territorial secretary to perform the governor’s duties in the
event that the latter left office.282 That’s it. So far as the First Congress was
concerned, the Northwest Ordinance’s unbounded delegation of openended police powers presented no other constitutional problems.
These powers were not just granted; they were exercised. In 1795,
Governor Arthur St. Clair and two territorial judges met in Cincinnati and
“organized as a Legislature” to adopt a new suite of laws for the territory,
selected from among the myriad laws on books in other states.283 Published
in what became known as Maxwell’s Code (named for the printer), the
laws were described as having been “Adopted and Made by the Governour
and Judges, in their Legislative Capacity”284—nothing apparently
precluding the exercise of legislative functions by executive and judicial
actors. (In letters, Governor St. Clair referred repeatedly to his and the
judges’ role “[a]s legislators.”)285 The laws they adopted ranged broadly,
from the regulation of taverns to the probate of wills, and from liability for
trespassing animals to the suppression of gambling.286 If a man could be
publicly whipped for violating a law that Congress never enacted, as the
Code provided for petty larceny,287 it’s hard to see what’s left of the

279. Act of Aug. 7, 1789, 1 Stat. at 51.
280. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 53.
281. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 53.
282. Id.
283. See St. Clair, 1795 Address, supra note 139, at 353–62.
284. Laws of the Territory of the United States Northwest of the Ohio, Adopted and
Made by the Governour and Judges, in Their Legislative Capacity (Cincinnati, W. Maxwell
1796) [hereinafter Maxwell’s Code].
285. See, e.g., Letter from Governor St. Clair to Judges Parsons and Varnum (Aug. 7,
1788), in 2 The St. Clair Papers, supra note 139, at 72, 77; see also Letter from Arthur St.
Clair to George Washington (Aug. 1789), available at Nat’l Archives: Founders Online,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-03-02-0339
[https://perma.cc/8GPR-FA7E] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (submitting “Copies of the Laws
that have been adopted and published by him and the Judges, who are constituted
temporary Legislators until the Inhabitants reach to a certain Number”).
286. Maxwell’s Code, supra note 284, at 148 (“A Law concerning the Probate of Wills,
written or nuncupative.”); id. at 157 (“A Law concerning trespassing Animals.”); id. at 206
(“A Law to Suppress Gambling.”).
287. Id. at 41 (“A Law for the trial and punishment of Larceny.”).
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objection that the Founders would never have tolerated delegations of
authority to make important rules governing private rights.
Nor was this broad delegation of lawmaking power an oversight or
one-off. Whenever early Congresses created new territories, they routinely
empowered governors, judges, and territorial legislatures to pass “Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory,” subject to congressional
oversight. They did so for the Southwest Territory (whose government
“shall be similar to that which is now exercised in [the Northwest
Territory]”),288 the Mississippi Territory (“a government in all respects
similar to that now exercised in [the Northwest Territory]”),289 and the
Indiana Territory (“a government in all respects similar to that provided”
in the original law reauthorizing the Northwest Territory).290 And in 1792,
Congress speciﬁcally authorized “the governor and judges” of the
Northwest Territory “to repeal their laws by them made, whensoever the
same may be found to be improper.”291 No one at the time protested the
suggestion that nonlegislative actors “made” laws.
It won’t do for originalists to insist, without support in the Founding
Era materials, that territories “do not exercise . . . the legislative or executive
power of the United States”292 and that the nondelegation doctrine
therefore has no application to territorial delegations. Apart from a
desire to deny the importance of sweeping Founding Era delegations, what
justiﬁes the claim? Congress’s Article IV authority to “make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory” is also legislative—just like
the powers enumerated in Article I.293 And the Article IV territorial
authority is assigned to Congress alone—again, just like
the powers enumerated in Article I.294 If originalists are right that
Congress can’t delegate its Article I authority to “regulate Commerce,” it
should follow that Congress also can’t delegate its Article IV power to
make “needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory.” And
yet, without apparent objection, the re-adopted Northwest Ordinance
delegated that power in its entirety to territorial officials.
Had the Founders collectively believed (or even if they had reasoned
their way to the view) that the nondelegation doctrine had less purchase
when it came to territorial legislation, surely someone, somewhere, would
288. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 14, § 1, 1 Stat. 123, 123 (incorporating by reference the
Act of Apr. 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106, 108, which provided that North Carolina law would
govern “until the same shall be repealed, or otherwise altered by the legislative authority of
the said territory”).
289. Act of Apr. 7, 1798, ch. 28, § 3, 1 Stat. 549, 550.
290. Act of May 7, 1800, ch. 41, § 2, 2 Stat. 58, 59.
291. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 42, § 2, 1 Stat. 285, 286.
292. Wurman, Nondelegation, supra note 16 (manuscript at 56).
293. See U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)).
294. See id. § 3.
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have said as much. To our knowledge, however, no one ever did. Nor will
it do to look to Supreme Court case law that came a century or more after
the Founding to insist that Congress faced fewer restrictions on its
authority to legislate when it came to the territories.295 The Supreme
Court’s conclusion didn’t spring from a careful review of Founding Era
evidence, but from case law developed in the late nineteenth century.296
It’s anachronistic to project those later views onto the Founders.
The practice of delegating broad authority to local legislatures ﬁnds
even more support in the laws that were adopted pursuant to Congress’s
power to “exercise exclusive Legislation [in the capital district] in all Cases
whatsoever.”297 If any provision of the Constitution were to prohibit
delegations of legislative authority, it would be one vesting “exclusive”
power in Congress. Yet the very First Congress delegated to three
commissioners, “under the direction of the President,” the power to
deﬁne the “proper metes and bounds” of the capital district, with little
more guidance than that it had to be put somewhere along a nearly 100mile stretch of the Potomac.298 At that point, “the district so deﬁned,
limited and located, shall be deemed the district accepted by this act, for
the permanent seat of the government of the United States.”299 The
commissioners were also authorized to buy “such quantity of land” east of

295. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142–43, 149 (1904) (holding that
Congress was not constitutionally compelled to set up a system of laws protecting the right
to a trial by jury in the territories); see also Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S.
308, 323 (1937) (“In dealing with the territories . . . Congress in legislating is not subject to
the same restrictions which are imposed in respect of laws for the United States considered
as a political body of States in union.”).
296. Cf. Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 163–250 (2002) (charting the emergence of claims of plenary authority over
the territories).
297. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added).
298. See Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 130, 130. The statute said that the
new district should be located “on the river Potomac, at some place between the mouths of
the Eastern Branch and Connogochegue.” Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 130. The Potomac’s Eastern
Branch is what’s now called the Anacostia River, and Connogochegue Creek splits near
what’s now Williamsport, Maryland. See Map from Connogochegue Creek to Anacostia
River, Google Maps, https://www.google.com/maps/@39.2520119,-77.2665511,10.92z (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Oct. 10, 2020). An earlier version of the
proposal was met with an objection from Representative Tucker: “I have no want of
conﬁdence in the judgment and discretion of the President, or those whom he may employ;
but I never can agree that they shall exercise their judgment or discretion in a business to
which the two branches of the Legislature alone are competent.” 1 Annals of Cong. 879
(1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Tucker). Tucker appears to have been
making a constitutionally inﬂected policy argument, not insisting on a constitutional
impediment to the delegation. In any event, Congress passed the law over his objections.
See id. at 880.
299. Act of July 16, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 130; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 17, 1 Stat.
214, 214 (providing “that it shall be lawful for the President to make any part of” a deﬁned
geographical area “a part of the said district”).
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the Potomac “as the President shall deem proper for the use of the United
States” and to “provide suitable buildings” to accommodate Congress, the
President, and other public offices.300 To pay for all “necessary” expenses
of moving the government to the newly established district, the law
established an indeﬁnite and open-ended appropriation.301 “From the
constitutional viewpoint,” as Currie writes, “the most noteworthy feature
of the legislation was the breadth of its delegation of authority.”302
But Congress didn’t stop there. In 1802, it delegated plenary authority
to the district’s mayor and council over subjects ranging from commerce
to the arts, health policy to private property, nuisance law to the laying and
collecting of taxes,303 and bolstered all that with what amounted to a
municipal Necessary and Proper Clause.304 St. George Tucker, a staunch
Jeffersonian, was bitterly opposed. The next year, he observed that “[i]f
the maxim be sound, that a delegated authority cannot be transferred to
another to exercise, the project here spoken of will probably never take
effect.”305 As events showed, of course, the maxim wasn’t sound. “In point
of fact,” Justice Story later wrote, “the three cities within [the capital
district] possess and exercise a delegated power of legislation under their
charters, granted by Congress, to the full extent of their municipal wants,
without any constitutional scruple, or surmise, or doubt.”306 Speciﬁcation and
detail indeed.
2. Commercial Regulations. — To foster industrial innovation and
cultivate the young nation’s economy, the Constitution gave Congress the

300. Act of July 16, 1790 § 3, 1 Stat. at 130.
301. See Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 53, § 7, 2 Stat. 195, 197 (granting power to “pass all
ordinances necessary to give effect and operation to all the powers vested in the corporation
of the city of Washington”).
302. Currie, supra note 82, at 109.
303. See Act of May 3, 1802 § 7, 2 Stat. at 197. For the initial organization of the district,
see Act of Mar. 3, 1801, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 115, 115–16; Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, 2 Stat. 103,
103–08.
304. See Act of May 3, 1802 § 7, 2 Stat. at 197. In debates over the 1801 legislation,
Representative Nathaniel Macon said, without much conviction, that he “doubted whether
the Legislature of the Union could at all delegate powers to this local government.” 10
Annals of Cong. 1000 (1801) (statement of Rep. Macon). Congress apparently disagreed.
305. 1 St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: With Notes of Reference, to the
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia app. at 277–78 (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham
Small 1803) (describing the plan as “in contemplation to establish a subordinate legislature,
with a governor to preside over the district”). This is the earliest argument resembling the
“potestas delegata non potest delegare” principle that we have found in a governance context,
notwithstanding some originalists’ insistence that it served as a central organizing principle
of eighteenth-century Anglo-American constitutional law. See, e.g., Hamburger, Is
Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 386; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 8, at
114–17; see also supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text. And it was rejected.
306. 2 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, supra note 95, § 1223, at 130–31
(1833) (emphasis added) (noting Tucker’s concern before brushing it aside as both wrong
and idiosyncratic).
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power to “secur[e] for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right
to their . . . Discoveries.”307 The First Congress promptly delegated this
crucial power over the commercial life of the United States—in its
entirety—to the executive branch. In its very ﬁrst patent law, Congress gave
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General (“or
any two of them”) the power to grant patents to new inventions.308 The
only policy guidance—if it can be called that—was that they must “deem
the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important” to warrant
protection for up to fourteen years.309 Congress left the three cabinet
officials at liberty to decide for themselves what counted as “sufficiently
useful and important” to warrant the issuance of a legally enforceable
monopoly, and for how long.310
The executive branch was thus empowered to prescribe, recognize,
and adjust the private rights of both inventors and putative infringers.
Federal officers were given precisely the kind of “blank check to write a
code of conduct governing private conduct” that originalists decry.311 Nor
was writing that code a trivial matter of ﬁlling in details. As Thomas
Jefferson reﬂected some years after serving on the ﬁrst patent board: “I
know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those
which are not,” and “saw with what slow progress a system of general rules
could be matured.”312 Nonetheless, Jefferson said that several rules had in
fact been “established by that board.”313 A patent wouldn’t issue, for
example, for a change in the application of an earlier invention (“a Chainpump for raising water might be used for raising wheat”), or a change of
material (“making a ploughshare of cast rather than of wrought iron”), or
a mere change in form (“a round hat instead of a three square”).314 None
of these rules were in the statute. They were, instead, the creations of a
patent board that crafted general rules in response to a broad
congressional delegation.
307. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
308. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110.
309. Id.
310. Id.; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American Patent
Law, 58 Ariz. L. Rev. 263, 268 (2016) (“The statute provided almost nothing in the way of
substantive or procedural review standards.”); Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and the
Jeffersonian Mythology, 29 J. Marshall L. Rev. 269, 280 (1995) (“The patent board was thus
left almost entirely to its own devices in implementing the Act.”).
311. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
312. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), available at
Nat’l Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/0306-02-0322 [https://perma.cc/NNA4-S248] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020).
313. Id.
314. Id. Among other things, the ﬁrst patent board also had to devise “the appropriate
means of establishing priority of invention between conﬂicting claimants because the Act of
1790 did not provide any guidance.” Walterscheid, supra note 310, at 284. Though the
board could have opted for a ﬁrst-to-ﬁle approach, it declined to do so. Id.
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3. Commerce and Other Interactions with Native Americans. — “Nothing,”
writes Professor Gordon Wood, “preoccupied the Federalist administration
more than having to deal with th[e] native peoples” of the transAppalachian West.315 Committed to the orderly settlement of the
territories, and fearful of provoking an Indian war, members of Congress
generally shared George Washington’s view that
[t]o suffer a wide extended Country to be overrun with Land
jobbers—Speculators, and Monopolizers or even with scatter’d
settlers is . . . inconsistent with that wisdom & policy which our
true interest dictates, or that an enlightned People ought to
adopt; and besides, is pregnant of disputes, both with the Savages,
and among ourselves, the evils of which are easier, to be
conceived than described . . . .316
At the same time, legislators recognized that properly regulated trade
(“without fraud, without extortion”317) could serve as an instrument to
foster good relations with the Indian tribes. Washington had long argued
for a bureaucratic response to this problem of regulatory calibration:
“[N]o person should be suffered to Trade with the Indians without ﬁrst
obtaining a license, and giving security to conform to such rules and
regulations as shall be prescribed; as was the case before the War.”318
The First Congress adopted an aggressive version of Washington’s
1783 proposal, banning not only “trade” but also any kind of “intercourse
with the Indian tribes, without a license” granted by the superintendent of
the territorial department.319 In this, it mimicked the preconstitutional
regime, which required a license not only to “trade with” but also simply
to “reside among . . . any Indian nation within the territory of the United
States.”320

315. Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty 114–23 (2009). For more on the political
centrality of this question in American politics, see generally Reginald Horsman, The
Frontier in the Formative Years (1975); Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians,
Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region (1991).
316. Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), available at Nat’l
Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-0102-11798 [https://perma.cc/3VJV-WVCZ] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
317. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of
Indian Tribes, 82 St. John’s L. Rev. 153, 171 (2008) (quoting Washington’s 1793 address to
Congress).
318. Letter from George Washington to James Duane, supra note 316.
319. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137, 137. In the same law, Congress declared
invalid any sales of Indian land that were not made pursuant to treaty. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 138.
As Professor Matthew Fletcher has explained, Congress thus guaranteed (or tried to,
anyhow) that every parcel of land purchased from the Indians “had to pass through the
federal government’s hands.” Fletcher, supra note 317, at 155.
320. 30 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 426–27 (John C. Fitzpatrick
ed., 1934) (recording “An Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs” (1786))
(creating a bureaucracy headed by “superintendants” vested with authorities ranging from
administering residence permits to managing stores and gifts).
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Regulations issued by the executive branch would “govern[]” any
person receiving such a license “in all things touching the said trade and
intercourse.”321 Yet the law said nothing—not one word—about the
content of these rules, regulations, or waivers, much less anything
approximating what Justice Gorsuch called “‘sufficiently deﬁnite and
precise’ standards ‘to enable Congress, the courts, and the public to
ascertain’ whether Congress’s guidance has been followed.”322 Instead, the
law instructed the President to build a framework from scratch, in his
complete discretion: Licensees would be “governed . . . by such rules and
regulations as the President shall prescribe.”323 The statute even authorized the
President to waive the licensing requirement entirely for Indian tribes
“surrounded in their settlements by the citizens of the United States,” with
no requirement other than that he “deem it proper.”324
President Washington had no compunction about exercising these
newly granted powers over private conduct. In 1790, he issued rules
creating “two departments” for regulating the Indian trade, the southern
department of which explicitly contained areas “within the limits of the U.
States.”325 Among other things, the rules said that only U.S. citizens could
be licensed; that the departmental superintendents may “assign the limits
within which each trader shall trade”; and that only goods “necessary for
the comfort & convenience of the Indians”—not “Distilled Spirits”—could
be sold directly in Indian towns and villages.326
The President’s regulations thus speciﬁed who could trade what and
where, including within the borders of the United States.327 These were
rules that Congress chose not to fashion itself—indeed, it declined even
to hint at what their content ought to be. Yet there is no evidence in the
historical record that anyone at any point raised anything resembling a
nondelegation objection to the arrangement.
Hamburger dismisses the licensing regime for Indian trade for the
curious reason that “persons, such as Indian traders, were not entirely
subject to domestic law.”328 But it’s a tautology that a nation’s laws do not
apply to someone not subject to those laws. As to the citizens and aliens to
321. Act of July 22, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 137.
322. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 464 (1944)).
323. Act of July 22, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 137 (emphasis added); see also Act of Mar. 1,
1793, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat. 329, 329 (amending the law but retaining the delegation).
324. Act of July 22, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 137.
325. Letter from George Washington to Henry Knox (Aug. 13, 1790), available at Nat’l
Archives: Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-0602-0119 [https://perma.cc/B6XT-UND2] (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (reprinting Timothy
Pickering’s copy of regulations issued pursuant to the delegation).
326. Id.
327. See Act of July 22, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 137; see also Act of Mar. 1, 1793 § 1, 1 Stat. at
329.
328. Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 105.
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whom the law did apply—the law said that “no person shall be permitted to
carry on any trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes, without a
license”329—the President was authorized to create binding rules for
private conduct. Hamburger seems to have in mind an exception to the
nondelegation doctrine for “cross-border or offshore problems.”330 But
many Indian tribes were located within the established borders of the
United States, and trade with them was banned too.331 To our knowledge,
no one in the Founding Era ever suggested that legislative power could be
delegated more freely in the borderlands. It’s a post hoc rationale offered
by modern-day originalists to explain away contrary evidence, not a
historically grounded distinction.
4. Social Welfare and Entitlement Beneﬁts. — In the late eighteenth
century, the most politically salient beneﬁts programs targeted members
of the army. For those currently in service, Congress authorized the
President to identify any of his soldiers who were “wounded or disabled
while in the line of his duty in public service,” and put them on “the list of
the invalids of the United States, at such rate of pay, and under such
regulations as shall be directed by the President of the United States, for
the time being.”332 Apart from placing upper limits on the size of awards,
however, Congress offered no guidance of any kind. Nothing about how
to decide eligibility; nothing about how the amount should be calculated;
nothing about how it should be paid out; nothing about how its availability
should be assessed; nothing about how to work out competing claims to a
limited source of funds.333 The delegation was especially noteworthy given
that it was typically legislative assemblies—not the executive branch—that
took responsibility for deciding who should be placed on the pension
lists.334
For veterans wounded in the Revolutionary War, the First Congress
created an even more elaborate structure of delegated authority,
329. Act of July 22, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 137 (emphasis added).
330. See Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 105. Gary
Lawson dismisses the delegation on similar grounds: that “the ‘executive Power’ [may]
ha[ve] a sufficiently broad sweep in the area of foreign affairs . . . to permit Congress to give
the President more discretion in this context than in others.” Lawson, supra note 3, at 401–
02. As one of us has explained elsewhere, however, the Founders did not in fact believe that
the “executive Power” had an intrinsically “broad sweep in the area of foreign affairs.”
Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1173–74; Mortenson, Executive Power
Clause, supra note 14, at 1367.
331. Take the Iroquois in New York, for example. See Alan Taylor, The Divided Ground
118 (2006) (reporting that about 6,000 Iroquois lived in New York in 1784).
332. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 119, 121.
333. Id.
334. See Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The
Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 La. L. Rev. 625, 637
(1985) (“[A]t the time of the establishment of the Constitution, the ‘legislative model’ of
claims determination was a ﬁrmly established part of the American political tradition at both
the state and national levels.”).
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grounded in a pension scheme originally created by the Continental
Congress.335 Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the preconstitutional
legislature had promised pensions of half-pay for life to soldiers who lost a
limb or were “otherwise so disabled as to prevent their serving in the army
or navy, or getting their livelihood.”336 Those with lesser injuries were
offered pensions “as shall be judged adequate” by those to whom this
authority was delegated.337 The cash-strapped Continental Congress,
however, couldn’t ﬁnance or oversee those pensions itself, and exhorted
the states to do so.338 Though the rules governing pensions were adjusted
several times prior to ratiﬁcation,339 the assignment of control to the
states—and more speciﬁcally to their legislatures—remained in place.
“Consequently,” as one commentator has noted wryly, “the continental
pension provision was just as effective as the individual states chose to
make it, and in many instances they performed the administrative duties
assigned to them very imperfectly.”340
The First Congress assumed responsibility for payments in arrears
and, at the same time, vested responsibility for administering the pension
regime in the President.341 In so doing, Congress speciﬁed only that
pensions “shall be continued and paid by the United States . . . under such
regulations as the President of the United States may direct.”342 No
guidance was offered as to how the President might discharge his
responsibilities, what principles might animate his “regulations,” what
restrictions might compromise the “continuation” of existing principles,
or what policy priorities should come foremost in the implementation of
the scheme.
The First Congress did retain the authority to add claimants to the
pension lists.343 But it was so besieged with petitions from wounded soldiers

335. See 5 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 702–04 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) (recording the August 1776 pension scheme (1776)) [hereinafter
August 1776 Pension Scheme].
336. Id.; see also 12 Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789, at 953–54
(Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1908) (recording the 1778 extensions of the August 1776
pension beneﬁts (1778)).
337. August 1776 Pension Scheme, supra note 335, at 703.
338. Id. at 704 (recommending that “the several states . . . cause payment to be made . . .
on account of the United States”).
339. See William H. Glasson, Federal Military Pensions in the United States 21–23
(David Kinley ed., 1918).
340. Id. at 21.
341. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95, 95.
342. Id. The First Congress renewed the delegation two more times before the end of
the term. See Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 218, 218; Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 27, 1 Stat.
129, 129–30.
343. See Glasson, supra note 339, at 54 (“Congress for a long time reserved to itself
direct control over the ﬁnal allowance of claims.”).
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that the Second Congress enlisted the courts to resolve contested claims.344
Judicial decisions about these claims were subject to review by the
Secretary of War, who was empowered “in any case, where the said
Secretary shall have cause to suspect imposition or mistake,” to omit a
claimant from the pension lists.345 The federal courts immediately
objected on the ground that the scheme was unconstitutional—but not
because it delegated policymaking discretion to judges or to the Secretary
of War.346 The only problem they saw was the putative unconstitutionality
of allowing an executive officer to second-guess a judicial decision.347 The
Supreme Court avoided resolving the question in Hayburn’s Case,348 after
which Congress amended the law to limit the courts’ involvement to taking
evidence, which they apparently believed was compatible with the judicial
role.349 It’s telling that at no point in this tangled history did anyone raise
a nondelegation objection to vesting such uncabined discretionary
authority in the executive branch.
5. Finance and Budget. — The parlous state of national ﬁnances had
for years been one of the young nation’s most pressing problems. The First
Congress recognized that both “justice and the support of public credit”
required payment of the foreign debt, now in arrears, that the United
States had accumulated during the war.350 They enabled that payment by
delegating enormous discretionary authority to the executive branch.351
For starters, Congress empowered the President to borrow up to $12
million to pay off the foreign debt, with the choice of prioritization among
lenders left entirely up to him.352 Perhaps even more signiﬁcant, the
President was further authorized “to cause to be made such other
contracts respecting the said debt as shall be found for the interest of the
[United] States.”353 In other words, the President was delegated the
authority to restructure the country’s foreign debt on terms that he
thought best, with parties he thought best, under conditions he thought
best. Apart from setting a ﬁfteen-year cap on the length of repayment of
any restructured loan, Congress offered no standards to guide the exercise
of the President’s discretion: which debts to pay ﬁrst, whether the
344. Charles E. Schamel, Mary Rephlo, Rodney Ross, David Kepley, Robert W. Coren &
James Gregory Bradsher, Guide to the Records of the United States House of
Representatives at the National Archives, 1789–1989: Bicentennial Edition, 6.16–.17, 6.20,
at 77–78 (Donnald K. Anderson ed., 1995).
345. Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, § 4, 1 Stat. 243, 244.
346. Currie, supra note 82, at 155.
347. Id. at 156.
348. See 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792) (avoiding the question on the ground that a
judicial decision subject to executive or legislative revision would be an improper advisory
opinion).
349. See Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, §§ 1–2, 1 Stat. 324, 324–25.
350. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 34, 1 Stat. 138, 138.
351. Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 139.
352. Id.
353. Id.
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President should prefer repayment to restructuring, or what sorts of terms
were acceptable.354
Comparable delegations pervaded other early ﬁnancial measures,
including a program aimed to use revenue newly raised from duties on
imports and tonnage to purchase the United States’ domestic debt back
from the public.355 To that end, Congress directed
[t]hat the purchases to be made of the said debt, shall be made
under the direction of the President of the Senate, the Chief
Justice, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and
the Attorney General for the time being; and who, or any three
of whom, with the approbation of the President of the United
States, shall cause the said purchases to be made in such manner,
and under such regulations as shall appear to them best calculated to
fulﬁll the intent of this act: Provided, That the same be made openly,
and with due regard to the equal beneﬁt of the several
states . . . .356
In other words, the entire responsibility for the First Congress’s plan to
reduce the public debt was vested in a ﬁve-member commission that was
given no meaningful guidance on what debt to retire ﬁrst, how to allocate
payments among the several states, or anything else.
These provisions did not simply delegate authority. They did so with
the power of the purse, perhaps the subject most tightly bound up with
legislative power. Nor did they relate to some trivial bookkeeping concern
or otherwise ﬁt within some exception for “authoriz[ing] another branch
to ‘ﬁll up the details.’”357 With an eye to repairing the tottering ﬁnances of
the new Republic, they instead instructed the executive branch to set
national ﬁscal policy as it saw best.358
6. Tax Assessment and Enforcement. — In several contexts, Congress
authorized line-level executive officers to invade people’s property without
a warrant and with little or no direction as to the circumstances under
which those invasions would be justiﬁed. The exercise of policymaking
discretion was thus passed to dispersed officers and their superiors within
the nascent bureaucracy.
In the maritime context, for example, port-of-entry collectors were
authorized to put inspectors on arriving ships “to examine the cargo or
contents” and “to perform such other duties according to law, as they shall
be directed by the said collector . . . to perform for the better securing the

354. See id.
355. See Act of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, § 1, 1 Stat. 186, 186.
356. Id. (emphasis altered).
357. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
358. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790 § 2, 1 Stat. at 139. For more on the lack of speciﬁcity in
early appropriations bills—and how their “very brief and not very speciﬁc” terms functioned
in practice as systematic delegations—see Chafetz, supra note 134, at 58–59.
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collection of the duties.”359 Another law authorized collectors to seize
evidence and open packages when they were “suspicious of fraud”360 and
to search ships when they had “cause to suspect a concealment.”361 Other
provisions gave the officers of revenue cutters “power and authority to go
on board of every ship or vessel which shall arrive within the United States,
or within four leagues of the coast thereof . . . and to search and examine
the same and every part thereof.”362 In none of these statutes did Congress
lay down any meaningful guidance about the circumstances in which ships
ought to be searched or the type of evidence that ought to make collectors
think that fraud or smuggling was afoot, leaving that determination to its
agents.363
Congress delegated comparably broad discretion when it instructed
federal tax supervisors to appoint officers to inspect local distilleries.364
The inspection officers, whom the President was to pay “as he shall deem
reasonable and proper,” had broad authority:
[I]t shall be lawful for the officers of inspection of each survey at
all times in the daytime, upon request, to enter into all and every
the houses, store-houses, ware-houses, buildings, and places . . .
and by tasting, gauging or otherwise, to take an account of the
quantity, kinds and proofs of the said spirits therein contained;
and also to take samples thereof, paying for the same the usual
price.365
Once again, Congress said nothing about the circumstances under
which inspection officers ought to exercise their discretion to taste
or sample the wares. That rankled the law’s opponents.366 “The law,” one
argued, “will let loose a swarm of harpies, who, under the denomination of
revenue officers, will range through the country, prying into every
man’s house and affairs, and like a Macedonian phalanx bear down all
before them.”367
Despite this opposition, Congress delegated vast policymaking authority
to the executive branch to regulate private conduct. The delegation’s
359. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 30, 1 Stat. 145, 164 (repealed 1799); see also Act of
July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 15, 1 Stat. 29, 40 (repealed 1790).
360. Act of July 31, 1789 § 22, 1 Stat. at 42.
361. Id. § 24, 1 Stat. at 43.
362. Act of Aug. 4, 1790 § 64, 1 Stat. at 175. The same statute delegated authority to the
President to purchase as many revenue cutters as he thought “necessary to be employed for
the protection of the revenue,” up to a maximum of ten. Id. § 62, 1 Stat. at 175.
363. See id. Searches and seizures weren’t the only discretionary responsibilities vested
in line officers. Congress, for example, speciﬁed that tea importers had to secure permits
certifying either that they had paid duties upon the teas or that they had had paid a bond
“to the satisfaction of the [customs] inspector.” Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 26, § 1, 1 Stat. 219,
219–20.
364. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, §§ 16, 18, 1 Stat. 199, 203.
365. Id. §§ 29, 58, 1 Stat. at 206, 213.
366. See 2 Annals of Cong. 1844 (1791).
367. Id. (statement of Rep. Parker).
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breadth would be blindingly apparent if Congress had, for example,
empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to craft formal rules governing
the circumstances under which private property could be searched and
seized. Functionally, however, Congress’s delegation of open-ended
authority to thousands of collectors and inspectors was a decentralized
delegation of exactly the same power.368 Recognizing as much, Congress
devised means to rationalize these individual choices. By statute, the
Secretary of the Treasury could “mitigate or remit” any penalties or
forfeitures associated with import duties or liquor taxes, “if in his opinion”
(or “if it shall appear to him”) the penalty or forfeiture did not arise from
willful negligence or fraud.369 In what should by now be a familiar pattern,
Congress offered no guidance on what factors should inform the Secretary’s
exercise of that judgment. As Professor Kevin Arylck has recently explored,
Secretary Hamilton and his successors freely exercised their “broad” and
“unreviewable” discretion under the law to grant remittance “in over ninety
percent of cases presented to them.”370
7. Citizenship. — For a nation ﬁlled with recent arrivals, few issues were
more central to its political identity than the question of citizenship. So it
is remarkable that the First Congress exercised its constitutional authority
to “establish an uniform rule of naturalization” with an expansive delegation.371 Under a 1790 statute, Congress gave to “any common law court
of record” the authority to grant U.S. citizenship to any free white persons
who had lived in the country for two years after “making proof to the
satisfaction of such court, that he is a person of good character.”372 The
provision was apparently added at the suggestion of Representative James
Jackson of Georgia:
I conceive, sir, that an amendment of this kind would be
reasonable and proper; all the difficulty will be to determine how
a proper certiﬁcate of good behavior should be obtained; I think
it might be done by vesting the power in the grand jury or district courts
to determine ou[t] the character of the man, as they should ﬁnd it.373
Delegating to the courts marked a shift from the colonial era practice in
which state legislatures were primarily responsible for naturalizing aliens.374
Congress, however, didn’t lay out what factors ought to matter in deciding

368. See Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services 13 (2d ed. 2010) (“[W]hen taken in concert, [street-level bureaucrats’] individual
actions add up to agency behavior.”).
369. Act of Mar. 3, 1791 § 43, 1 Stat. at 209 (concerning the tax on spirits); Act of May
26, 1790, ch. 12, § 1, 1 Stat. 122, 123 (concerning import duties).
370. Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, 1452 (2019).
371. U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cl. 4; Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103–04
(repealed 1795).
372. Act of Mar. 26, 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. at 103.
373. 1 Annals of Cong. 1114 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Jackson) (emphasis added).
374. See id. at 1120 (statement of Rep. Huntington).

348

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:277

whether an alien was of “good character.”375 That was left up to the
courts.376 Not once during the recorded (and extensive) debates over the
ﬁrst naturalization law did any member of Congress so much as intimate
that this vague delegation of naturalization authority might be
unconstitutional.
8. Powers Arguably Within Another Branch’s Constitutional “Space.” — For
the most part, we have not included in our discussion laws that contain
delegations that plausibly sit in what Justice Gorsuch calls an “overlap[]”
between “Congress’s legislative authority” and “authority the Constitution
separately vests in another branch.”377 But two laws in that category, both
of which delegated wide discretionary authority without meaningful
legislative guidance, bear mentioning.
In an “Act for Regulating the Military Establishment of the United
States,” Congress authorized the mustering and organization of soldiers
for the purpose of “protecting the inhabitants of the frontiers of the
United States.”378 Among other things, the law gave the President the
power “to call into service from time to time such part of the militia of the
states respectively, as he may judge necessary for th[at] purpose.”379 In other
words, Congress authorized President Washington to call up any state
militias he so pleased, at any time he so pleased, in any numbers he so
pleased, to wherever on the frontier he so pleased, with no more guidance
than the vague instruction to guard frontiersman from Indians.
The First Judiciary Act conveyed even more sweeping rulemaking
discretion, vesting authority in “all the . . . courts of the United States” to
“make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting [of]
business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the
laws of the United States.”380 Yet again, Congress said nothing about the
content of those rules.
Professor Lawson has dismissed the signiﬁcance of this delegation on
the ground that the courts may have inherent authority under Article III

375. One representative objected to the proposal on the ground that it would “add an
inquisition . . . . Indeed, sir, I fear, if we go on as is proposed now, in the infancy of our
Republic, we shall, in time, require a test of faith and politics, of every person who shall
come into these States.” Id. at 1114–15 (statement of Rep. Page).
376. See Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Naturalization and Expatriation, 31 Yale L.J. 702, 707
(1922) (reading the naturalization statute to require courts to “ascertain, through
examination of witnesses acquainted with the applicant, whether he was a ﬁt person to
receive the privilege of American citizenship”).
377. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
378. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 16, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (repealed 1795).
379. Id. (emphasis added). The First Congress used nearly identical language in an
earlier law that aimed to “recognize and adapt to the Constitution of the United States the
establishment of the Troops raised under” the Confederation Congress. Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95, 95 (repealed 1790).
380. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.
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of the Constitution to adopt procedural rules.381 But that’s by no means an
obvious inference—it’s at least as plausible that Congress’s greater power
to create the lower federal courts should include the lesser power to deﬁne
the rules and procedures by which those courts would proceed.382 At any
rate, it’s telling that Congress felt the need to explicitly delegate the power
to make rules, yet felt no obligation to be speciﬁc about what those rules
should be.
*

*

*

In less than two years, the First Congress adopted law after law
delegating policymaking discretion without offering meaningful guidance
on how that discretion was to be exercised. These laws touched on some
of the most sensitive and contentious questions in the early Republic:
territorial administration, the patent system, Indian affairs, foreign and
domestic debt, naturalization, customs duties, military service, and the
federal courts. They conveyed authority over private rights and interests that went far beyond ﬁlling up details, ﬁnding facts, or organizing
public structures. None of these delegations, taken alone, can prove a
negative. But their sheer accumulated weight makes it difficult—indeed,
impossible—to credit modern claims that the Founders were committed
to the nondelegation doctrine, let alone fundamentally so. We are
unaware of any evidence that any member of the First Congress objected
to any of the laws we have discussed on the ground that Congress
had unconstitutionally surrendered its legislative power. The silence is
deafening.
B.

The Post Roads Debate

Even if delegation raised no constitutional concerns, early Congresses
did sometimes debate the wisdom of vesting broad authority in the executive
branch. And objections to excessive delegations—however provisional,
defeasible, and supervised those delegations were—sometimes drew on
contemporary political theory’s standard policy prescription that the
powers of government should not be excessively consolidated. Indeed,
something like that concern may have animated James Madison’s failed
effort to amend the Constitution to provide that the executive “shall never
exercise . . . the power vested in the Legislative.”383 Given the still-pervasive
381. See Lawson, supra note 3, at 396–99 (“The statute would only be relevant to the
nondelegation doctrine if it was so obvious that courts have no independent power to set
procedural rules that the Judiciary Act must be understood as reﬂecting a view about
Congress’s ability to delegate legislative powers.”).
382. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
383. 1 Annals of Cong. 436 (1789) (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison). In a later debate, Madison proposed: “The powers delegated by this
Constitution . . . shall be exercised as therein appropriated, so that the Legislative shall not
exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial; nor the Executive the power vested
in the Legislative or Judicial; nor the Judicial the powers vested in the Legislative or
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tendency for political disagreements to express themselves in constitutional terms, it should come as no surprise that some policy objections
eventually began to be framed—tentatively at ﬁrst—as constitutional
violations.384 Indeed, as Currie has noted, it is during the Second Congress
that “increasingly one has the sense that many [legislators] were tailoring
their [constitutional] arguments to their conclusions.”385
The ﬁrst semiserious nondelegation objection in the early Republic
came during the Second Congress’s debate over the nation’s post roads.386
Modern originalists have looked to the post-roads debate as evidence—
indeed, their best evidence—for the principle that the nondelegation
doctrine existed at the Founding.387 But to call the post-roads debate a thin
reed would be a vast overstatement. It is no reed at all.
In December 1791, the House of Representatives opened debate on a
bill to establish the United States postal system.388 At the time, the question
of which towns would be connected to the postal network had enormous
commercial, political, and social signiﬁcance.389 Members of Congress,
especially those with business interests of their own, were keenly interested
in ensuring that the roads ran along their preferred routes. As was natural
for a bill that attracted considerable political interest, it speciﬁed in

Executive.” Id. at 760. Representative Samuel Livermore thought the clause “subversive of
the Constitution” and “hoped it might be disagreed to.” Id. at 760–61 (statement of Rep.
Livermore). Though the House adopted the language, the Senate did not. Id. at 761.
384. For a recent account tracing this dynamic in the early Republic, see generally
Gienapp, supra note 82.
385. Currie, supra note 82, at 171.
386. 3 Annals of Cong. 239–41 (1791). Two months earlier, Representative Livermore
had objected to creating a Committee of Contested Elections on the ground that the House,
and not just a part of it, “should be the judges of contested elections of their own
members . . . . Such a transfer of power . . . would be as unconstitutional as to delegate a
Legislative authority.” Id. at 144–45 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). Over his lone protest, a
committee was immediately appointed. Id.
387. See, e.g., Joseph Postell, Bureaucracy in America: The Administrative State’s
Challenge to Constitutional Government 75 (2017); Wurman, Nondelegation, supra note
16 (manuscript at 17–23).
388. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 232, 232. Two earlier laws had provided for
“the temporary establishment of the Post-Office,” but they were due to lapse. See Act of
Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 23, § 1, 1 Stat. 218, 218; Act of Sept. 22, 1789, ch. 16, § 2, 1 Stat. 70, 70.
389. In his 1791 address to Congress, George Washington made the stakes plain:
The importance of the Post Office and Post Roads, on a plan sufficiently
liberal and comprehensive, as they respect the expedition, safety, and
facility of communication, is increased by their instrumentality in
diffusing a knowledge of the laws and proceedings of the Government;
which, while it contributes to the security of the people, serves also to
guard them against the effects of misrepresentation and misconception.
3 Annals of Cong. 15 (1791) (statement of President Washington); see also Lawson, supra
note 3, at 403 (“Postal routes were the eighteenth-century equivalent of water projects.”).
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painstaking detail the ﬁfty-three towns through which the post roads would
run.390
Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts, however, was
dissatisﬁed with that level of speciﬁcation: “The members of the House
could not be supposed to possess every information that might be requisite
on this subject, and their opinions were liable to be biassed by local
interests.”391 He offered a ﬂexible alternative: Instead of Congress laying
out the roads, the mail should be carried “by such route as the President
of the United States shall, from time to time, cause to be established.”392
A lengthy debate ensued, and Sedgwick’s proposal was eventually
defeated.393 There was no single theme to the diverse and uncoordinated
opposition. Among the six delegates who voiced concerns in the recorded
debates, most maintained that neither the President nor “any one man”
could be expected to know as well as House members where the roads
ought to be placed.394 Far from limiting partiality, Sedgwick’s proposed
delegation would afford the President “a dangerous power of establishing
offices and roads in those places only where his interest would be promoted, and removing others of long standing, in order to harass those he
might suppose inimical to his ambitious views.”395 Two of the objectors
expressed reservations about giving the President broad authority over a
postal system that might either become a ﬁnancial drain (if the roads were
extended haphazardly) or a substantial source of revenue (as was the case
in England).396
Among the opponents, at most three members of the House—and
probably only two397—raised a constitutional objection to delegating
390. Act of Feb. 20, 1792 § 1, 1 Stat. at 233 (“[F]rom Springﬁeld, by Northampton,
Brattleborough, and Charlestown, by Windsor in Vermont, to Hanover, and from Hartford,
by Middletown, to New London . . . .”).
391. 3 Annals of Cong. 229 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
392. Id.
393. Id. at 241.
394. Id. at 235 (statement of Rep. Vining) (“[T]he members [of the House] were as
fully competent to judge of the matter as any one man could be . . . .”); id. at 233 (statement
of Rep. White) (“No individual could possess an equal share of information with th[e]
House on the subject of the geography of the United States.”); id. at 231 (statement of Rep.
Hartley) (“If it were left to the President or Postmaster General, neither is acquainted with
all the roads contemplated; they must depend in great measure on the information of
others.”).
395. Id. at 235 (statement of Rep. Vining).
396. See id. at 229–30 (statement of Rep. Livermore); id. at 231–32 (statement of Rep.
Hartley).
397. The objections of the third member, Representative Livermore, seem best
understood as a criticism of the policy rather than as a hard constitutional objection. See id.
at 229–30 (statement of Rep. Livermore) (observing in passing that Congress “could [not]
with propriety delegate that power, which they were themselves appointed to exercise”
(emphasis added)). The same goes for Representatives Hartley and White. See id. at 231
(statement of Rep. Hartley) (recording the complaint that “[t]he Constitution seems to have
intended that we should exercise all the powers respecting the establishing post roads we are
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Congress’s Article I authority “[t]o establish Post Offices and post
Roads.”398 Representative John Page “look[ed] upon the motion as
unconstitutional, and if it were not so, as having a mischievous
tendency.”399 James Madison agreed, maintaining “that there did not
appear to be any necessity for alienating the powers of the House; and that
if this should take place, it would be a violation of the Constitution.”400
Some modern commentators have cited Madison’s and Page’s arguments,
together with the defeat of Sedgwick’s motion, as decisive evidence of a
Founding Era nondelegation commitment that was both broadly shared
and fundamental.401 Close attention to the debate, however, reveals that
the opposite was true.
Certainly Sedgwick and his supporters were “astonished” at the
constitutional objections, which seemed to them obvious makeweights.402
Channeling the standard view that the scope of delegation was a question
left to ordinary politics, Representative Benjamin Bourne responded that
“[t]he Constitution meant no more than that Congress should possess the
exclusive right of doing that, by themselves or by any other person, which
amounts to the same thing.”403 For his part, Sedgwick snarked that
Congress was “also empowered to coin money, and if no part of their
power be delegable, he did not know but they might be obliged to turn
coiners, and work in the Mint themselves. Nay, they must even act the part
of executioners, in punishing piracies committed on the high seas.”404
capable of . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 233 (statement of Rep. White) (calling the
delegation an “advance[] towards monarchy”). The Second Congress’s post roads debate
was anticipated by brief skirmishes over a similar amendment in the First Congress. See 2
Annals of Cong. 1677 (1790) (statement of Reps. Bloodworth, White, Steele, Livermore,
Hartley, and Gerry) (recording the claim that the amendment “is unconstitutional, as that
expressly reserves the power of establishing Post Offices and post roads to the Legislature”);
id. (statement of Reps. Partridge and Sedgwick) (responding that “the bill proposes no
more . . . than is provided for in the other Executive Departments”).
398. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
399. 3 Annals of Cong. 233–34 (1791) (statement of Rep. Page).
400. Id. at 238–39 (statement of Rep. Madison) (conceding the difficulty of
“determin[ing] with precision the exact boundaries of the Legislative and Executive
powers,” but suggesting that delegating the power to establish post roads “will lead to
blending those powers so as to leave no line of separation whatever”).
401. See Postell, supra note 387, at 75; Gordon, supra note 11, at 746 (arguing that the
post roads debate “undoubtedly weigh[s] in favor of the proposition[] that Congress could
not delegate legislative power”); Ilan Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, 96 Tex. L. Rev.
975, 992–93 (2018) [hereinafter Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation] (arguing that
“Congress’s deliberation appears to have liquidated the question whether the power to
establish post roads can be delegated”).
402. See 3 Annals of Cong. 235 (1791) (statement of Rep. Barnwell); id. at 239
(statement of Rep. Sedgwick). Professor Wurman is therefore mistaken when he reads the
House debates as indicating that speakers were “nearly” unanimous about the
unconstitutionality of the delegation. See Wurman, As-Applied Nondelegation, supra note
401, at 992.
403. 3 Annals of Cong. 232 (1791) (statement of Rep. Bourne) (emphasis added).
404. Id. at 230–31 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).

2021]

DELEGATION AT THE FOUNDING

353

For at least three reasons, it’s clear that Madison’s and Page’s
arguments did not reﬂect a majority view among those present and voting,
much less a constitutional consensus. First, the statute that Congress
actually adopted did confer wide discretionary authority to site post roads,
even though Sedgwick’s particular amendment was defeated.405 At the
time Madison made his objection, the bill that Sedgwick was seeking to
amend already gave the Postmaster General authority “to establish such
other roads as post roads, as to him may seem necessary.”406 Sedgwick
pointed out the anomaly:
As to the constitutionality of this delegation, it was admitted by
the committee themselves who brought in the bill; for if the
power was altogether indelegable, no part of it could be
delegated; and if a part of it could, he saw no reason why the
whole could not. The second section [with the delegation to the
Postmaster General] was as unconstitutional as the ﬁrst . . . .407
Evidently caught short by Sedgwick’s point, Representative Samuel
Livermore lamely suggested that the latter clause could “be amended
when we come to it.”408
Yet there never was any amendment—or rather, not one that
addressed the nondelegation objection. The ﬁnal version of the law gave
the Postmaster General unfettered discretion to “designate[]” additional
roads that “shall . . . be deemed and considered as post roads” by entering
into contracts to “extend[] the line of posts.”409 Far from demonstrating
the force of Madison’s constitutional objection, the statute as enacted
expressly conferred the open-ended authority that Madison had claimed
was unconstitutional during debate.410
Second, the law that Congress adopted conveyed a similar power to
site post offices.411 That is irreconcilable with the logic of the nondelegation
argument: If the constitutional objection was that only Congress could
“establish Post Offices and post Roads,” that objection should have applied

405. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, §§ 2, 3, 1 Stat. 232, 233–34.
406. 3 Annals of Cong. 230 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting the bill).
407. Id.
408. Id. at 237 (statement of Rep. Livermore) (accusing Sedgwick of taking “an
uncandid advantage of the liberality of the committee in leaving the appointment of the
deputy postmasters and branching offices to the Postmaster General”).
409. Act of Feb. 20, 1792 § 2, 1 Stat. at 233 (granting authority “to enter into contracts,
for a term not exceeding eight years, for extending the line of posts . . . ; and the roads,
therein designated, shall, during the continuance of such contract, be deemed and
considered as post roads”).
410. Allowing for eight-year contracts for post roads was arguably even more expansive
than the original version of the bill, which terminated after two years. Act of Feb. 20, 1792
§ 30, 1 Stat. at 239; see also Currie, supra note 82, at 149 n.131 (noting the change but
dismissing it because “[i]t is not clear why it mattered”).
411. Act of Feb. 20, 1792 § 3, 1 Stat. at 234.
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with equal force to offices as to roads.412 As Representative Egbert Benson
pointed out, “it is said that the Legislature alone is competent to establish
post offices and post roads; notwithstanding this, there is not a single post
office designated by the bill.”413 Still, no one objected to allowing the
Postmaster General to create post offices. Instead, the bill left those
decisions to the executive branch, conferring authority on the Postmaster
General “to appoint . . . deputy postmasters, at all places where such shall
be found necessary,” and directing “[t]hat every deputy postmaster shall
keep an office.”414 Benson’s observation went without a recorded
response,415 and when Congress passed the law, the delegated authority to
designate post offices remained with the Postmaster General.416
Third, the nondelegation objections were inconsistent with the terms
of the excise tax on distilled spirits—the Whiskey Tax—that had been
enacted the previous year.417 Though Congress initially established
fourteen tax districts, they were “subject to alterations by the President of
the United States, from time to time, by adding to the smaller such
portions of the greater as shall in his judgment best tend to secure and
facilitate the collection of the revenue.”418 As two critics of Madison’s
constitutional claim observed, the constitutionality of that delegation
provided a clear precedent for one governing post roads.419 Madison tried
to wave off the point by saying that the excise tax “cannot be considered

412. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
413. 3 Annals of Cong. 236 (1791) (statement of Rep. Benson).
414. Act of Feb. 20, 1792 §§ 3, 7, 1 Stat. at 234.
415. Madison offered what might at ﬁrst glance be taken as a rebuttal of Benson’s
concerns: “[T]he President is invested with the power of ﬁlling those offices; but does it
follow that we are to delegate to him the power to create them?” 3 Annals of Cong. 238
(1791) (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison was not referring to physical post offices,
however, but instead to the statutory offices of deputy postmasters. And he was responding
to a different claim that the House might “infring[e] on the powers of the Executive” if it
effectively told the President where his deputy postmasters must go. Id. Not so, argued
Madison: Congress had previously thought it appropriate not only to create executive offices
but even to specify the officers who would ﬁll them. If that was so, why would congressional
speciﬁcity be more objectionable “in respect to the post office and post roads, more than in
all other cases?” Id. At any rate, if Madison did mean to object to delegating to the
Postmaster General the authority to establish post offices, he lost that argument when the
enacted law did just that. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792 §§ 3, 7, 1 Stat. at 234.
416. Act of Feb. 20, 1792 §§ 3, 7, 1 Stat. at 234 (granting the Postmaster General
authority to appoint deputy postmasters and directing “[t]hat every deputy postmaster shall
keep an office”).
417. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 199, 199; see also supra section III.A.6.
418. Act of Mar. 3, 1791 § 4, 1 Stat. at 200.
419. 3 Annals of Cong. 232 (1791) (statement of Rep. Bourne) (“[T]he House . . .
empowered the president to mark out the districts and surveys; and if they had a right to
delegate such power to the Executive, the further delegation of the power of marking out
the roads for the conveyance of the mail, could hardly be thought dangerous.”); id. at 240
(statement of Rep. Sedgwick) (making the same point).
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as a parallel case; no similar exigency exists to justify a similar
delegation.”420 Sedgwick was baffled by the distinction:
[A] supposed necessity could not justify the infraction of a
Constitution which the members were under every obligation of
duty, and their oaths, solemnly pledged, to support. Gentlemen
should be very cautious how, on slight grounds, they assent to
principles, which, if they were true, would evince that the
Government had scattered through the whole country, officers
who are daily seizing on the property of the citizens, by the
assumption of unconstitutional powers.421
In short, it couldn’t be further from the truth that Madison’s poor
constitutional arguments reﬂected “an affirmation of the nondelegation
principle by both Federalists and Republicans.”422 To the contrary, they
were condemned for their lack of support in constitutional text and
legislative practice. And again, Congress as a whole decisively rejected
them when it passed a law authorizing the Postmaster General to establish
post offices as he saw ﬁt, to extend the post roads as he saw ﬁt, and to
“basically . . . do whatever was necessary to deliver the mail.”423
A controversial, self-interested, and losing argument grounded in a
speciﬁc grant of congressional power (“To establish Post Offices and post
Roads”424) cannot even arguably serve as the basis for a modern
nondelegation doctrine grounded in Article I, Section 1. Even if it could,
the particular formulation of the nondelegation doctrine pressed in the
post roads debate would call into question not only those laws empowering
the executive branch to adopt rules regulating private conduct, but also
those that “ma[d]e the application of [a given] rule depend on executive
fact-ﬁnding”—a category that the Gundy dissent425 and many originalists426
aver has always been permissible. Madison’s nondelegation argument,
were it accepted, would constitute a far more radical version of the
nondelegation doctrine than the one contemplated by most originalists
today.
At most, the post roads debate shows that, when it served their
political aims, several members of the House of Representatives in 1791
could mobilize constitutional rhetoric about the dangers of delegating too
much power. As Sedgwick observed, “[t]he powers of the Constitution, he
was sorry to say, were made in debate to extend or contract, as seemed, for
the time being, to suit the convenience of the arguments of gentlemen.”427
Nothing about the debate suggests that the Founders agreed that such
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

Id. at 238 (statement of Rep. Madison).
Id. at 239 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
Postell, supra note 387, at 75.
Currie, supra note 82, at 149.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2136 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, supra note 9, at 4.
3 Annals of Cong. 239–41 (1791) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
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limits existed, and there certainly was no consensus—even a rough one—
about what those limits were. The constitutional opportunism of a few
politicians does not a doctrine make.
C.

The Pattern in Later Congresses

While space here permits only a sketch, the pattern established in the
First Congress continued through the 1790s. When it seemed appropriate
to do so, Congress delegated wide authority to the executive branch,
typically without pausing to consider any questions of constitutional
character. We offer three key examples.
First, in 1794, a Congress fearful of British hostilities passed a law
authorizing President Washington to lay an embargo “on all ships and
vessels in the ports of the United States” whenever, “in his opinion, the
public safety shall so require” and Congress was out of session.428 As with
prior statutes, the authorization to impose an embargo and specify any
“such regulations as the circumstances of the case may require” was
completely open-ended: It didn’t specify the target, the trigger circumstances, any substantive limitations, any procedural safeguards, or even a
particular purpose.429 It’s an especially clear example of a delegation affording the President the power to issue binding rules for private persons.
The embargo act’s conferral of plenary authority over outbound
voyages was in fact a carefully considered policy choice. As the bill’s
supporters argued, the delays of lawmaking and the difficulty of keeping
a secret in “a body as numerous as the Legislature” meant that deciding whether and how to impose an embargo was “better performed” by
the President than by the legislature.430 Otherwise, they pointed out,
“every ship” would leave port at the ﬁrst hint that an embargo was under
discussion.431 Apparently persuaded, Congress gave the President the
unilateral and essentially unfettered authority to keep every ship in the
nation at dock at whim: “On great occasions, confidence must be reposed
in the Executive.”432 No constitutional objection was recorded to the
delegation.433
Second, Congress in 1796 debated the bill that became the nation’s
ﬁrst quarantine law.434 The ﬁrst paragraph of the initial draft delegated
wide power to the President to craft rules that infringed on private liberty:
[T]he President of the United States be, and is hereby,
authorized to direct at what place or station in the vicinity of the
428. Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372, 372 (“An Act to authorize the President of
the United States to lay, regulate and revoke Embargoes.”).
429. See id.
430. 4 Annals of Cong. 503 (1794) (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. See id. at 731–35 (debating and passing the bill).
434. See Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474, 474 (repealed 1799).
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respective ports of entry within the United States, and for what
duration and particular periods of time, vessels arriving from
foreign ports and places may be directed to perform
quarantine.435
Debate over the constitutionality of this provision grew heated. Did it
regulate foreign commerce and thus come within Congress’s enumerated
powers? Its defenders thought so: Quarantine was “of the nature of a
commercial regulation, to which, by the Constitution, Congress alone
were competent.”436 States might otherwise exploit their quarantine laws
to undercut the federal government’s power to regulate trade with foreign
nations.437 The provision’s opponents, however, insisted that a quarantine
law was an internal health regulation of the sort that the Constitution
reserved to the states.438 They feared that an expansive reading of the
commerce clause “would swallow up all the authority of the State
Governments.”439
Yet again, at no point during the tense debate did any member object
that the law impermissibly delegated too much power to the President.440
This silence can’t be dismissed on the ground that the nondelegation
doctrine applies with less force to foreign affairs: The entire premise of
the opponents’ objection was that the quarantine law did not entail the
regulation of foreign commerce.441 If the nondelegation doctrine was a
well-understood feature of the original constitutional understanding, the
law’s opponents could have—and surely would have—invoked it alongside
their other constitutional objections. Yet they said nothing about it.
435. 5 Annals of Cong. 1349 (1796).
436. Id. at 1350 (statement of Rep. Bourne).
437. See id. at 1357–58.
438. See id. at 1353 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“[T]he regulation of quarantine had
nothing to do with commerce. It was a regulation of internal police.”).
439. Id. at 1358 (statement of Rep. Brent).
440. To the contrary, three members of the House—Representatives Brent, Williams,
and Swanwick—were at pains to clarify that their opposition to the ﬁrst paragraph did not
arise because they were “unreasonably jealous of the power of the Executive. Surely, to
prevent the landing of diseased persons or infected goods, could not have any relation to a
jealousy of that power.” Id. at 1356 (statement of Rep. Swanwick); see also id. at 1352
(statement of Rep. Williams) (averring the same); id. at 1358 (statement of Rep. Brent)
(joining the sentiment).
A few members voiced policy objections to the delegation. Representative Giles wanted
the states to regulate quarantine, “[B]ut if it were the business of the General Government,
it was Legislative and not Executive business.” Id. at 1351 (statement of Rep. Giles).
Representative Page said that he would “wish to vote against the bill itself, as it was an
attempt to extend the power of the Executive unnecessarily.” Id. at 1357 (statement of Rep.
Page). And Representative Heister feared that “if the power [of quarantine] was to be
transferred from the President to the Collectors at each port, (and that he conceived must
be the case,) it would put a vast deal too much power into their hands.” Id. at 1348
(statement of Rep. Heister). But no member raised a constitutional objection.
441. See, e.g., id. at 1359 (statement of Rep. Brent) (arguing that if the broad
construction of the commerce power “was carried to its extent” to encompass quarantine,
“there would be no bounds to it”).
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Eventually, the House of Representatives voted to strike the offending
clause, leaving only the second paragraph of the original bill in place.442
But that paragraph also contained an expansive delegation, albeit one
more sensitive to state power: The President was authorized “to aid in the
execution of quarantine, and also in the execution of the health laws of
the states, respectively, in such manner as may to him appear necessary.”443 The
amended bill was signed into law later that month, still without a hint of
delegation-related objections.444
Third, as Professor Nicholas Parrillo has recently and meticulously
documented, Congress in 1798 adopted a direct tax on real estate to
ﬁnance possible war with France.445 Because such a tax had to be
apportioned among the states relative to their populations, Congress
created a cadre of many thousands of federal officers to estimate the value
of virtually all property in the country.446 To assure that local valuations
were not out of line with valuations elsewhere in the state, Congress also
created a board of federal tax commissioners to adjust the valuations “as
shall appear to be just and equitable.”447 The commissioners’ decisions
were ﬁnal and not subject to judicial review, even though they directly
affected how much individual Americans would owe in federal taxes.448 As
Parrillo notes, “the 1798 direct tax provides a clear founding-era example
of congressional delegation of rulemaking authority in a context that was
both coercive and domestic—the taxation of real estate.”449 Yet the direct
tax, like most sweeping delegations in the Founding Era, occasioned no
nondelegation objections in any recorded debate.450
Even as the thoroughly permissive approach to legislative delegations
continued apace, a few people—James Madison among them—began to
raise occasional objections to particular delegations. Sometimes, they even
couched these objections in a constitutional register. Every time, however,
their arguments were rejected.

442. Id. at 1359.
443. Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474, 474 (repealed 1799) (emphasis added); see
also 5 Annals of Cong. 1354 (1796) (statement of Rep. Kittera) (mentioning that, in the
“second” section of the law, “officers of the United States are commanded to aid in the
execution of the State laws”).
444. Act of May 27, 1796, 1 Stat. 474.
445. Nicholas R. Parrillo, A Critical Assessment of the Originalist Case Against
Administrative Regulatory Power: New Evidence from the Federal Tax on Private Real Estate
in the 1790s, 131 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 22–26), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3696860 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
446. See id. (manuscript at 29–32).
447. Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 70, § 22, 1 Stat. 580, 589.
448. Parrillo, supra note 445 (manuscript at 89–90).
449. Id. (manuscript at 12).
450. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 98) (noting that despite the strong political incentive
to do so, even “Jefferson himself made no constitutional objections to the delegations to the
federal boards”).
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In 1792, for example, in response to a request from President
Washington for an arrangement to redeem the public debt,451 Congress
debated a resolution directing the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
Hamilton, “to report a plan for that purpose.”452 Implacably opposed to
Hamilton’s ﬁnancial plans, Madison objected even to this mild delegation
of an advisory authority:
He insisted that a reference to the Secretary of the Treasury on
subjects of loans, taxes, and provision for loans, etc, was, in fact,
a delegation of the authority of the Legislature, although it would
admit of much sophistical argument to the contrary . . . . [I]t was
evident the Secretary’s plans were not introduced in such
manner as to leave the House the freedom of exercising their
own understandings in a proper constitutional manner.453
Madison wasn’t actually objecting here to the delegation of legislative
power simpliciter. As the broader context of the debate indicates, he was
focused on the House of Representatives’ constitutional duty to originate
any revenue-raising bill.454 (Hence Madison’s reference to the “manner”
in which the report was “introduced.”) How a report would have had that
effect isn’t clear, and it certainly perplexed Madison’s opponents.455 In any
event, the objection failed to carry the day: A motion to strike the
offending language was voted down, 32-25.456
Nondelegation objections surfaced with more intensity in two debates
in the late 1790s. As tensions with France rose in the wake of the XYZ
Affair, Congress passed a string of laws delegating broad powers to the
President.457 As Currie explains:
The President was empowered to build whatever fortiﬁcations
the public safety might require, to build more ships if he found
451. See President George Washington, State of the Union Address (Nov. 6, 1792),
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washs04.asp [https://perma.cc/TYM4-UKBM]
(exhorting Congress “to enter upon a systematic and effectual arrangement for the regular
redemption and discharge of the public debt”).
452. 3 Annals of Cong. 711 (1792).
453. Id. at 722 (statement of Rep. Madison); see also id. at 712 (statement of Rep.
Findley) (“[I]t is of the nature of Executive power to be transferrable to subordinate
officers; but Legislative authority is incommunicable, and cannot be transferred.”); cf.
Alexander Hamilton, Paciﬁcus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of
Alexander Hamilton, supra note 133, at 33, 42 (“The Legislature is free to perform its own
duties according to its own sense of them—though the Executive in the exercise of its
constitutional powers, may establish an antecedent state of things which ought to weigh in
the legislative decisions.”).
454. See 3 Annals of Cong. 712 (1792) (statement of Rep. Findley) (“To give the ﬁrst
form to revenue plans is a peculiar trust reposed in this House that we cannot transfer even
to the Senate; and if that body were to propose a plan to us, we could not accept of it.”).
455. See id. at 717 (statement of Rep. Ames) (“[W]ill it be seriously affirmed that,
according to the spirit and natural meaning of the Constitution, the Report of the Secretary
will be a revenue bill, or any other bill, and that this proposition is originating such a bill?”).
456. Id. at 722.
457. Currie, supra note 82, at 244–45.

360

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 121:277

them necessary to protect the United States, to discontinue the
statutory ban on intercourse with France if it ceased to violate our
neutrality, to make rules for the training of volunteer companies,
and even to authorize the capture of French warships, which
looked suspiciously like a delegation of the power to determine
whether or not to go to war.458
The bill that occasioned the sharpest and most extensive
constitutional debate would have empowered the President to raise a
provisional army of up to 20,000 troops “whenever he shall judge the
public safety shall require the measure.”459 The Senate, apparently
untroubled, had already passed the bill, but Republican members in the
House objected on the ground that it would license the President to raise
a standing army.460 Representative Albert Gallatin of Pennsylvania took the
lead in arguing that the law was ill-advised: Why go to the risk and expense
of raising a standing army when state militias offered adequate protection
in the unlikely event of an invasion?461 “He must confess he looked upon
all that was said of an invasion by France as a mere bugbear.”462
Gallatin and his colleagues joined a constitutional claim to their
policy objection: “He believed the principle of the bill to be improper . . .
because it vested Legislative power in the President of the United
States.”463 Every legislator who voiced agreement with Gallatin’s argument
also objected to the law on policy grounds.464 Gallatin continued: “If the
principle upon which this bill is founded, were to be established, our
Constitution would become a mere blank; it would be to transform our
Government into a Monarchy, or, if gentlemen like the expression better,
into a despotic Government.”465
As in the debate over post roads, the law’s supporters were baffled by
the constitutional move: “[U]pon the principles of the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Congress must turn tax-gatherers, borrowers of money or
money brokers, apprehenders of coiners, and recruiting sergeants . . . .
[Mr. Gallatin’s] construction, therefore, proves too much, and is perfectly

458. Id.
459. 8 Annals of Cong. 1631–32 (1798) (internal quotation marks omitted).
460. See id. at 1631–32 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
461. Id. at 1632–34.
462. Id. at 1633.
463. Id. at 1538.
464. See, e.g., id. at 1526 (statement of Rep. Nicholas) (“If an army was necessary, the
Legislature ought to raise it . . . .”); id. at 1532 (statement of Rep. Baldwin) (arguing that if
the House was not convinced it needed to raise an army at the time, then “the law ought
not to pass” because “[t]he Constitution made the Legislature the sole judge on this
subject” and “he thought it a very improper transfer of Legislative power”).
465. Id. at 1539 (statement of Rep. Gallatin). In addition to Gallatin, ten members of
the House raised constitutional objections to the supposed transfer of legislative power. See,
e.g., id. at 1644 (statement of Rep. McDowell) (“He believed the power of determining the
ﬁt time to raise an army was vested in Congress, and could not be transferred.”).
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ridiculous.”466 Channeling the conventional view, Representative Lewis
Sewall said that “[i]n a variety of cases, Congress did not exercise their
Constitutional powers themselves; they were frequently obliged to
authorize the President to act for them.”467 Representative Thomas
Pinckney, meanwhile, offered a version of the anti-alienation principle in
contrast: “If this power [to raise an army] was generally transferred to the
President, he might at all times raise an army, without the consent of
Congress; but it would not be said that this would be the case, if this bill
should pass.”468
Supporters also pointed to precedent,469 including a 1791 law giving
the President the authority to raise 2,000 soldiers for protection of the
frontier “if the President should be of opinion, that it will be conducive to
the public service”470 and a 1794 law authorizing the President to call up
2,500 soldiers “if, in the judgment of the President, the same shall be
deemed necessary to suppress unlawful combinations.”471 As Pinckney put
it, “where a thing has frequently been done in one way, and no objections
raised to that course, it was reasonable to suppose that course was not
unconstitutional.”472
Representative Nicholas, along with other objectors, acknowledged
that “some” of the precedents “were in point,” but that “he was not for
being bound by precedent.”473 The law’s supporters snorted: “[W]ill the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Gallatin] come forward, as if he were the
oracle of political wisdom, the only high-priest of the Constitution, and
say, that these authorities have no weight? In doing this he set at naught

466. Id. at 1637 (statement of Rep. Dana).
467. Id. at 1635 (statement of Rep. Sewall); see also id. at 1530 (statement of Rep.
Harper) (“He had no hesitation in saying . . . that the House might determine upon a tax,
and authorize the collecting of it, only in case the President should ﬁnd it necessary, or in
case a certain event should take . . . place”).
468. Id. at 1660 (statement of Rep. Pinckney).
469. Id. at 1534 (statement of Rep. Rutledge) (“Mr. R. adduced, as in point, the law
enabling the President to call out troops in consequence of the Western insurrection, and
that making provision for the effectual protection of the frontiers of the United States.”);
see also id. at 1535 (statement of Rep. Craik).
470. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 28, § 8, 1 Stat. 222, 223 (repealed 1795).
471. Act of Nov. 29, 1794, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 403, 403. A few months earlier, Representative
James Madison had objected on something like nondelegation grounds to a bill allowing
the President to raise troops: “He thought that it was a wise principle in the Constitution, to
make one branch of Government raise an army, and another conduct it.” 4 Annals of
Congress 738 (1794) (statement of Rep. Madison). Though that bill went down to defeat,
the later 1794 law suggests Congress as a whole did not share Madison’s view. See Act of
Nov. 29, 1794 § 1, 1 Stat. at 403.
472. 8 Annals of Cong. 1660 (1798) (statement of Rep. Pinckney).
473. Id. at 1541 (statement of Rep. Nicholas); see also id. at 1638 (statement of Rep.
Brent) (“[T]hose precedents had no influence upon him. If the acts referred to were
unconstitutional, they still remain so. Error will continue to be error however frequently it is
repeated.”).
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the wisdom of all who had preceded him.”474 Speaker of the House
Jonathan Dayton twisted the knife:
As to the unconstitutionality of the principle contained in this
ﬁrst section, as had been objected by its opponents, it was truly
remarkable for the novelty of the discovery, which was now, for
the ﬁrst time, made by the enlightened members of the 5th
Congress, although not a session had passed since 1791, in which
the same had not been acted upon and sanctioned. Mr. D[ayton]
said, he recollected perfectly well that, six years ago, in the session
of 1792, the section which contains this very principle, in its
broadest latitude, was drawn up and moved by a very respectable
member from the State of Virginia; one, indeed, of the most
respectable of those who had ever occupied a seat in that House,
and who was a member of the Federal Convention, (Mr.
Madison.) That gentleman had done him the favor to show him
the proposition before it was moved, and to ask if he would give
it his support, which it received, not only from himself, but from
the whole House. It thus became incorporated with the act
passed in that year, and that, too, without the least suggestion
from any member of its being unconstitutional, either then or at
any time since, although it had been renewed in many of their
laws.475
It is worth dwelling on this for a moment, and not just for the irony of
conscripting Madison as an opponent of the nondelegation doctrine. As
we have shown, Dayton exaggerated only a little in mocking the doctrine
as a “discovery” made “for the ﬁrst time . . . by the enlightened members
of the 5th Congress.”476 Even Gallatin recognized that prior congresses
hadn’t felt much compunction about delegating. On the 1792 law that
Dayton referred to, for example, Gallatin only offered the wan retort that
“it proved that [Congress] had heretofore done wrong, and that they
ought to be more careful in [the] future.”477 Dayton had thus drawn blood
in implying that Gallatin manufactured a constitutional objection to
bolster his opposition to the law. The very novelty of the nondelegation
objection is yet another piece of evidence that the doctrine was not a
widely shared premise of the original constitutional understanding.

474. Id. at 1637 (statement of Rep. Dana).
475. Id. at 1679 (statement of Rep. Dayton). Dayton was referring to a 1792 law
providing for “three additional regiments” to protect the frontier. See Act of Mar. 5, 1792,
ch. 9, § 12, 1 Stat. 241, 243 (repealed 1795). The law said that it was “lawful for the President
of the United States, to forbear to raise, or to discharge, after they shall be raised, the whole or any
part of the said three additional regiments, in case events shall in his judgment, render his
doing so consistent with the public safety.” Id. (emphasis added). Dayton’s point was that there’s
no constitutionally signiﬁcant difference between vesting in the President the open-ended
discretion to forbear from raising a speciﬁed number of troops and vesting in the President
the open-ended discretion to raise a speciﬁed number of troops.
476. 8 Annals of Cong. 1678 (1798) (statement of Rep. Dayton).
477. Id. at 1538–39 (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
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Gallatin’s argument undercuts originalist claims in two additional
ways. First, drawing on Hamburger’s work, Justice Gorsuch claims that the
nondelegation principle applies only to “the power to adopt generally
applicable rules of conduct governing future actions by private persons.”478
But Gallatin wouldn’t have agreed with that characterization. We know
that because the law governing the provisional army did not involve
any delegation of prescriptive authority; it called for volunteers, not
conscripts.479 Justice Gorsuch and modern commentators frequently aver
that broad delegations are acceptable if “the discretion is to be exercised
over matters already within the scope of executive power”480—a proviso
meant to explain away early delegations relating to foreign affairs, national
security, and the military.481 Again, however, Gallatin argued the opposite—
that nondelegation fears should be at their apex when it came to raising a
standing army under the President’s control.482 Whatever constitutional
doctrine Gallatin was attempting to create, it wasn’t the one that Justice
Gorsuch and many originalist commentators envision today.
In any event, the House of Representatives rejected Gallatin’s
objections and passed the law by a vote of ﬁfty-one to forty.483 The bill
was narrowed before its passage, but only slightly. The troop level was
capped at 10,000 and the President’s authority was limited to a declared
war, an actual invasion, or “imminent danger of such invasion discovered
in his opinion to exist.”484 Gallatin understood that the “in his opinion”
478. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
479. See Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, §§ 1, 3, 1 Stat. 558, 558 (repealed 1802).
480. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine, supra note 71, at 1260); see also Rappaport, supra note 42, at 271
(building an originalist argument for a nondelegation doctrine that “does not apply to
various matters, including foreign and military affairs”).
481. As one of us has explained, the Founders didn’t actually think “the executive
power” had anything to do with these speciﬁc subject matters as such—or any other ones,
for that matter. See Mortenson, Royal Prerogative, supra note 14, at 1235–42 (“[T]he
subordinacy of ‘executive power’ was one of its constitutive features: Without some preexisting
intention or instruction, that power is an empty vessel that has nothing to execute.”).
482. See, e.g., 8 Annals of Cong. 1655–56 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin). Gallatin
argued:
[O]ne of the most important powers that could be vested in Congress, viz:
the power of raising an army, is, by this bill, proposed to be transferred
from Congress to the President. This he considered as a dangerous
principle, and if once admitted, it would be in the power of Congress to
destroy the Constitution.
Id.; see also id. at 1673 (statement of Rep. Brent ) (“He said a certain evil; for however other
gentlemen may consider them, he considered standing armies as the bane of the liberty and
happiness of every country where they are established.”); id. at 1653 (statement of Rep.
Claiborne) (“We need only to look at the nations of Europe to see that the loading of one
Executive with power has frequently enabled his successor, at some future day, to enslave
the people.”).
483. See id. at 1772.
484. Act of May 28, 1798 § 1, 1 Stat. at 558. The President’s authority was also conﬁned
to the congressional recess. Id.
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language afforded the President wide discretion with only the haziest of
guidance: The revised statute, he said, “is liable to the same Constitutional
objection to which the original bill was liable, as it left it to the opinion of
the President to decide the proper time of raising an army.”485 But a
majority of Gallatin’s colleagues in the Fifth Congress was unpersuaded.
A second nondelegation debate arose out of the same panic over a
possible French invasion. In 1798, the Virginia legislature adopted a
resolution, drafted by Madison, objecting to the constitutionality of the
federal Alien and Sedition Acts, which had just been signed into law.486
The following year, Madison, who had by then joined the Virginia
legislature, was moved to prepare a lengthy defense of the Virginia
Resolution in what came to be called the Report of 1800.487
Madison’s report—which attracted little notice at the time—dwelled
on the appropriateness of interposing state objections to the laws, on the
absence of any constitutional power authorizing the Acts’ adoption, and
on the need to protect a free press.488 In a brief passage, Madison also
raised what looks like a nondelegation claim:

485. See 8 Annals of Cong. 1632 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin). The ﬁnal language
recalled a law adopted by the Second Congress empowering the President to call forth the
militia where necessary “to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel
invasions.” Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264, 264 (repealed 1795). As that earlier law
worked its way through Congress, a few members objected to various drafts “as vesting a
dangerous power in the Supreme Executive; that circumstances did not render the
delegation necessary.” 3 Annals of Cong. 553 (1792) (statement of Rep. Gerry); see also id.
at 576–77 (statement of Rep. Baldwin); id. at 574 (statement of Rep. Livermore); id. at 554
(statement of Rep. Murray). The objections were sometimes couched in constitutional
terms: One member, for example, “adverted to the Constitution to show that it was not
contemplated thereby that this power [to call forth the militia] should be slightly delegated
to the Executive.” Id. at 576 (statement of Rep. Baldwin). But no one is reported as pressing
a hard-edged nondelegation argument along Gallatin’s lines.
In 1827, the Supreme Court, per Justice Story, dismissed any constitutional objections
to a slightly revised 1795 version of the 1792 militia law:
In our opinion there is no ground for a doubt [that the law is within
Congress’s constitutional authority,] . . . for the power to provide for
repelling invasions includes the power to provide against the attempt and
danger of invasion, as the necessary and proper means to effectuate the
object . . . . The power thus conﬁded by Congress to the President, is,
doubtless, of a very high and delicate nature . . . . But it is not a power
which can be executed without a correspondent responsibility.
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 29 (1827).
486. James Madison, Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 21, 1798), available at Nat’l Archives:
Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0128 [https://
perma.cc/AAE7-9GHU] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
487. James Madison, The Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), available at Nat’l Archives:
Founders Online, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-17-02-0202 [https://
perma.cc/GB2M-CPWB] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
488. Id.; see also id. (editor’s note) (noting that Madison’s Report “was little commented
upon outside of Virginia, and even there it seems to have had limited impact”).
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However difficult it may be to mark, in every case, with clearness
and certainty, the line which divides legislative power, from the
other departments of power; all will agree, that the powers
referred to these departments may be so general and undeﬁned,
as to be of a legislative, not of an executive or judicial nature; and
may for that reason be unconstitutional. Details, to a certain
degree, are essential to the nature and character of a law; and,
on criminal subjects, it is proper, that details should leave as little
as possible to the discretion of those who are to apply and to
execute the law.489
The Alien and Sedition Acts violated that principle, Madison warned, by
conferring broad authority on the President to deport “all such aliens as
he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States.”490
The terms “leave every thing to the President,” Madison argued. “His will
is the law.”491
Contrary to the assumption of some commentators,492 Madison’s
nondelegation challenge to the Alien and Sedition Acts was unusual to the
point of idiosyncrasy. At least one pamphlet rebutting his claim seems to
have understood this piece of his argument as sounding in prudential
policy concerns rather than as a traditional claim of legal restriction.493
More to the point, the legislative debate over the constitutionality of the
Alien and Sedition Acts raged in Congress for days—but not over delegation.
Debate instead focused on which if any of Congress’s enumerated powers
(the General Welfare Clause? the Commerce Clause? the War Power? the
Necessary and Proper Clause?) could support the laws.494 Legislators also
clashed over whether a constitutional restriction designed to protect the
slave trade495 prohibited Congress from authorizing the expulsion of
aliens.496
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation
of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1806 (2012) (misreading Madison’s position as characteristic
of the Founding Era).
493. See Alexander Addison, Analysis of the Report of the Committee of the Virginia
Assembly (1800), reprinted in 1 American Political Writing, supra note 116, at 1055, 1068
(“I shall not spend time in discussing conjectures like these; but will just observe that any
prerogative, given by the legislature to the executive, may be restrained, or reclaimed by the
power which gave it, and the legislature will always be under the control of the
people . . . .”). Addison also observed that Madison had been in the minority on related
arguments for more than a decade. Id. at 1061 (“[T]he censure of the report[’s] [discussion
of the fourth resolution] looks rather like a pettish adherence to an obstinate prejudice
than a sound opinion of a constitutional point.”).
494. See 8 Annals of Cong. 1785–96 (1798) (regarding alien enemies); id. at 1954–71
(seditious practices); id. at 1973–2029 (alien enemies again).
495. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (banning regulation of the “Migration or Importation
of such Persons as any of the States . . . shall think proper to admit” until 1808).
496. See, e.g., 8 Annals of Cong. 1957 (1798) (statement of Rep. Gallatin).
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Opponents of the Alien and Sedition Acts, including Gallatin, didn’t
raise nondelegation objections even when they lingered over the dangers
of vesting sweeping authority to the president and begged for greater
speciﬁcity in the legislative text.497 Over the entire course of the extensive
debate, only two House members—Robert Williams and Edward
Livingston—voiced anything that bore a resemblance to a nondelegation
argument.498 And that argument failed: Congress adopted the Alien and
Sedition Acts, replete with their sweeping delegations of authority.499 The
laws may have been awful, but they were not unconstitutional delegations.
CONCLUSION
The original public meaning of the Constitution did not include
anything like the modern nondelegation doctrine. Contemporary political
theorists recognized the propriety of legislative delegations and were
comfortable describing their exercise as an act of executive power.500 Some
eighteenth-century writers may have been committed to an anti-alienation
principle, arguing that the legislature could not irrevocably transfer or
renounce its ultimate authority to chart the nation’s course. But any such
prohibition on the everlasting transfer of legislative power is worlds apart
from the nondelegation doctrine espoused by modern-day originalists.
Practice followed theory. Though early Congresses often issued
instructions in painstaking detail, they also delegated in sweeping terms.
These delegations were not ancillary or of secondary importance. They
were vital to the establishment of a new country—to shore up its ﬁnances,
to regulate its industry, to govern its nonstate territories, to secure its
revenue, and to guard against internal and external threats. Contrary
to the claims of many originalists, many of these delegations conveyed
the authority to issue binding rules of conduct for private persons.
As legislative disputes arose and partisan lines hardened over the 1790s,
opponents of this policy or that began to make what sounded like
nondelegation arguments in a constitutional register. But those arguments

497. See, e.g., id. at 1980 (statement of Rep. Gallatin) (“He wished all crimes and
punishments to be accurately deﬁned; and he hoped gentlemen who profess to be warm
supporters of this Government and Constitution, will not say that it is not in our power to
reach the object.”).
498. See id. at 1963 (statement of Rep. Williams) (“Besides, it is inconsistent with the
provisions of our Constitution, and our modes of jurisprudence, to transfer power in this
manner . . . .”); id. at 2007–08 (statement of Rep. Livingston) (“[D]o[es] not [the bill]
confound these fundamental powers of Government, vest them all in the more unqualiﬁed
terms in one hand, and thus subvert the basis on which our liberties rest . . . . This, then,
comes completely within the deﬁnition of despotism—an union of Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial powers.”).
499. See Currie, supra note 82, at 255 (“What to do with [aliens from a hostile nation]
was up to the President; there were virtually no limits to this remarkable delegation of
authority.”).
500. See supra section II.B.
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were never central to the debates, were rarely taken seriously, and bore no
resemblance to the nondelegation arguments pressed by most originalists
today. In any event, they were always rejected.
If you’re committed to the nondelegation doctrine, you may be
tempted to tell a complicated story about how the delegations in the early
Republic reﬂect particular exceptions to a general rule of nondelegation.
So maybe there was an exception for post offices. An exception for
post roads, at least when they connected to roads previously specified by
Congress. An exception for commercial interactions with noncitizens.
An exception for noncommercial relationships with noncitizens. An
exception for federal benefits. An exception for debt restructuring.
An exception for loan repayment. An exception for quarantines. An
exception for embargoes. An exception for import duties. An exception for
taxes on liquor and real property. An exception for territorial governance.
An exception for the District of Columbia. An exception for intellectual
property. An exception for search-and-seizure policy. An exception for
immigration and naturalization. An exception for all ships and vessels. An
exception for raising a standing army.
But if you have to stack all these epicycles to defend your theory, at
some point you’ve got to admit it’s the theory that’s mistaken. There is a
simpler explanation that incorporates the historical record rather than
ﬁghting it at every step. The Founders were concerned about consolidated
power, so they dispersed it and created explicit textual mechanisms to
protect that dispersal. The rest was left to the political process. There was
no nondelegation doctrine at the Founding, and the question isn’t close.
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